Oil is on the defensive again, retracing from resistance in recent days amid bearish U.S.-centric data of rampant production increases. Despite the Good Friday holiday, we get the EIA inventory report at the usual time tomorrow, but for now, hark, here are six things to consider in oil markets today:
1) As oil prices based on the Dubai-Oman benchmark remain more expensive than U.S.-based WTI, Latin American crude continues to be pulled towards Asia. This is displacing other flows, translating into lower U.S. imports. We are over halfway through the month, and imports from Central and South America are at the slowest monthly pace on our records.
Our ClipperData show that imports this month continue to drop from Brazil and Colombia, while Ecuadorian grades, Napo and Oriente, are completely absent. Only Venezuelan grades are showing strength versus the month prior:
2) The latest monthly IEA report has been interpreted as somewhat downbeat, despite the prognostication that 'the market is already very close to balance'. This is because demand growth has been adjusted lower by 200,000 bpd in Q1, and by 100,000 bpd for 2017 on the whole, to +1.3mn bpd.
While Asian fuel demand has been the backbone of oil demand growth for many a year, signs of stuttering from various parts of the region - including South Korea, Japan and India - means demand growth may not be as robust as we have come to expect.
The second piece of the puzzle is inventories. The agency reported that OECD oil and product stocks fell by a mere 8.1 million barrels in February after January's rise. This leaves them at 3.055 billion (beeelion) barrels, some 330 million barrels above the 5-year average (aka, the normalized level that is the goal of the OPEC production cuts).
Including the IEA's estimate for March, it projects that inventories still climbed on the aggregate through the first quarter of the year, up by 38.5 million barrels:
3) Yesterday's feature on NPR's Texas Standard addressed the issue of fracking sand, and how it is in a bull market. The interview can be found here, while here are some of the sand stats quoted:
--Fracking sand is used as a proppant in hydraulic fracturing, to hold open tiny fissures for oil and gas to pass through
--A total of 54 million tons of fracking sand were used in the U.S. in 2014. Demand is projected to rise to 80 million tons this year, and to 120 million tons in 2018
--Typically the fracking sector has been dominated by silica sand from Wisconsin and Minnesota, as well as from Illinois, Iowa and Indiana. But as more fracking sand is needed in Texas, more mines are starting up
--Nearly 20 times more sand is used per well compared to the peak of the last energy boom
--The largest wells now consume up to 25,000 tons, compared to from 1,500 tons in 2014
--It can take up to 1,000 truck loads to haul enough sand to frack a single large well
4) While so much focus remains on the oil boom in the Permian basin, it is important to note that according to the latest EIA drilling productivity report, natural gas production in the basin is set to reach a new milestone, clambering over 8 Bcf/d. This has prompted Blackstone Group LP to takeover EagleClaw Midstream Ventures for $2 billion. As crude production rises in the basin, more 'associated gas' is produced as a biproduct. With demand for natural gas set to continue on its upward trajectory due to a number of factors - power generation, industrial demand, pipeline and LNG exports - the future is looking bright for the Permian, for both oil and gas.
5) While on the topic of the Permian, the chart below is part of a study of 37 U.S. E&P companies by Bloomberg, showing that 32 of the 37 companies have hedged part of their production for 2017. As for Permian-focused companies, they have hedged 64 percent of their expected oil production for this year...and at a weighted average price of $49.43/bbl to boot. As efficiencies improve in the basin, a hedged price of around $50/bbl appears an attractive option. Only 21 of 37 have hedged anticipated production for 2018.
6) Finally, this piece out on RBN Energy references ClipperData, and how we are counting cargoes and using port agents to identify the quantity, type and quality of crude that is being imported into the U.S. on an almost real-time basis.
Something interesting to share?
Join NrgEdge and create your own NrgBuzz today
According to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has the world’s 9th largest natural gas reserves (192 TCF of gas reserves). As at 2018, Nigeria exported over 1tcf of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to several countries. However domestically, we produce less than 4,000MW of power for over 180million people.
