In Vienna yesterday, OPEC announced that it would be rolling over the landmark supply freeze that began in January 2017 by another nine months. Joining them will be the key non-OPEC members – principally Russia, but other major Central Asian producers – extending the 1.8 mmb/d cuts (1.2 mmb/d for OPEC and 600 kb/d for non-OPEC) through to March 2018. Ordinarily this would be cause for cheer. But instead, the markets reacted in dismay. Brent and WTI plunged by almost 5%, erasing all gains from the last week.
It is an overreaction, certainly, but also evident that the market was expecting a more drastic cut from OPEC to help bolster prices. The extension of the freeze is good, but had already been telegraphed weeks ago by rumblings out of Russia and Saudi Arabia. So that has already been factored into the price – one of the reasons why crude rose over the past week – and traders were looking for a little bit more good news, deeper cuts. When that did not materialise, the sell-off happened.
What’s going on? It took no rocket scientist to predict back in January that the OPEC freeze effect would be blunted by rising production elsewhere. Despite record compliance within the OPEC block – even Iran and Iraq toed the line – once the supply cuts took place, crude from elsewhere rushed to take its place. We saw crude from Alaska shipped to China for the first time, while Japan and South Korea offset Saudi Arabia’s cuts to their supply with crude from West Africa. Buoyed by price signals, American production from onshore shale deposits surged. Two weeks, the American oil rig count blasted past 700 active rigs, the highest in almost two years and is now marching towards 800. This rise in American production is estimated to have offset at least two-thirds of the lost OPEC output. And at current trends, it is estimated that some additional 900 kb/d of oil from the US will be added to global production. Nelson Martinez, Venezuela's oil minister said "In terms of the threat, we still don't know how much (U.S. shale) will be producing in the near future” after the recent OPEC talks. The Energy Minister if UAE, Suhail bin Mohammed al-Mazroui commented that he personally did not believe U.S. oil production would rise by 1 million bpd by next year. Representatives from US Shale who attended the Vienna meeting did not provide any specific guidance or projections either, keeping plans close to their chest.
So analysts were hoping that OPEC would match that with another cut. But getting OPEC to agree on additional cuts is like herding cats. The original November 2016 was landmark, and the high compliance another rare occurrence. But despite this, global inventories and supplies remain high. Part of this is artificial; in the six weeks between announcement and implementation, OPEC members pumped record volumes of crude, stockpiling them to sell during the freeze period. This is evident when you look at OPEC export statistics; they have fallen, but not nearly by as much as production. Extending the freeze may do the trick, to account for this lag. Saudi Arabia certainly seems to agree, pointing out that US crude supplies may have risen over the early period of the freeze, but had fallen for the past seven weeks, which helped convince some OPEC members of the delayed impact. The second half of the year is also a more strategic time to see the impact of the cuts, when the Middle East nations hoard crude to burn for summer power requirements and American/European drivers go out for summer, driving gasoline demand.
But still, there are issues. Libya and Nigeria were exempt for the original OPEC freeze. Their production has been rising following quelling of insurgent activity, while OPEC welcomed its 14th members, Equatorial Guinea, which replaces Indonesia that left last year. The wording of the OPEC announcement suggest that all three will not be expected to produce within the existing quotas, potentially blunting the impact further. Gone are the days when an OPEC freeze was a standalone solution.
Now is this merely a band-aid, kicking the ball further down the road to March 2018 where OPEC will once again have to ask themselves or do we need more cuts earlier? OPEC meets again in November to reconsider output its policy. Reuters reports that “while most in the group now appear to believe that shale has to be accommodated, there are still those in OPEC who think another fight is around the corner". Nigerian Oil Minister Emmanuel Kachikwu commented that “If we get to a point where we feel frustrated by a deliberate action of shale producers to just sabotage the market, OPEC will sit down again and look at what process it is we need to do”.
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It has been 21 years since Japanese upstream firm Inpex signed on to explore the Masela block in Indonesia in 1998 and 19 years since the discovery of the giant Abadi natural gas field in 2000. In that time, Inpex’s Ichthys field in Australia was discovered, exploited and started LNG production last year, delivering its first commercial cargo just a few months ago. Meanwhile, the abundant gas in the Abadi field close to the Australia-Indonesia border has remained under the waves. Until recently, that is, when Inpex had finally reached a new deal with the Indonesian government to revive the stalled project and move ahead with a development plan.
This could have come much earlier. Much, much earlier. Inpex had submitted its first development plan for Abadi in 2010, encompassing a Floating LNG project with an initial capacity of 2.5 million tons per annum. As the size of recoverable reserves at Abadi increased, the development plan was revised upwards – tripling the planned capacity of the FLNG project to be located in the Arafura Sea to 7.5 million tons per annum. But at that point, Indonesia had just undergone a crucial election and moods had changed. In April 2016, the Indonesian government essentially told Inpex to go back to the drawing board to develop Abadi, directing them to shift from a floating processing solution to an onshore one, which would provide more employment opportunities. The onshore option had been rejected initially by Inpex in 2010, given that the nearest Indonesian land is almost 100km north of the field. But with Indonesia keen to boost activity in its upstream sector, the onshore mandate arrived firmly. And now, after 3 years of extended evaluation, Inpex has delivered its new development plan.
