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Variability surrounding future battery technology, government policies, consumer preferences, and other developments related to personal transportation markets casts a great deal of uncertainty on the long-term effects that battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles may have on worldwide energy consumption. This article discusses market trends related to these plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) and compares results from standalone runs of EIA’s new International Transportation Energy Demand Determinates model [1] to those presented in the International Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017). These results help quantify some of the uncertainty associated with the long-term effects that PEVs may have on energy markets.


Even though the future penetration of PEVs into personal automobile markets may be heavily influenced by changes in technology and government policies, the side cases presented in this article are based on differences in consumer tastes and preferences. This approach is the easiest way to examine the effects that different penetration rates have on energy consumption because the methodology does not require us to develop a detailed set of new policies across countries or new assumptions related to technological progress.


The side cases consist of a Low and a High PEV Penetration case. In the Low PEV Penetration case, consumer preferences are set to result in an almost 50% smaller stock of plug-in electric vehicles in 2040 than in the Reference case. In the High PEV Penetration case, preferences are set to create nearly twice as large a stock of plug-in electric vehicles at the end of the projection period than at the end of the Reference case projection period.


The side cases show that different rates of PEV penetration have measurable effects on liquid fuel consumption in the transportation sector. In the Low PEV Penetration case, liquid fuel consumption is almost 2 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) higher than the 225 quadrillion Btu level in the Reference case in 2040. In the High PEV Penetration case, consumption of these fuels is 2.75 quadrillion Btu lower than in the Reference case at the end of the projection period.


Even though the range of results might be smaller than initially expected, there are two important factors to understand. First, the use of PEVs in transportation starts from a small base. Although cumulative sales of PEVs worldwide reached 1.2 million in 2015, they still accounted for less than 1% of the total number of automobiles currently in use. Second, the side cases only address changes in adoption of PEVs in the light-duty vehicle sector and do not address PEVs in the two-and-three wheeler sector or in buses. The focus is on the light-duty vehicle sector because globally, light-duty vehicles consume more energy than any other mode of transportation, and most of the PEV policies are for light-duty vehicles. However, in all three cases, light-duty vehicles account for about 40% of total liquid fuel consumption in the transportation sector over the entire projection period.


In addition, the side cases do not consider variation in developments that are more closely tied to the growing digital economy in many countries, including ridesharing, carpool facilitation, and autonomous vehicles. Possible developments in these other transportation-related areas also cast a great deal of uncertainty on future transportation energy demand and could amplify or dampen the effects that PEVs have on energy consumption over the projection horizon.


DISCUSSION


Decreases in battery cell and pack costs and government incentives in many countries have been factors as helping PEVs reach their current level of market penetration. However, many uncertainties related to future government policies and other market-related developments remain.


Policy trends


Governments in many countries—including China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have enacted policies encouraging PEV sales. These policies range from direct monetary incentives to time-saving measures. The monetary incentives include rebates at the time of purchase, tax exemptions, toll waivers, free parking, and exemptions from ferry fees. The time-saving measures include granting PEVs access to high-occupancy vehicle or bus lanes. The desire to reduce on-road vehicle emissions, including greenhouse gases and other pollutants, is often cited as the primary motivation for these incentives.


The Norwegian government offers the largest monetary incentives for PEVs. These incentives reduce the purchase price and the operational costs associated with PEV ownership and include an exemption from an acquisition tax ($11,600 savings) for both battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). They also include an exemption from the countrywide 25% value-added tax for BEVs. Collectively, these incentives make the price of a luxury battery electric vehicle roughly equivalent to that of a non-luxury petroleum-fueled vehicle in that country. In addition to these cost savings, PEVs in Norway also receive waivers to avoid paying toll road and ferry fees.