Think about this – imagine every Nigerian holding a 20W light bulb, that’s how much power we generate in Nigeria. In comparison, South Africa generates 42,000MW of power for a population of 57 million. We have the capacity to produce over 2 million Metric Tonnes of fertilizer (primarily urea) per year but we still import fertilizer. The Federal Government’s initiative to rejuvenate the agriculture sector is definitely the right thing to do for our economy, but fertilizer must be readily available to support the industry. Why do we import fertilizer when we have so much gas?
I could go on and on with these statistics, but you can see where I’m going with this so I won’t belabor the point. I will leave you with this mental image: imagine a man that lives with his family on the banks of a river that has fresh, clean water. Rather than collect and use this water directly from the river, he treks over 20km each day to buy bottled water from a company that collects the same water, bottles it and sells to him at a profit. This is the tragedy on Nigeria and it should make us all very sad.
Several indigenous companies like Nestoil were born and grown by the opportunities created by the local and international oil majors – NNPC and its subsidiaries – NGC, NAPIMS, Shell, Mobil, Agip, NDPHC. Nestoil’s main focus is the Engineering Procurement Construction and Commissioning of oil and gas pipelines and flowstations, essentially, infrastructure that supports upstream companies to produce and transport oil and natural gas, as well as and downstream companies to store and move their product. In our 28 years of doing business, we have built over 300km of pipelines of various sizes through the harshest terrain, ranging from dry land to seasonal swamp, to pure swamps, as well as some of the toughest and most volatile and hostile communities in Nigeria. I would be remiss if I do not use this opportunity to say a big thank you to those companies that gave us the opportunity to serve you. The over 2,000 direct staff and over 50,000 indirect staff we employ thank you. We are very grateful for the past opportunities given to us, and look forward to future opportunities that we can get.
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 15 July 2019 – Brent: US$66/b; WTI: US$59/b
Headlines of the week
Unplanned crude oil production outages for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averaged 2.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first half of 2019, the highest six-month average since the end of 2015. EIA estimates that in June, Iran alone accounted for more than 60% (1.7 million b/d) of all OPEC unplanned outages.
EIA differentiates among declines in production resulting from unplanned production outages, permanent losses of production capacity, and voluntary production cutbacks for OPEC members. Only the first of those categories is included in the historical unplanned production outage estimates that EIA publishes in its monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO).
Unplanned production outages include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflicts, political disputes, labor actions, natural disasters, and unplanned maintenance. Unplanned outages can be short-lived or last for a number of years, but as long as the production capacity is not lost, EIA tracks these disruptions as outages rather than lost capacity.
Loss of production capacity includes natural capacity declines and declines resulting from irreparable damage that are unlikely to return within one year. This lost capacity cannot contribute to global supply without significant investment and lead time.
Voluntary cutbacks are associated with OPEC production agreements and only apply to OPEC members. Voluntary cutbacks count toward the country’s spare capacity but are not counted as unplanned production outages.
EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity—which only applies to OPEC members adhering to OPEC production agreements—as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. EIA does not include unplanned crude oil production outages in its assessment of spare production capacity.
As an example, EIA considers Iranian production declines that result from U.S. sanctions to be unplanned production outages, making Iran a significant contributor to the total OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages. During the fourth quarter of 2015, before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became effective in January 2016, EIA estimated that an average 800,000 b/d of Iranian production was disrupted. In the first quarter of 2019, the first full quarter since U.S. sanctions on Iran were re-imposed in November 2018, Iranian disruptions averaged 1.2 million b/d.
Another long-term contributor to EIA’s estimate of OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages is the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Production halted there in 2014 because of a political dispute between the two countries. EIA attributes half of the PNZ’s estimated 500,000 b/d production capacity to each country.
In the July 2019 STEO, EIA only considered about 100,000 b/d of Venezuela’s 130,000 b/d production decline from January to February as an unplanned crude oil production outage. After a series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 and cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, EIA estimates that PdVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, could not restart the disrupted production because of deteriorating infrastructure, and the previously disrupted 100,000 b/d became lost capacity.