I used to be a pure red blooded driller. Red, the colour of fire and blood, associated with energy, war, danger, strength, power, determination as well as passion, desire, and love. And all of that hot emotions was for my passion to drill. I did not care about anything else other than well length, cost, time, and how great I was at selecting the right tool, using it and of course telling people about my accomplishments. And in Feb 2004, I reached the very pinnacle of being a drilling engineer. I drilled, single handedly (that shall go in my future memoirs), the longest well in Malaysia. At 6313mMD, I, the lead drilling engineer, held the Malaysian record for longest well ever drilled.
Unfortunately that intense self admiration and jubilation was short lived, when in a few weeks that record was broken by another operator. My ego deflated, my self worth diminishing by every mention of the other well's length, I banged my forehead whenever I thought of them who beat my record by a measly 50m. And of course, being a red blooded driller, the only lesson I learned was to just to drill longer next time. If I ever drilled another record breaking well, I will make sure I just put in some contingency shale drilling of about ~60m, so that I never get beaten again -_-
Sadly, I have never had a chance again, because since 2004, there have only been a handful of ultra ERD wells drilled. To put this into perspective, the longest well currently in Malaysia was drilled in 2014 to ~6700m, which is a laudable achievement, but exemplifies a slow progression over 10 years. As a driller, I feel that it is my responsibility to revive the interest in ERD and invigorate the passion for world class records which has since waned in the Malay Basin.
But now I've since gone to the Dark Side (Star Wars trademark), the side that bleeds hydrocarbon, I realise that my previous infatuation with drilling KPIs just seems so irrelevant in the grand scheme of things, when the oil business bottom line are production and profits, and doesn't really give a hoot on how long a well is. To stay profitable, and as reserves become even smaller and difficult to access, it has becomes an ever-more important to focus on looking at several concepts with enabling techniques, to be able to select the right solution to exploit hydrocarbons. As a driller, nothing is sexier and more elegant than suggesting extended reach drilling. While its the most straightforward option which allows the ability to explore and produce further and deeper, and minimise facilities installation, it does come with added risk and possibility of failure.
Any solution proposed requires capital expenditure. And capital expenditure proposals must be sufficiently specific to permit their technical and commercial justification, with sufficient risk assessment, for exploration and production operations, not just for the immediate fiscal year, but the life of the production sharing contract or field. In the economic phase of evaluation, oil management may find that it has more investment opportunities than capital to invest, or more capital to invest than investment opportunities. Whichever situation exists, oil management needs to resort to some economic criteria for selecting or rejecting investment proposals. Management’s decision in either case is likely to be based largely on the measures of financial return on the investment. In the current depressed oil price climate, how do we make extended reach drilling a viable option?
I won’t pretend that I’m an expert at economics like Wally in the Dilbert strip above, but let’s try to simplify the concept for the purpose of this article. Lets just say, all of the KPIs of a well, production, cost, schedule, IRR, ROI, terms of PSC, can all be rolled into a variable limit, the economic threshold of the project.
This chart represents the likelihood of costs in a normal Monte Carlo S-curve spread, where the cost of a project is typically quoted as the P50, with a range given for sensitivities. In layman's terms, the mid case is the P50 (50% chance having costs below that threshold) and P10 and P90 is the low and high side respectively. The range of costs are given so that the project can be carefully evaluated against the returns for any given scenario.
However, most projects focus on the most straightforward approach, which is trying to reduce base cost ('What we plan for' curve), in an attempt to get closer to the low side, and hope that nothing goes wrong to upset the cart and skew to the upside. To shift the whole S-curve downwards, the team will negotiate contracts, purchase cheaper tangibles/consumables, reduce the technology, and try to get the work done with a lean operation. However, as we lower down our price point, we will inevitably be introducing creep, compromising quality and safety. Post experiencing a trainwreck, the looming result is cost inadvertently passing the economic threshold ('What will actually happen' curve).
A prudent project manager should try to visualise, manage and contain all of the outcomes, trying to put a cap on the risk and exposure of the upside, while making the likelihood of meeting the P50 expectation more likely, even if it means increasing the mid-case, and forgoing a more aggressive P10 ('What we actually need' Green curve). To put it simply, don't lose the farm while trying to save every single dollar.
If you are planning to justify a new technology, a new technique, or a risky proposition such as extended reach drilling, there are 5 key elements that you need in your proposal, to emulate the 'What we actually need' green curve:
Key 1: Collaborate and Build the knowledge of your team: Collaborate as much as possible internally, and externally with partners, host government, increase data trade transactions, and engage professional networks in order to learn as much as you can on the venture you are undertaking. In this environment, you will be pleasantly surprised that others might actually be interested to learn from you to. In my previous life, I was part of an assurance team, called upon by our partner in Western Australia to look at their concept work. They were down to two options, where they were weighing a 10km ERD well versus a subsea development, where the costs of subsea were 50% higher. The upside costs presented by the drilling team for the ERD looked reasonable, with their P90 costs about a wash with the subsea well. So on paper, ERD looked to be the right selection. However, the Drilling Manager confessed that despite the economics and his attempt to show the risks, he believes that his team does not have the capability to carry out the work, in other words the drillability due to the capability was questionable. The ERD well was dropped in favor of the subsea well, and everybody agreed that was the right call, because regardless what the evaluation on paper shows, there was no confidence in the team that was to carry the work out. Pity.
