World production of crude and liquids has been revised slightly downward from EIA’s May Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) for both 2017 and 2018. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met on May 25, 2017, and announced an extension to production cuts that were originally set to end this month. The agreed-upon OPEC crude oil production target remains at 32.5 million barrels per day (b/d) through the end of the first quarter of 2018. EIA now forecasts OPEC members’ crude oil production to average 32.3 million b/d in 2017 and 32.8 million b/d in 2018, about 0.2 million b/d and 0.4 million b/d, respectively, lower than previously forecast. However, continuing production growth in many non-OPEC countries is expected to moderate the pace of global liquid fuels inventory draws in 2017 and lead to a small inventory build in 2018.
EIA now forecasts OPEC crude oil and other liquids production to average 39.6 million b/d from the third quarter of 2017 through the first quarter of 2018 (340,000 b/d lower than previously forecast). Non-OPEC production averages 59.6 million b/d over this period, up from 58.3 million b/d over the same period a year earlier. Considering both OPEC and non-OPEC production forecasts and the outlook for demand growth, EIA now expects an average global inventory draw of 100,000 b/d through the first quarter of 2018. The largest draws are expected in the third quarter of 2017, when global crude oil and other liquids inventories are forecast to fall by an average of 430,000 b/d
Inventory draws of this magnitude suggest the possibility of some upward pressure on crude oil prices over the coming months. The third quarter 2017 Brent spot price forecast is $54/b in EIA’s June STEO, up from $52/b in the May STEO. However, because U.S. tight oil production is relatively responsive to changes in oil prices, and given an estimated six-month lag between a change in oil prices and realized production, higher crude oil prices in mid-2017 have the potential to raise U.S. supply in 2018.
The largest global inventory increase in the forecast occurs in the second quarter of 2018, when Brazilian and OPEC production are expected to realize quarterly increases of 570,000 b/d and 220,000 b/d, respectively. The expectation of supply growth in 2018 could contribute to oil price weakness in late 2017 and early 2018; the June STEO’s Brent spot price forecast for the first quarter of 2018 is $52/b, $3/b lower than in the previous forecast. The current forecast assumes OPEC cuts will be extended beyond March 2018, but that non-compliance, which begins to grow late in 2017, increases somewhat in the second half of 2018. Although this forecast reflects the assumption of only partial OPEC compliance with a second production-cut extension in 2018, any extension provides some support for crude oil prices, even if only temporarily, and partially offsets downward price pressure from growing inventories.
The June STEO forecasts a 2017 average spot price for Brent crude oil of $53/b, unchanged from the previous STEO, along with a $56/b price forecast for 2018, $1/b lower than expected last month. WTI prices are forecast to average $2/b less than Brent in both 2017 and 2018 (Figure 2). As always, all oil price forecasts are subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, NYMEX contract values for September 2017 delivery that traded during the five-day period ending June 1 suggest that a range of $39/b to $64/b encompasses the market expectation for WTI prices in September 2017 at the 95% confidence level; also, as shown in the figure, the range encompassing current market expectations at this confidence level widens for longer time horizons.
U.S. crude oil production increases through the forecast, averaging 9.3 million b/d in 2017 and 10.0 million b/d in 2018. The 2018 forecast exceeds the previous record production level of 9.6 million b/d set in 1970. Growth in U.S. production of crude oil and hydrocarbon gas liquids has been the largest contributor to the 820,000 b/d of non-OPEC liquids supply growth from January through May 2017. Continued increases in drilling activity in U.S. shale basins, particularly in Texas, support production increases throughout the forecast. The largest expansion for U.S. production occurs in the fourth quarter of 2017, which averages a quarter-over-quarter rise of 330,000 b/d.