The new plan encompasses an onshore LNG plant with a total production capacity of 9.5 million tons per annum. With an estimated cost of US$18-20 billion, it will be the single largest investment in Indonesia and one of the largest LNG plants operated by a Japanese firm. FID is expected within 3 years, with a tentative target operational timeline of the late 2020s. LNG output will be targeted at Japan’s massive market, but also growing demand centres such as China. But Abadi will be entering into a far more crowded field that it would have if initial plans had gone ahead in 2010; with US Gulf Coast LNG producers furiously constructing at the moment and mega-LNG projects in Australia, Canada and Russia beating Abadi’s current timeline, Abadi will have a tougher fight for market share when it starts operations. The demand will be there, but the huge rise in the level of supplies will dilute potential profits.
It is a risk worth taking, at least according to Inpex and its partner Shell, which owns the remaining 35% of the Abadi gas field. But development of Abadi will be more important to Indonesia. Faced with a challenging natural gas environment – output from the Bontang, Tangguh and Badak LNG plants will soon begin their decline phase, while the huge potential of the East Natuna gas field is complicated by its composition of sour gas – Indonesia sees Abadi as a way of getting its gas ship back on track. Abadi is one of Indonesia’s few remaining large natural gas discoveries with a high potential commercialisation opportunities. The new agreement with Inpex extends the firm’s licence to operate the Masela field by 27 years to 2055 with the 150 mscf pipeline and the onshore plant expected to be completed by 2027. It might be too late by then to reverse Indonesia’s chronic natural gas and LNG production decline, but to Indonesia, at least some progress is better than none.
The Abadi LNG Project:
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 10 June 2019 – Brent: US$62/b; WTI: US$53/b
Headlines of the week
Midstream & Downstream
A month ago, crude oil prices were riding a wave, comfortably trading in the mid-US$70/b range and trending towards the US$80 mark as the oil world fretted about the expiration of US waivers on Iranian crude exports. Talk among OPEC members ahead of the crucial June 25 meeting of OPEC and its OPEC+ allies in Vienna turned to winding down its own supply deal.
That narrative has now changed. With Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov suggesting that there was a risk that oil prices could fall as low as US$30/b and the Saudi Arabia-Russia alliance preparing for a US$40/b oil scenario, it looks more and more likely that the production deal will be extended to the end of 2019. This was already discussed in a pre-conference meeting in April where Saudi Arabia appeared to have swayed a recalcitrant Russia into provisionally extending the deal, even if Russia itself wasn’t in adherence.
That the suggestion that oil prices were heading for a drastic drop was coming from Russia is an eye-opener. The major oil producer has been dragging its feet over meeting its commitments on the current supply deal; it was seen as capitalising on Saudi Arabia and its close allies’ pullback over February and March. That Russia eventually reached adherence in May was not through intention but accident – contamination of crude at the major Druzhba pipeline which caused a high ripple effect across European refineries surrounding the Baltic. Russia also is shielded from low crude prices due its diversified economy – the Russian budget uses US$40/b oil prices as a baseline, while Saudi Arabia needs a far higher US$85/b to balance its books. It is quite evident why Saudi Arabia has already seemingly whipped OPEC into extending the production deal beyond June. Russia has been far more reserved – perhaps worried about US crude encroaching on its market share – but Energy Minister Alexander Novak and the government is now seemingly onboard.
Part of this has to do with the macroeconomic environment. With the US extending its trade fracas with China and opening up several new fronts (with Mexico, India and Turkey, even if the Mexican tariff standoff blew over), the global economy is jittery. A recession or at least, a slowdown seems likely. And when the world economy slows down, the demand for oil slows down too. With the US pumping as much oil as it can, a return to wanton production risks oil prices crashing once again as they have done twice in the last decade. All the bluster Russia can muster fades if demand collapses – which is a zero sum game that benefits no one.
Also on the menu in Vienna is the thorny issue of Iran. Besieged by American sanctions and at odds with fellow OPEC members, Iran is crucial to any decision that will be made at the bi-annual meeting. Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh, has stated that Iran has no intention of departing the group despite ‘being treated like an enemy (by some members)’. No names were mentioned, but the targets were evident – Iran’s bitter rival Saudi Arabia, and its sidekicks the UAE and Kuwait. Saudi King Salman bin Abulaziz has recently accused Iran of being the ‘greatest threat’ to global oil supplies after suspected Iranian-backed attacks in infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. With such tensions in the air, the Iranian issue is one that cannot be avoided in Vienna and could scupper any potential deal if politics trumps economics within the group. In the meantime, global crude prices continue to fall; OPEC and OPEC+ have to capability to change this trend, but the question is: will it happen on June 25?
Expectations at the 176th OPEC Conference