In 2016, slightly more than 19% of new vehicles sales in Norway were plug-in electric vehicles (Figure IF-1). Because the country offered greater incentives for PHEVs in 2016 than in previous years, sales of PHEVs grew faster than sales of BEVs during the year. As a result, PHEVs accounted for 41%[2] of the total PEV purchases by Norwegian consumers.


Governments in several countries have started to remove or phase out existing policies that encourage the purchase of PEVs. In countries where this has happened, immediate and significant reductions in PEVs sales have been seen—for example, when Denmark’s government removed its PEV subsidies in 2016, the country saw a 71% decrease in BEV sales and a 49% decrease in PHEV sales compared with sales in the previous year.[3] Moving forward, the hope of many governments is that manufacturing costs will come down quickly enough to make PEVs more competitive in automobile markets, leading to increased sales.

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More recently, governments in several countries have proposed policies that would discourage or prohibit the use or sale of non-electric vehicles in future years. The Norwegian government hopes to end the sale of petroleum-fueled vehicles by 2025. India’s government announced that by 2030 only electric vehicles will be sold in India. The governments of France and the United Kingdom have stated that they will ban the sale of internal combustion engine vehicles by 2040.


Market developments


A number of market-related factors can affect the demand for PEVs, but the factors most commonly focused on are differences in the purchase prices and operational costs between plug-in and a gasoline-fueled vehicles. Although such measures are informative, other less tangible or difficult-to-measure costs are also important factors that affect adoption rates. These less tangible costs relate to whether the vehicles serve as perfect substitutes or not, given current technology and supporting infrastructure. In addition, income levels and a more general notion of consumer tastes and preferences are likely to influence the demand for PEVs as well.


To compare the relative costs associated with the two different types of vehicles, measures of vehicle price parity are commonly used. The idea behind these measures is that once the price of PEVs begins to approach the price of gasoline-fueled vehicles, consumers will become more willing to purchase PEVs rather than gasoline-fueled vehicles because it makes sense to do so financially.


Two methods are typically used to create measures to examine vehicle price parity. The first is based on total cost of ownership (TCO). Under this concept, parity is achieved when ownership costs are the same for two types of vehicle measured over their service lives. Factors such as fuel cost per mile, maintenance, and length of ownership factor prominently into these types of measures. Because the cost-per-mile and maintenance costs are typically lower for PEVs, TCO parity is usually achieved even though electric vehicles have a higher purchase price than gasoline vehicles.


The second measure of vehicle price parity is based on the purchase price of a comparable vehicle. Under this concept, price parity is reached when the upfront cost in purchasing a PEV without discounts or incentives is the same as that associated with an equivalent gasoline-fueled vehicle. To reach price parity with gasoline-fueled vehicles, battery packs for plug-in electric vehicles will likely need to decrease to about $100/kilowatt hour (kWh).


Customers in the more developed countries are more likely to purchase electric vehicles once TCO parity is achieved. This outcome results because consumers in less-developed countries who are purchasing a new vehicle for the first time are likely to face a greater financial burden in spending the additional money upfront to purchase a PEV.


The main factor that may contribute to future vehicle price parity is increasing economies of scale for vehicle powertrain components. As more batteries are produced, lower per-unit costs are realized because fixed overhead and development costs are spread across a greater number of units. However, a large increase in battery demand may lead to bottlenecks in the supply chain for essential components, keeping PEV prices high, at least in the near term.


The most expensive component affecting the overall costs of PEV vehicles is the battery cell. The cost of lithium-ion cells, the most commonly used PEV battery, has decreased from about $1,000 per kWh of storage in 2010 to between $130/kWh – $200/kWh in 2016, depending on the manufacturer. However, the cost of the battery pack for most manufactures is still more than $200/kWh. Further reductions in cost will need to be realized to fully achieve vehicle price parity with gasoline vehicles.


A potential bottleneck in the supply chain could be caused by the need for lithium or cobalt to produce PEV batteries. Over the past few years, the cost of lithium has quadrupled as the demand for lithium has grown more quickly than supply. In the long run, however, lithium production is likely to be sufficient to support robust growth in the production of PEVs.


