President and CEO Dwi Soetjipto was forced to vacate his position, along with his Deputy President and Deputy CEO Ahmad Bambang. When announced last week, rumours circulated that the two were part of a cull linked to corruption – sadly not uncommon in Indonesia – but the truth is more sanguine. The two simply did not get along, and their disagreements were detrimental to a state oil behemoth struggling to implement the government’s ambitious energy goals.
Soetjipto was named to Pertamina’s top job in November 2014 by President Joko Widodo. Coming from another state player – cement firm Semen Indonesia where he had successfully merged three smaller ailing state firms into a renewed force – Soetjipto was criticised for his lack of experience in oil and gas, but seen as a emblem of Widodo’s will to reform the energy sector by reducing subsidies, eliminating corruption and kickstarting a moribund industry. Perhaps as a counterbalance, Ahmad Bambang was named Deputy CEO in October 2016 by State-Owned Entreprises Minister Rini Soemarno, a mere three months ago. Bambang was a career Pertamina man, seen as more in line with the existing state oil and gas bureaucratic machinery than Soetjipto.
Both immediately began to butt heads. Bambang overstepped his position by signing off on gasoline imports that were being put off by Soetjipto, a breach of authority. The two also disagreed on key position appointments, leaving important roles like the president director of Pertamina Gas unfilled. Corporate disagreements are not uncommon, but the situation between Soetjipto and Bambang was getting toxic, leading up to their dismissals by the Pertamina board of commissioners and the Ministry of State-owned Entreprises.
The spat comes at a difficult time for Pertamina, struggling to manage upstream production while hitting dead-ends on raising domestic refining capacity. Pertamina’s crude production is declining – forcing it out of OPEC for a second time last November as it could not implement supply cuts - but wants to nearly triple its upstream output by 2025, focusing on jumpstarting domestic fields and hunting for overseas assets. Meanwhile, growing fuel demand is leading to a reliance on expensive exports, as Pertamina’s grand plan to upgrade/build new refineries has stalled. Some progress had been made under Soetjipto, but just last month, Saudi Aramco pulled out of the Dumai project, while Pertamina admitted it may have to undertake the Balongan upgrade alone.
Pertamina’s board is hoping that a new management structure will help speed up things. Yenni Andayani, director for gas and renewable energy, has been named as acting CEO, while the government searches for a new leader by early March. The position of Deputy CEO will be abolished, centralising power in the new CEO, and a streamlining of the company’s 20 existing strategic positions may be implemented. Which raises the question: if the issue was the clash of personalities, why fire both? Soetjipto was a Widodo appointee, so removing him and promoting Bambang would have seemed like an usurpation, but retaining Soetjipto and removing Bambang was not an option as the state energy machinery still viewed the former as an outsider. So both heads had to fall.
This recent development will certainly colour the search for a new CEO, almost certainly to be an executive already rooted within Pertamina. But uneasy lies the head that wears the crown, and the new CEO will step into a some very large boots because the challenges facing Pertamina are vast.
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It has been 21 years since Japanese upstream firm Inpex signed on to explore the Masela block in Indonesia in 1998 and 19 years since the discovery of the giant Abadi natural gas field in 2000. In that time, Inpex’s Ichthys field in Australia was discovered, exploited and started LNG production last year, delivering its first commercial cargo just a few months ago. Meanwhile, the abundant gas in the Abadi field close to the Australia-Indonesia border has remained under the waves. Until recently, that is, when Inpex had finally reached a new deal with the Indonesian government to revive the stalled project and move ahead with a development plan.
This could have come much earlier. Much, much earlier. Inpex had submitted its first development plan for Abadi in 2010, encompassing a Floating LNG project with an initial capacity of 2.5 million tons per annum. As the size of recoverable reserves at Abadi increased, the development plan was revised upwards – tripling the planned capacity of the FLNG project to be located in the Arafura Sea to 7.5 million tons per annum. But at that point, Indonesia had just undergone a crucial election and moods had changed. In April 2016, the Indonesian government essentially told Inpex to go back to the drawing board to develop Abadi, directing them to shift from a floating processing solution to an onshore one, which would provide more employment opportunities. The onshore option had been rejected initially by Inpex in 2010, given that the nearest Indonesian land is almost 100km north of the field. But with Indonesia keen to boost activity in its upstream sector, the onshore mandate arrived firmly. And now, after 3 years of extended evaluation, Inpex has delivered its new development plan.
