Rumours are swirling that the world’s largest IPO ever, might just slip a few months into 2019. Though Saudi Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan told investors just recently on the 25th of September that the IPO of Saudi state oil giant Aramco will proceed as planned in 2018. Saudi Aramco said in a statement that the IPO remains ‘on track’, underlining that it was committed to ensuring high standards.
However, there are a few big questions that have not been answered. The question of where Aramco will list has still yet to be answered. It will float on the domestic stock exchange in Riyadh, that is certain, but an IPO this size needs a major international exchange. The options for that would be either London or New York. Neither has been selected yet. It appears that Aramco will only formally announce this in late October, when a big investment conference in Riyadh is scheduled.
Once it is confirmed where Aramco will float, then the rest of the preparatory work can continue – having been contingent on this choice. It is a tight timeframe; 12 months is a short span to iron out all details and kinks, which is why the IPO may very well slip into the early months of 2019. But meanwhile, Aramco is taking steps to restructure itself into a contemporary supermajor, instead of the state entity it has always operated as.
In the past few months, Aramco has struck strategic partnerships with several key countries as it moves from simply selling crude, to ensuring its crude has place and space in a competitive world. It is deploying new technology in the Rub al Khalid – the vast Empty Quarter – that could help shore up and increase crude reserves. It has taken full ownership of Motiva in the US, home to the largest refinery in America. Mega-refinery partnerships have been signed in China, India and Malaysia – ensuring captive demand. And just last week, Aramco announced that would be buying and selling non-Saudi crude for the first time even.
That will form the lynchpin of an expanded trading business, which will put crude marketing and refined product trading under the same management. Currently, both are separate. Crude selling is crude selling, done in Singapore and Dahran. And refined products, which already includes non-Saudi fuels, is done out of London. Combining the two under one structure is a shift in policy for Aramco, approximating the arrangement of something like ExxonMobil, PetroChina or Glencore. Trading of Saudi crude will still be a priority, but expanding coverage will help Saudi Trading – set to be based in Singapore – cover its supply chain more efficiently to plug in gaps as they appear, as well as become a strong profit driver in its own right. This would be unthinkable five years ago. But to appeal to international investors, Aramco has to show them that its businesses are on part with the biggest international companies.
At home, Saudi Arabia is also planning to phase out subsidies for gasoline and jet fuel, which would lit them up by almost 80% to international levels. Prices for gasoil and fuel oil – both heavily used in power generation, particularly in summer – will be reformed, at a more gradual pace. Saudi Arabia also plans to introduce value-added tax (VAT), scheduled to be implemented at the start of 2018. Details of the Citizen’s Account, a household allowance scheme intended to reduce the impact of austerity policies on low and middle-income Saudi families would be announced in the coming weeks. While this is mainly focused on balancing the government’s budget, it has a knock-on effect on Aramco. Previously, Aramco only had to answer to the Saudi King when it came to diverting funds from the company to balance out the rest of the economy. As a publicly traded company, this will come under intense scrutiny. By removing subsidies, it removes a drain on the Aramco coffers, which is a necessary change for a publicly-traded company. Too long has the country been dependent on Saudi Aramco as the national bank account. This IPO is a chance to restructure and rejuvenate the entire economy, making it leaner, fitter and more competitive.
All of this makes a delay in the IPO more and more likely. This isn’t just a simple floating of shares. This is an attempt to remake the world’s most valuable company and an entire country to be more dynamic economically and modern. In that context, waiting a few more months to ensure every checkbox is ticked is far, far better in the long run.
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According to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has the world’s 9th largest natural gas reserves (192 TCF of gas reserves). As at 2018, Nigeria exported over 1tcf of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to several countries. However domestically, we produce less than 4,000MW of power for over 180million people.