The price of cobalt has also doubled in the past couple years. However, long-run prospects for using this material in PEV batteries are not as strong as those for lithium. Cobalt is a scarcer resource with lower proven reserves. In addition, many of the known reserves exist in less politically stable regions of the world. The degree to which such supply chain bottlenecks could inhibit or delay the ability of electric vehicles to achieve price parity is uncertain.


Infrastructure to support the growth of PEV use needs to be further developed in many countries. For example, less than 80% of the population in India had access to electricity in 2014.[4] In addition, many of those with access to electricity, often do not have a reliable source or enough electricity to power more than few basic household appliances. To circumvent this issue and keep costs down, India plans to sell plug-in electric vehicles and lease the batteries to consumers. When the battery is empty, the consumer can swap out the battery for a fully charged battery at a station. Thus, consumers will not need individual access to a reliable source for electricity, as long as they have access to battery replacement stations.


In more-developed countries, access to charging stations still places limits on PEV adoption. With the current technology, it takes hours to fully charge an electric battery without using a high-speed charger. Even with such a charger, it still takes longer to charge a battery than to fill a tank with gasoline. Because of limited availability of high-speed chargers, consumers need to be able to charge their vehicles at their residences or places of work. However, many consumers do not have access to electrical outlets where they park their cars. As a result, many countries will need to install charging stations near residences.


Another important factor affecting PEV adoption is personal tastes and preferences. In China, the government offers the second-highest monetary incentives to promote the purchase of PEVs, but consumers have been more frequently opting for more-expensive gasoline-powered sport-utility vehicles (SUVs). In May 2017, SUV sales in China experienced 17% year-on-year growth, reaching 3.78 million vehicles sold year to date.[5] However, new energy vehicles, which include battery electric, plug-in hybrid electric, and fuel cell cars, experienced 7.8% year-on-year growth, reaching 136,000 vehicles sold year to date.


SIDE CASES


The side cases focus on how different levels of global PEV sales affect transportation energy consumption in both Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non-OECD countries. To develop these cases, assumptions about consumer tastes and preferences were varied.


In the Low PEV Penetration case, consumers are less willing to pay the additional upfront cost for a PEV, resulting in fewer purchases than in the Reference case. This outcome results in less charging infrastructure being built and fewer makes and models of PEVs being developed. By 2040, the availability of fewer charging stations and fewer vehicle makes and models results in PEVs appearing even less attractive to consumers than in the Reference case.


In the High PEV Penetration case, consumers are more willing to pay the additional upfront cost for a PEV, resulting in more purchases than in the Reference case. This outcome results in more charging infrastructure being built and greater numbers of PEVs makes and models being developed for consumers. By 2040, the availability of more charging stations and more vehicle makes and models results in PEVs appearing even more attractive to consumers than in the Reference case.


In the Reference case, plug-in electric vehicles account for approximately 14% of the light-duty vehicle stock in 2040 (Figure IF-2). In the Low PEV Penetration case, plug-in electric vehicles account for 8% of the light-duty vehicle stock in that same year. In the High PEV Penetration case, plug-in electric vehicles account for 26% of the light-duty vehicle stock. In all three cases PEV sales as a percent of total new LDV sales increase quicker than PEV stocks as a percent of total stocks due to the large non-PEV stocks in many countries and LDV stock turnover rates.

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In all three cases, plug-in electric vehicles in OECD countries make up a larger share of the light-duty vehicle stock than in non-OECD countries for at least three reasons (Figure IF-3):

  • More OECD countries have current policies supporting the adoption of PEVs. Even policies supporting PEV adoption in the near term have an effect on the stock of plug-in electric vehicles in 2040 because of the 25-year service life associated with these vehicles.
  • Higher incomes in OECD countries make it easier for consumers to purchase PEVs before plug-in electric vehicle price parity is achieved.
  • OECD countries have better electric grid reliability, making it less risky for consumers to own electric vehicles.

