More Chinese crude oil imports coming from non-OPEC countries
China, the world’s largest crude oil net importer, increased the share of its crude oil imports from countries outside the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 2016. Of the country’s 7.6 million barrels per day (b/d) of 2016 crude oil imports, 57% came from OPEC countries, led by Saudi Arabia (13% of total imports), Angola (11%), Iraq (10%), and Iran (8%). Leading non-OPEC suppliers included Russia (14% of total imports), Oman (9%), and Brazil (5%). While total crude oil imports from OPEC exceed those from non-OPEC sources, crude oil from non-OPEC countries made up 65% of the growth in China’s imports between 2012 and 2016. Recent Chinese import data, crude oil price spreads, and non-OPEC production trends suggest continued growth in non-OPEC countries’ share of China’s growing crude oil imports.
China’s crude oil imports increased by 2.2 million b/d between 2012 and 2016, with the non-OPEC countries’ share increasing from 34% to 43% over the period (Figure 1). Since the beginning of 2012 through February 2017 (the latest month for which data are available), the market shares of three of the top four OPEC suppliers to China (Saudi Arabia, Angola, and Iran) fell when measured using rolling 12-month averages. Over the same period, however, market shares for China’s top four non-OPEC suppliers (Russia, Oman, Brazil, and the United Kingdom), increased. While still comparatively small as a share of China’s crude oil imports, imports from Brazil reached a record high of 0.6 million b/d in December 2016, while imports from the United Kingdom reached their all-time high of 0.2 million b/d in February 2017.
Growth in China’s total crude oil imports in 2016 reflected both lower domestic crude oil production and continued demand growth. After increasing steadily between 2012 and 2015, China’s crude oil production declined significantly in 2016. Total liquids supply in China averaged 4.9 million b/d in 2016, a year-over-year decline of 0.3 million b/d, the largest drop for any non-OPEC country in 2016 (Figure 2). U.S. crude oil production fell by over 0.5 million b/d in 2016, but total liquids declined by under 0.3 million b/d because other liquids production increased by under 0.3 million b/d. Much of Chinese production growth from 2012 through 2015 was driven by more expensive drilling and production techniques, such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR), on older fields. Investments in development of new reserves fell as oil prices declined, contributing to a fall in total Chinese production because of the natural declines of old fields.
China’s demand growth has remained the world’s largest in every year since 2009, including an increase of 0.4 million b/d in 2016. As China increased its imports to address a growing gap between its domestic production and demand, it surpassed the United States as the world’s largest net importer of total petroleum in 2014. Other factors contributed to an increase in Chinese crude oil imports. For example, in July 2015, the Chinese government began allowing independent refiners (those not owned by the government) to import crude oil. The independent refiners previously had restrictions on the amount of crude oil they could import and relied on domestic supply and fuel oil as primary feedstocks. A second factor was the Chinese government’s filling of new Strategic Petroleum Reserve sites.
Total Chinese crude oil imports reached an all-time high of 8.6 million b/d in December 2016, with January and February 2017 data showing record highs for those particular months, at a time when demand is usually lower because of shutdowns related to the Chinese New Year (Figure 3).
Recent market dynamics suggest the market share of non-OPEC suppliers in China may continue to grow as its imports increase and the country remains a competitive market for suppliers. The Brent-Dubai Exchange of Futures for Swaps (EFS), an instrument that allows trade between the Brent futures market and the Dubai swaps market and represents the price premium of Brent over Dubai crude oil, is at the lowest levels for this time of year since 2010 (Figure 4). The relatively low price of Brent crude oil allows long distance arbitrage opportunities for some suppliers, particularly producers in the Atlantic basin market. For Chinese refiners, purchasing crude oil from Atlantic basin producers is generally more expensive because of higher transportation costs. The relatively lower price of Brent crude oil, however, allows some Chinese refiners to purchase Atlantic basin grades less expensively than Middle Eastern grades, even after the cost of shipping. Producers in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and, increasingly, the United States have taken advantage of this arbitrage, boosting flows of non-OPEC oil into China. The March edition of EIA’s monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) forecasts a 0.3 million b/d increase in China’s total liquid fuels demand in both 2017 and 2018.
U.S. average regular gasoline and diesel prices rise
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price increased over four cents from the previous week, to $2.36 per gallon on April 3, up 28 cents from the same time last year. The Midwest price rose 10 cents to $2.28 per gallon, the Gulf Coast price rose nearly four cents to $2.12 per gallon, the East Coast price rose nearly three cents to $2.30 per gallon, and the West Coast price increased less than one cent, remaining at $2.85 per gallon. The Rocky Mountain price fell less than one cent, remaining at $2.30 per gallon.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price increased over two cents to $2.56 per gallon on April 3, 44 cents higher than a year ago. The Gulf Coast price increased nearly four cents to $2.41 per gallon, the Rocky Mountain price rose nearly three cents to $2.62 per gallon, and the West Coast, East Coast, and Midwest prices each increased two cents to $2.84 per gallon, $2.61 per gallon, and $2.48 per gallon, respectively.