Think about this – imagine every Nigerian holding a 20W light bulb, that’s how much power we generate in Nigeria. In comparison, South Africa generates 42,000MW of power for a population of 57 million. We have the capacity to produce over 2 million Metric Tonnes of fertilizer (primarily urea) per year but we still import fertilizer. The Federal Government’s initiative to rejuvenate the agriculture sector is definitely the right thing to do for our economy, but fertilizer must be readily available to support the industry. Why do we import fertilizer when we have so much gas?
I could go on and on with these statistics, but you can see where I’m going with this so I won’t belabor the point. I will leave you with this mental image: imagine a man that lives with his family on the banks of a river that has fresh, clean water. Rather than collect and use this water directly from the river, he treks over 20km each day to buy bottled water from a company that collects the same water, bottles it and sells to him at a profit. This is the tragedy on Nigeria and it should make us all very sad.
Several indigenous companies like Nestoil were born and grown by the opportunities created by the local and international oil majors – NNPC and its subsidiaries – NGC, NAPIMS, Shell, Mobil, Agip, NDPHC. Nestoil’s main focus is the Engineering Procurement Construction and Commissioning of oil and gas pipelines and flowstations, essentially, infrastructure that supports upstream companies to produce and transport oil and natural gas, as well as and downstream companies to store and move their product. In our 28 years of doing business, we have built over 300km of pipelines of various sizes through the harshest terrain, ranging from dry land to seasonal swamp, to pure swamps, as well as some of the toughest and most volatile and hostile communities in Nigeria. I would be remiss if I do not use this opportunity to say a big thank you to those companies that gave us the opportunity to serve you. The over 2,000 direct staff and over 50,000 indirect staff we employ thank you. We are very grateful for the past opportunities given to us, and look forward to future opportunities that we can get.
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 15 July 2019 – Brent: US$66/b; WTI: US$59/b
Headlines of the week
Unplanned crude oil production outages for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averaged 2.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first half of 2019, the highest six-month average since the end of 2015. EIA estimates that in June, Iran alone accounted for more than 60% (1.7 million b/d) of all OPEC unplanned outages.
EIA differentiates among declines in production resulting from unplanned production outages, permanent losses of production capacity, and voluntary production cutbacks for OPEC members. Only the first of those categories is included in the historical unplanned production outage estimates that EIA publishes in its monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO).
Unplanned production outages include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflicts, political disputes, labor actions, natural disasters, and unplanned maintenance. Unplanned outages can be short-lived or last for a number of years, but as long as the production capacity is not lost, EIA tracks these disruptions as outages rather than lost capacity.
Loss of production capacity includes natural capacity declines and declines resulting from irreparable damage that are unlikely to return within one year. This lost capacity cannot contribute to global supply without significant investment and lead time.
Voluntary cutbacks are associated with OPEC production agreements and only apply to OPEC members. Voluntary cutbacks count toward the country’s spare capacity but are not counted as unplanned production outages.
EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity—which only applies to OPEC members adhering to OPEC production agreements—as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. EIA does not include unplanned crude oil production outages in its assessment of spare production capacity.
As an example, EIA considers Iranian production declines that result from U.S. sanctions to be unplanned production outages, making Iran a significant contributor to the total OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages. During the fourth quarter of 2015, before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became effective in January 2016, EIA estimated that an average 800,000 b/d of Iranian production was disrupted. In the first quarter of 2019, the first full quarter since U.S. sanctions on Iran were re-imposed in November 2018, Iranian disruptions averaged 1.2 million b/d.
Another long-term contributor to EIA’s estimate of OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages is the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Production halted there in 2014 because of a political dispute between the two countries. EIA attributes half of the PNZ’s estimated 500,000 b/d production capacity to each country.
In the July 2019 STEO, EIA only considered about 100,000 b/d of Venezuela’s 130,000 b/d production decline from January to February as an unplanned crude oil production outage. After a series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 and cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, EIA estimates that PdVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, could not restart the disrupted production because of deteriorating infrastructure, and the previously disrupted 100,000 b/d became lost capacity.