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In the Reference case, most of global light-duty vehicle energy consumption comes from a petroleum-based fuel (motor gasoline, diesel, or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)) throughout the projection period (Figure IF-4). However, the share of petroleum-based fuel for light-duty vehicle use decreases over time. In particular, petroleum-based fuels made up 98% of light-duty vehicle energy consumption in 2015. By 2040, petroleum-based fuels make up 90% of light-duty vehicle energy consumption. Electricity is the fastest growing energy source used to power these vehicles.


Total light-duty vehicle energy consumption increases from 48 quadrillion Btu in 2015 to 56 quadrillion Btu in the Reference case (Figure IF-4). OECD countries’ light-duty vehicle energy consumption decreases from 32 quadrillion Btu in 2015 to 25 quadrillion Btu in 2040. For these countries collectively, decreases in fuel consumption resulting from increased fuel economy standards more than offset increases resulting from increased light-duty vehicle travel. During the same period, non-OECD countries increase their light-duty vehicle energy consumption from 16 quadrillion Btu in 2015 to 31 quadrillion Btu in 2040. As a result, OECD countries’ decrease in light-duty vehicle energy consumption between 2015 and 2040 is more than offset by the increase in non-OECD light-duty vehicle energy consumption.

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In the Low and High PEV Penetration cases, the different PEV penetration rates result in different levels of petroleum-based fuel, electricity, and natural gas consumption in the light-duty vehicle sector compared with the Reference case (Figure IF-5). In the Low PEV Penetration case, light-duty vehicles consume almost 2 quadrillion Btu more petroleum-based fuel in 2040 compared with the Reference case. In the High PEV Penetration case, light-duty vehicles consume almost 2.75 quadrillion Btu less petroleum-based fuel compared with the Reference case.


The differences in petroleum consumption in the two side cases do not result in a one-to-one change in energy consumption with natural gas and electricity because of the differences in efficiency between the vehicles. The battery portion of plug-in electric vehicles is more efficient than petroleum-fueled vehicles, which results in the use of fewer Btus of electricity to replace a given amount of Btus of petroleum-based fuel.

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Differences in worldwide PEV penetration are projected to have measurable effects on total liquids consumption. In the Reference case, total worldwide liquids consumption reaches 225 quadrillion Btu in 2040 (Figure IF-6). Transportation liquids consumption as a percent of total liquids consumption remains relatively flat throughout the projection period at around 55%. Most of the change in total liquid fuel consumption comes from the 38 quadrillion Btu increase in non-OECD countries between 2015 and 2040.

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In the Low PEV Penetration case, worldwide liquids consumption is almost 2 quadrillion Btu higher than in the Reference case, representing an additional 1%point increase in total liquids consumption in 2040 (Figure IF-7). The difference in total liquids consumption is larger for OECD countries than for non-OECD countries because OECD countries have more PEVs on-road in the Reference case. Total liquids consumption in OECD countries is almost 2% higher in the Low PEV Penetration case than in the Reference case.

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In the High PEV Penetration case, worldwide liquids consumption is 2.75 quadrillion Btu lower than in the Reference case in 2040 (Figure IF-8). This difference in liquids consumption represents a 1% reduction in total liquids consumption in the High PEV Penetration case compared with the Reference case. Both OECD and non-OECD countries increase PEV adoption throughout the projection period, resulting in almost equal decreases in total liquids consumption in OECD and non-OECD countries.

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The State of the Industry: Q2 2020 Financial Performance

It is, obviously, unsurprising that the recently released Q2 financials for the oil & gas supermajors contained distressed numbers as the first full quarter of Covid-19 impact washed over the entire industry. It is, however, surprising how the various behemoths of the energy world are choosing to respond to the new normal, and how past strategies have exposed either inherent strengths or weakness in their operational strategy.