Key 2: Cap your upside costs: Gone are the days when people say, "A well is going to cost what its going to cost". Have savvier contracts, such as with lump sum capped, performance incentivised, meterage measured or even turnkeyed contract. We should no longer be dependent on time based contracts, just because the supplier says so. Determine the cost structure which fits your project and design your contracts to meet what is required
Key 3: Increase your execution reliability: This doesn't mean not having problems. What it means is being able to deliver what you promised. So if the design is complex, and on average non productive time is high, design the lower complexity aspects of the project to absorb the possible problems that you will eventually have. Sometimes you have to accept that your planned costs would have to be higher to increase reliability. Justify the increase and plan for success, but be ready for failure.
Key 4: Have contingency plans for everything, even failure of your base plan: It goes without saying that risk assessments are the support system for a project, but without closing out and implementing any of the mitigation plans, the risk assessment are just a waste of time. An always think of what would happen if the primary plan fails? Do you have a fall back plan to still retain value or limit exposure? An alternative target, perhaps? A ready for deployment sidetrack assembly?
Key 5: Increase the value statement of your design: During detailed design, a D&C team often gets carried away on focusing too much on 'getting the job' done versus remembering why the job was done in the first place. Reaching an objective is just the means to extract the value from the project. Design the well in order to increase the returns on the project, and increase the economic threshold. Drill better wells, which doesn't necessarily mean drilling longer or more wells.
Hopefully the keys above will assist the reader in creating more palatable ERD proposals. Every single project, every single team, and every single company will have a different approach in creating value, but I do hope that maybe in some minute way, I managed to jog some life back into excitement about drilling and ERD in Malaysia. Stay savvy, people.
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The vast Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan’s portion of the South Caspian Sea marked several milestones in 2018. It has now produced a cumulative total of 100 billion cubic metres of natural gas since the field started up in 2006, with daily output reaching a new peak, growing by 12.5% y-o-y. At a cost of US$28 billion, Shah Deniz – with its estimated 1.2 trillion cubic metres of gas resources – has proven to be an unparalleled success, being a founding link of Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor and coming in relatively on budget and on time. And now BP, along with its partners, is hoping to replicate that success with an ambitious exploration schedule over the next two years.
Four new exploration wells in three blocks, along with a seismic survey of a fourth, are planned for 2019 and an additional three wells in 2020. The aggressive programme is aimed at confirming a long-held belief by BP and SOCAR there are more significant pockets of gas swirling around the area. The first exploratory well is targeting the Shafag-Asiman block, where initial seismic surveys suggest natural gas reserves of some 500 billion cubic metres; if confirmed, that would make it the second-largest gas field ever discovered in the Caspian, behind only Shah Deniz. BP also suspects that Shah Deniz itself could be bigger than expected – the company has long predicted the existence of a second, deeper reservoir below the existing field, and a ‘further assessment’ is planned for 2020 to get to the bottom of the case, so to speak.
Two wells are planned to be drilled in the Shallow Water Absheron Peninsula (SWAP) block, some 30km southeast of Baku, where BP operates in equal partnership with SOCAR, with an additional well planned for 2020. The goal at SWAP is light crude oil, as is a seismic survey in the deepwater Caspian Sea Block D230 where a ‘significant amount’ of oil is expected. Exploration in the onshore Gobustan block, an inland field 50km north of Baku, rounds up BP’s upstream programme and the company expects that at least one seven wells of these will yield a bonanza that will take Azerbaijan’s reserves well into the middle of the century.
Developments in the Caspian are key, as it is the starting node of the Southern Gas Corridor – meant to deliver gas to Europe. Shah Deniz gas currently makes its way to Turkey via the South Caucasus Gas pipeline and exports onwards to Europe should begin when the US$8.5 billion, 32 bcm/y Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) starts service in 2020. Planned output from Azerbaijan currently only fills half of the TANAP capacity, meaning there is room for plenty more gas, if BP can find it. From Turkey, Azeri gas will link up to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline in Greece and connect into Turkey, potentially joined by other pipelines projects that are planned to link up with gas production in Israel. This alternate source of natural gas for Europe is crucial, particularly since political will to push through the Nordstream-2 pipeline connecting Russian gas to Germany is slackening. The demand is there and so is the infrastructure. And now BP will be spending the next two years trying to prove that the supply exists underneath Azerbaijan.