The new plan encompasses an onshore LNG plant with a total production capacity of 9.5 million tons per annum. With an estimated cost of US$18-20 billion, it will be the single largest investment in Indonesia and one of the largest LNG plants operated by a Japanese firm. FID is expected within 3 years, with a tentative target operational timeline of the late 2020s. LNG output will be targeted at Japan’s massive market, but also growing demand centres such as China. But Abadi will be entering into a far more crowded field that it would have if initial plans had gone ahead in 2010; with US Gulf Coast LNG producers furiously constructing at the moment and mega-LNG projects in Australia, Canada and Russia beating Abadi’s current timeline, Abadi will have a tougher fight for market share when it starts operations. The demand will be there, but the huge rise in the level of supplies will dilute potential profits.
It is a risk worth taking, at least according to Inpex and its partner Shell, which owns the remaining 35% of the Abadi gas field. But development of Abadi will be more important to Indonesia. Faced with a challenging natural gas environment – output from the Bontang, Tangguh and Badak LNG plants will soon begin their decline phase, while the huge potential of the East Natuna gas field is complicated by its composition of sour gas – Indonesia sees Abadi as a way of getting its gas ship back on track. Abadi is one of Indonesia’s few remaining large natural gas discoveries with a high potential commercialisation opportunities. The new agreement with Inpex extends the firm’s licence to operate the Masela field by 27 years to 2055 with the 150 mscf pipeline and the onshore plant expected to be completed by 2027. It might be too late by then to reverse Indonesia’s chronic natural gas and LNG production decline, but to Indonesia, at least some progress is better than none.
The Abadi LNG Project:
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 10 June 2019 – Brent: US$62/b; WTI: US$53/b
Headlines of the week
Midstream & Downstream
A month ago, crude oil prices were riding a wave, comfortably trading in the mid-US$70/b range and trending towards the US$80 mark as the oil world fretted about the expiration of US waivers on Iranian crude exports. Talk among OPEC members ahead of the crucial June 25 meeting of OPEC and its OPEC+ allies in Vienna turned to winding down its own supply deal.
That narrative has now changed. With Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov suggesting that there was a risk that oil prices could fall as low as US$30/b and the Saudi Arabia-Russia alliance preparing for a US$40/b oil scenario, it looks more and more likely that the production deal will be extended to the end of 2019. This was already discussed in a pre-conference meeting in April where Saudi Arabia appeared to have swayed a recalcitrant Russia into provisionally extending the deal, even if Russia itself wasn’t in adherence.
That the suggestion that oil prices were heading for a drastic drop was coming from Russia is an eye-opener. The major oil producer has been dragging its feet over meeting its commitments on the current supply deal; it was seen as capitalising on Saudi Arabia and its close allies’ pullback over February and March. That Russia eventually reached adherence in May was not through intention but accident – contamination of crude at the major Druzhba pipeline which caused a high ripple effect across European refineries surrounding the Baltic. Russia also is shielded from low crude prices due its diversified economy – the Russian budget uses US$40/b oil prices as a baseline, while Saudi Arabia needs a far higher US$85/b to balance its books. It is quite evident why Saudi Arabia has already seemingly whipped OPEC into extending the production deal beyond June. Russia has been far more reserved – perhaps worried about US crude encroaching on its market share – but Energy Minister Alexander Novak and the government is now seemingly onboard.
Part of this has to do with the macroeconomic environment. With the US extending its trade fracas with China and opening up several new fronts (with Mexico, India and Turkey, even if the Mexican tariff standoff blew over), the global economy is jittery. A recession or at least, a slowdown seems likely. And when the world economy slows down, the demand for oil slows down too. With the US pumping as much oil as it can, a return to wanton production risks oil prices crashing once again as they have done twice in the last decade. All the bluster Russia can muster fades if demand collapses – which is a zero sum game that benefits no one.
Also on the menu in Vienna is the thorny issue of Iran. Besieged by American sanctions and at odds with fellow OPEC members, Iran is crucial to any decision that will be made at the bi-annual meeting. Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, has stated that Iran has no intention of departing the group despite ‘being treated like an enemy (by some members)’. No names were mentioned, but the targets were evident – Iran’s bitter rival Saudi Arabia, and its sidekicks the UAE and Kuwait. Saudi King Salman bin Abulaziz has recently accused Iran of being the ‘greatest threat’ to global oil supplies after suspected Iranian-backed attacks in infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. With such tensions in the air, the Iranian issue is one that cannot be avoided in Vienna and could scupper any potential deal if politics trumps economics within the group. In the meantime, global crude prices continue to fall; OPEC and OPEC+ have to capability to change this trend, but the question is: will it happen on June 25?
Expectations at the 176th OPEC Conference