Let’s begin with BP. With roots that stretch back to 1908 with the discovery of commercial oil in Persia, now Iran – BP arguably coined the phrase supermajor in the late 1990s, when acquisition of Amoco, Arco and Burmah Castrol married BP’s own substantial holdings in Europe and the Middle East to create a transatlantic oil and gas giant. It was a trend mirrored across the industry, with the Seven Sisters of the 1970s becoming ExxonMobil (Esso and Mobil), Chevron (Gulf Oil, Socal and Texaco) and modern day Royal Dutch Shell. Joining them were ConocoPhillips (Conoco and Phillips) and Total (Petrofina and Elf Aquitaine). As the world’s appetite for oil and gas increased at an accelerating pace, the supermajors became among the world’s largest and highest valued companies across the next two decades.

That is now poised for a major change. With fossil fuels waning in demand and renewables becoming more investable, BP is now declaring that it will no longer be a supermajor. CEO Bernard Looney made the announcement ahead of the release of the company’s Q2 financials, seeking to reinvent the firm as ‘integrated energy company’ rather than an ‘integrated oil company’. To make this change, Looney is looking to shrink BP’s oil and gas output by 40% through 2030 and invest heavily to become the world’s largest renewable energy businesses, putting climate change firmly on the agenda and getting ahead of the curve in meeting European directives for a low-carbon future. This was, perhaps, already on the cards. But the Covid-19 effect has hastened it. With a second quarter loss of US$6.7 billion, BP is choosing this time to rebrand itself for long-term transformation rather than maximise current shareholder value; indeed, it will slash dividends in half in order to invest cash for the future.

On the European side of the Atlantic, that trend is accelerating. Shell and Total are also aiming to be carbon neutral by 2050, alongside other European majors such as Eni and Equinor. That isn’t to say that oil or gas will no longer play a huge role in their operations – indeed Total and Eni in particular have made many recent and potentially lucrative finds in Egypt, South Africa and Suriname – just that oil and gas will become a smaller percentage of a diversified business. Both Shell and Total have also displayed how past strategic decisions have paid dividends in uncertain times. Both supermajors declared profits for the quarter, escaping the trend of underlying losses with net profits of US$638 million and US$126 million respectively when a deep red colour to the numbers was expected. The saving grace in a dramatic quarter was their trading activities, where the trading divisions of Shell and Total (as well as BP) took advantage of chaos in the market to deliver strong results. But even with this silver lining, Shell and Total are scaling back on dividends, as they join BP in a drive to diversify in the age of climate change, which has strong political backing in Europe where they are based.

On the other side of the pond, the mood surrounding climate change is decidedly different. ExxonMobil and Chevron aren’t exactly ignoring a low-carbon future but they aren’t exactly embracing it wholeheartedly either. Instead, both supermajors look to be focusing on maximising shareholder value by focusing on producing oil as profitably as possible. It explains why Chevron moved to acquire Noble Energy recently after failing to buy Anadarko last year, and why ExxonMobil is still gung-ho over American shale and its new found black gold assets in Guyana. The Permian remains on their focus; with economic pressure on, there are rich pickings in the shale patch that could turn American shale from a patchwork of ragtag independent drillers to big boy-dominated. In the short-term, that promises quick returns after the panic – especially with ExxonMobil and Chevron declaring net losses of US$1.08 billion and US$8.3 billion for Q2, respectively – but the underlying assumption to that is that the energy industry will recover and continue as it is for the foreseeable future, rather than the major upheaval predicted by their European counterparts.

For shareholders, and the companies themselves, the expectation is what the future will hold once the worse is over. That Q2 2020 financials dismal performance was never in doubt. What is more revealing is where the supermajors will go from here. Will BP’s attempt to end the supermajor era pay off? Or will American optimism return us back to business as usual? It’s two different visions of the future that will either way spell a sea change for the industry.