U.S. average regular gasoline price increases, diesel retail price drops
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price rose slightly from the previous week, remaining virtually unchanged at $2.41 per gallon on May 29, up three cents from the same time last year. The Midwest and Gulf Coast prices each rose two cents to $2.32 per gallon and $2.17 per gallon, respectively, while the Rocky Mountain and East Coast prices each increased one cent to $2.43 per gallon per gallon and $2.35 per gallon, respectively. The West Coast price dropped two cents to $2.94 per gallon.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price fell one cent to $2.56 per gallon on May 29, 16 cents higher than a year ago. The West Coast, East Coast, Midwest, and Gulf Coast prices each dropped one cent to $2.84 per gallon, $2.60 per gallon, $2.51 per gallon, and $2.42 per gallon, respectively, while the Rocky Mountain price increased less than a penny, remaining at $2.66 per gallon.
Propane inventories gain
U.S. propane stocks increased by 3.3 million barrels last week to 50.4 million barrels as of June 2, 2017, 26.9 million barrels (34.8%) lower than a year ago. Gulf Coast, Midwest, Rocky Mountain/West Coast, and East Coast inventories increased by 2.3 million barrels, 0.5 million barrels, 0.3 million barrels, and 0.1 million barrels, respectively. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.5% of total propane inventories.
Something interesting to share?
Join NrgEdge and create your own NrgBuzz today
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 20 May 2019 – Brent: US$73/b; WTI: US$63/b
Headlines of the week
Midstream & Downstream
At first, it seemed like a done deal. Chevron made a US$33 billion offer to take over US-based upstream independent Anadarko Petroleum. It was a 39% premium to Anadarko’s last traded price at the time and would have been the largest industry deal since Shell’s US$61 billion takeover of the BG Group in 2015. The deal would have given Chevron significant and synergistic acreage in the Permian Basin along with new potential in US midstream, as well as Anadarko’s high potential projects in Africa. Then Occidental Petroleum swooped in at the eleventh hour, making the delicious new bid and pulling the carpet out from under Chevron.
We can thank Warren Buffet for this. Occidental Petroleum, or Oxy, had previously made several quiet approaches to purchase Anadarko. These were rebuffed in favour of Chevron’s. Then Oxy’s CEO Vicki Hollub took the company jet to meet with Buffet. Playing to his reported desire to buy into shale, Hollub returned with a US$10 billion cash infusion from Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway – which was contingent on Oxy’s successful purchase of Anadarko. Hollub also secured a US$8.8 billion commitment from France’s Total to sell off Anadarko’s African assets. With these aces, she then re-approached Anadarko with a new deal – for US$38 billion.
This could have sparked off a price war. After all, the Chevron-Anadarko deal made a lot of sense – securing premium spots in the prolific Permian, creating a 120 sq.km corridor in the sweet spot of the shale basin, the Delaware. But the risk-adverse appetite of Chevron’s CEO Michael Wirth returned, and Chevron declined to increase its offer. By bowing out of the bid, Wirth said ‘Cost and capital discipline always matters…. winning in any environment doesn’t mean winning at any cost… for the sake for doing a deal.” Chevron walks away with a termination fee of US$1 billion and the scuppered dreams of matching ExxonMobil in size.
And so Oxy was victorious, capping off a two-year pursuit by Hollub for Anadarko – which only went public after the Chevron bid. This new ‘global energy leader’ has a combined 1.3 mmb/d boe production, but instead of leveraging Anadarko’s more international spread of operations, Oxy is looking for a future that is significantly more domestic.
The Oxy-Anadarko marriage will make Occidental the undisputed top producer in the Permian Basin, the hottest of all current oil and gas hotspots. Oxy was once a more international player, under former CEO Armand Hammer, who took Occidental to Libya, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, the Congo and other developing markets. A downturn in the 1990s led to a refocusing of operations on the US, with Oxy being one of the first companies to research extracting shale oil. And so, as the deal was done, Anadarko’s promising projects in Africa – Area 1 and the Mozambique LNG project, as well as interest in Ghana, Algeria and South Africa – go to Total, which has plenty of synergies to exploit. The retreat back to the US makes sense; Anadarko’s 600,000 acres in the Permian are reportedly the most ‘potentially profitable’ and it also has a major presence in Gulf of Mexico deepwater. Occidental has already identified 10,000 drilling locations in Anadarko areas that are near existing Oxy operations.