Propane inventories fall
U.S. propane stocks decreased by 1.2 million barrels last week to 41.6 million barrels as of March 31, 2017, 23.3 million barrels (35.9%) lower than a year ago. Gulf Coast and East Coast inventories decreased by 1.1 million barrels and 0.5 million barrels, respectively, while Midwest inventories increased by 0.4 million barrels, and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories rose slightly, remaining essentially unchanged. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.9% of total propane inventories.
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According to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has the world’s 9th largest natural gas reserves (192 TCF of gas reserves). As at 2018, Nigeria exported over 1tcf of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to several countries. However domestically, we produce less than 4,000MW of power for over 180million people.
Think about this – imagine every Nigerian holding a 20W light bulb, that’s how much power we generate in Nigeria. In comparison, South Africa generates 42,000MW of power for a population of 57 million. We have the capacity to produce over 2 million Metric Tonnes of fertilizer (primarily urea) per year but we still import fertilizer. The Federal Government’s initiative to rejuvenate the agriculture sector is definitely the right thing to do for our economy, but fertilizer must be readily available to support the industry. Why do we import fertilizer when we have so much gas?
I could go on and on with these statistics, but you can see where I’m going with this so I won’t belabor the point. I will leave you with this mental image: imagine a man that lives with his family on the banks of a river that has fresh, clean water. Rather than collect and use this water directly from the river, he treks over 20km each day to buy bottled water from a company that collects the same water, bottles it and sells to him at a profit. This is the tragedy on Nigeria and it should make us all very sad.
Several indigenous companies like Nestoil were born and grown by the opportunities created by the local and international oil majors – NNPC and its subsidiaries – NGC, NAPIMS, Shell, Mobil, Agip, NDPHC. Nestoil’s main focus is the Engineering Procurement Construction and Commissioning of oil and gas pipelines and flowstations, essentially, infrastructure that supports upstream companies to produce and transport oil and natural gas, as well as and downstream companies to store and move their product. In our 28 years of doing business, we have built over 300km of pipelines of various sizes through the harshest terrain, ranging from dry land to seasonal swamp, to pure swamps, as well as some of the toughest and most volatile and hostile communities in Nigeria. I would be remiss if I do not use this opportunity to say a big thank you to those companies that gave us the opportunity to serve you. The over 2,000 direct staff and over 50,000 indirect staff we employ thank you. We are very grateful for the past opportunities given to us, and look forward to future opportunities that we can get.
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 15 July 2019 – Brent: US$66/b; WTI: US$59/b
Headlines of the week
Unplanned crude oil production outages for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averaged 2.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first half of 2019, the highest six-month average since the end of 2015. EIA estimates that in June, Iran alone accounted for more than 60% (1.7 million b/d) of all OPEC unplanned outages.
EIA differentiates among declines in production resulting from unplanned production outages, permanent losses of production capacity, and voluntary production cutbacks for OPEC members. Only the first of those categories is included in the historical unplanned production outage estimates that EIA publishes in its monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO).
Unplanned production outages include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflicts, political disputes, labor actions, natural disasters, and unplanned maintenance. Unplanned outages can be short-lived or last for a number of years, but as long as the production capacity is not lost, EIA tracks these disruptions as outages rather than lost capacity.
Loss of production capacity includes natural capacity declines and declines resulting from irreparable damage that are unlikely to return within one year. This lost capacity cannot contribute to global supply without significant investment and lead time.
Voluntary cutbacks are associated with OPEC production agreements and only apply to OPEC members. Voluntary cutbacks count toward the country’s spare capacity but are not counted as unplanned production outages.
EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity—which only applies to OPEC members adhering to OPEC production agreements—as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. EIA does not include unplanned crude oil production outages in its assessment of spare production capacity.
As an example, EIA considers Iranian production declines that result from U.S. sanctions to be unplanned production outages, making Iran a significant contributor to the total OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages. During the fourth quarter of 2015, before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became effective in January 2016, EIA estimated that an average 800,000 b/d of Iranian production was disrupted. In the first quarter of 2019, the first full quarter since U.S. sanctions on Iran were re-imposed in November 2018, Iranian disruptions averaged 1.2 million b/d.
Another long-term contributor to EIA’s estimate of OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages is the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Production halted there in 2014 because of a political dispute between the two countries. EIA attributes half of the PNZ’s estimated 500,000 b/d production capacity to each country.
In the July 2019 STEO, EIA only considered about 100,000 b/d of Venezuela’s 130,000 b/d production decline from January to February as an unplanned crude oil production outage. After a series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 and cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, EIA estimates that PdVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, could not restart the disrupted production because of deteriorating infrastructure, and the previously disrupted 100,000 b/d became lost capacity.