BP’s upcoming planned exploration in the Caspian:
When it was first announced in 2012, there was scepticism about whether or not Petronas’ RAPID refinery in Johor was destined for reality or cancellation. It came at a time when the refining industry saw multiple ambitious, sometimes unpractical, projects announced. At that point, Petronas – though one of the most respected state oil firms – was still seen as more of an upstream player internationally. Its downstream forays were largely confined to its home base Malaysia and specialty chemicals, as well as a surprising venture into South African through Engen. Its refineries, too, were relatively small. So the announcement that Petronas was planning essentially, its own Jamnagar, promoted some pessimism. Could it succeed?
It has. The RAPID refinery – part of a larger plan to turn the Pengerang district in southern Johor into an oil refining and storage hub capitalising on linkages with Singapore – received its first cargo of crude oil for testing in September 2018. Mechanical completion was achieved on November 29 and all critical units have begun commissioning ahead of the expected firing up of RAPID’s 300 kb/d CDU later this month. A second cargo of 2 million barrels of Saudi crude arrived at RAPID last week. It seems like it’s all systems go for RAPID. But it wasn’t always so clear cut. Financing difficulties – and the 2015 crude oil price crash – put the US$27 billion project on shaky ground for a while, and it was only when Saudi Aramco swooped in to purchase a US$7 billion stake in the project that it started coalescing. Petronas had been courting Aramco since the start of the project, mainly as a crude provider, but having the Saudi giant on board was the final step towards FID. It guaranteed a stable supply of crude for Petronas; and for Aramco, RAPID gave it a foothold in a major global refining hub area as part of its strategy to expand downstream.
But RAPID will be entering into a market quite different than when it was first announced. In 2012, demand for fuel products was concentrated on light distillates; in 2019, that focus has changed. Impending new International Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulations are requiring shippers to switch from burning cheap (and dirty) fuel oil to using cleaner middle distillate gasoils. This plays well into complex refineries like RAPID, specialising in cracking heavy and medium Arabian crude into valuable products. But the issue is that Asia and the rest of the world is currently swamped with gasoline. A whole host of new Asian refineries – the latest being the 200 kb/d Nghi Son in Vietnam – have contributed to growing volumes of gasoline with no home in Asia. Gasoline refining margins in Singapore have taken a hit, falling into negative territory for the first time in seven years. Adding RAPID to the equation places more pressure on gasoline margins, even though margins for middle distillates are still very healthy. And with three other large Asian refinery projects scheduled to come online in 2019 – one in Brunei and two in China – that glut will only grow.
The safety valve for RAPID (and indeed the other refineries due this year) is that they have been planned with deep petrochemicals integration, using naphtha produced from the refinery portion. RAPID itself is planned to have capacity of 3 million tpa of ethylene, propylene and other olefins – still a lucrative market that justifies the mega-investment. But it will be at least two years before RAPID’s petrochemicals portion will be ready to start up, and when it does, it’ll face the same set of challenging circumstances as refineries like Hengli’s 400 kb/d Dalian Changxing plant also bring online their petchem operations. But that is a problem for the future and for now, RAPID is first out of the gate into reality. It won’t be entering in a bonanza fuels market as predicted in 2012, but there is still space in the market for RAPID – and a few other like in – at least for now.
RAPID Refinery Factsheet:
Tyre market in Bangladesh is forecasted to grow at over 9% until 2020 on the back of growth in automobile sales, advancements in public infrastructure, and development-seeking government policies.
The government has emphasized on the road infrastructure of the country, which has been instrumental in driving vehicle sales in the country.
The tyre market reached Tk 4,750 crore last year, up from about Tk 4,000 crore in 2017, according to market insiders.
The commercial vehicle tyre segment dominates this industry with around 80% of the market share. At least 1.5 lakh pieces of tyres in the segment were sold in 2018.
In the commercial vehicle tyre segment, the MRF's market share is 30%. Apollo controls 5% of the segment, Birla 10%, CEAT 3%, and Hankook 1%. The rest 51% is controlled by non-branded Chinese tyres.
However, Bangladesh mostly lacks in tyre manufacturing setups, which leads to tyre imports from other countries as the only feasible option to meet the demand. The company largely imports tyre from China, India, Indonesia, Thailand and Japan.
Automobile and tyre sales in Bangladesh are expected to grow with the rising in purchasing power of people as well as growing investments and joint ventures of foreign market players. The country might become the exporting destination for global tyre manufacturers.
Several global tyre giants have also expressed interest in making significant investments by setting up their manufacturing units in the country.
This reflects an opportunity for local companies to set up an indigenous manufacturing base in Bangladesh and also enables foreign players to set up their localized production facilities to capture a significant market.
It can be said that, the rise in automobile sales, improvement in public infrastructure, and growth in purchasing power to drive the tyre market over the next five years.