While Chevron licks its wounds, it can comfort itself with the fact that it is still the largest current supermajor presence in the Permian, with output there surging 70% in 2018 y-o-y. There could be other targets for acquisitions – Pioneer Natural Resources, Concho Resources or Diamondback Energy – but Chevron’s hunger for takeover seems to have diminished. And with it, the promises of an M&A bonanza in the Permian over 2019.
The Occidental-Anadarko deal:
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook
In April 2019, Venezuela's crude oil production averaged 830,000 barrels per day (b/d), down from 1.2 million b/d at the beginning of the year, according to EIA’s May 2019 Short-Term Energy Outlook. This average is the lowest level since January 2003, when a nationwide strike and civil unrest largely brought the operations of Venezuela's state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to a halt. Widespread power outages, mismanagement of the country's oil industry, and U.S. sanctions directed at Venezuela's energy sector and PdVSA have all contributed to the recent declines.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, based on Baker Hughes
Venezuela’s oil production has decreased significantly over the last three years. Production declines accelerated in 2018, decreasing by an average of 33,000 b/d each month in 2018, and the rate of decline increased to an average of over 135,000 b/d per month in the first quarter of 2019. The number of active oil rigs—an indicator of future oil production—also fell from nearly 70 rigs in the first quarter of 2016 to 24 rigs in the first quarter of 2019. The declines in Venezuelan crude oil production will have limited effects on the United States, as U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have decreased over the last several years. EIA estimates that U.S. crude oil imports from Venezuela in 2018 averaged 505,000 b/d and were the lowest since 1989.
EIA expects Venezuela's crude oil production to continue decreasing in 2019, and declines may accelerate as sanctions-related deadlines pass. These deadlines include provisions that third-party entities using the U.S. financial system stop transactions with PdVSA by April 28 and that U.S. companies, including oil service companies, involved in the oil sector must cease operations in Venezuela by July 27. Venezuela's chronic shortage of workers across the industry and the departure of U.S. oilfield service companies, among other factors, will contribute to a further decrease in production.
Additionally, U.S. sanctions, as outlined in the January 25, 2019 Executive Order 13857, immediately banned U.S. exports of petroleum products—including unfinished oils that are blended with Venezuela's heavy crude oil for processing—to Venezuela. The Executive Order also required payments for PdVSA-owned petroleum and petroleum products to be placed into an escrow account inaccessible by the company. Preliminary weekly estimates indicate a significant decline in U.S. crude oil imports from Venezuela in February and March, as without direct access to cash payments, PdVSA had little reason to export crude oil to the United States.
India, China, and some European countries continued to receive Venezuela's crude oil, according to data published by ClipperData Inc. Venezuela is likely keeping some crude oil cargoes intended for exports in floating storageuntil it finds buyers for the cargoes.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, and Clipper Data Inc.
A series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, likely damaging the reservoirs and associated infrastructure. In the Orinoco Oil Belt area, Venezuela produces extra-heavy crude oil that requires dilution with condensate or other light oils before the oil is sent by pipeline to domestic refineries or export terminals. Venezuela’s upgraders, complex processing units that upgrade the extra-heavy crude oil to help facilitate transport, were shut down in March during the power outages.
If Venezuelan crude or upgraded oil cannot flow as a result of a lack of power to the pumping infrastructure, heavier molecules sink and form a tar-like layer in the pipelines that can hinder the flow from resuming even after the power outages are resolved. However, according to tanker tracking data, Venezuela's main export terminal at Puerto José was apparently able to load crude oil onto vessels between power outages, possibly indicating that the loaded crude oil was taken from onshore storage. For this reason, EIA estimates that Venezuela's production fell at a faster rate than its exports.
EIA forecasts that Venezuela's crude oil production will continue to fall through at least the end of 2020, reflecting further declines in crude oil production capacity. Although EIA does not publish forecasts for individual OPEC countries, it does publish total OPEC crude oil and other liquids production. Further disruptions to Venezuela's production beyond what EIA currently assumes would change this forecast.