Market Outlook:

  • Crude price trading range: Brent – US$43-45/b, WTI – US$40-42/b
  • Global crude oil price benchmarks moved higher after a devastating blast in Lebanon that levelled a significant amount of Beirut’s port facilities
  • However, the market is also cautious as OPEC+ begins to wind its supply cuts down to a new level of 7.7 mmb/d with concerns that demand recovery is slower-than expected
  • OPEC’s Gulf nations – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE – also ended voluntary cuts made in June, but are looking to force Iraq to 100% compliance in August and September as the latest data continues to show it lagging behind commitments

End of Article 

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In this time of COVID-19, we have had to relook at the way we approach workplace learning. We understand that businesses can’t afford to push the pause button on capability building, as employee safety comes in first and mistakes can be very costly. That’s why we have put together a series of Virtual Instructor Led Training or VILT to ensure that there is no disruption to your workplace learning and progression.

Find courses available for Virtual Instructor Led Training through latest video conferencing technology.

August, 07 2020
Suriname’s Mega Discovery

It was just over five years ago that ExxonMobil discovered first oil in Guyana, transforming the sleepy South American country into the world’s upstream hotspot in just half a decade. The strike rate there has been amazing – 18 discoveries out of 20 well campaigns, and more seem to coming as new discovery efforts get underway. This made Guyana the envy of its neighbours. And why not? The Guyanese economy is projected to grow at 86% y-o-y in 2020, despite the Covid-19 pandemic, as first commercial oil from the Liza field hit the market.

Just over the Guyana border, Suriname, a former Dutch colony had all the more reason to be envious. Unlike Guyana, Suriname has an established upstream industry. Managed by the state oil firm Staastsolie, the volumes are paltry: the onshore Calcutta and Tamabredjo field collectively produce at a current rate of 17,000 b/d. Guyana’s Liza field alone is 15 times larger than Suriname’s total crude output. But the Guyanese miracle always did herald some hope that some of that golden dust could blow Suriname’s way, not least because the giant offshore discoveries in the Staebroek block were just across the maritime border.

In January 2020, this bet proved right. US independent Apache announced it had made a ‘significant oil discovery’ at the Maka-Central 1 well, the first suggestion that the Cretaceous oil formation in Guyana extended southeast to Suriname. Two more discoveries were announced by Apache in quick succession, Sapakara West and, just this week, Kwaskwasi. All three are located in the 1.4 million acre offshore Block 58, which was originally held entirely by Apache before French supermajor Total bought into a 50% stake just before the Maka Central discovery was announced. Three discoveries in six month is quite a payoff, especially with the Kwaskwasi-1 well delivering the highest net pay and confirming a ‘world-class hydrocarbon resource’. More importantly, initial findings suggest that Kwaskwasi holds oil with API gravities in the 34-43 degree range, the sort of light oil that is perfect for petrochemicals and higher-grade fuels.

With Total scheduled to take over operatorship of the block after a fourth drilling campaign, the partners are eager to extend their streak. The Sam Croft drillship is scheduled to head to Keskesi, the fourth scheduled prospect in Block 58, after operations at Kwaskwasi-1 have concluded, and an additional exploration campaign is already in the plans for 2021.

Total and Apache aren’t the only ones playing in Surinamese waters, though they are the first to hit the payday. Most of the country’s offshore blocks have been apportioned, snapped up by ExxonMobil, Kosmos, Petronas, Tullow and Equinor, and all are hoping to be the next to announce a find. ExxonMobil, with Equinor and Hess Energy, have a good position in Block 59, just next to the Caieteur block in Guyana, while Kosmos is hunting in Block 42, right next to the Canje block in Guyana. However, it is Malaysia’s Petronas that is the next likely candidate. Present in Suriname since 2016, when it drilled the exploratory Roselle-1 well in Block 52, Petronas also has interests in Block 48 and Block 53, and recently completed a farm-out sale with ExxonMobil for 50% of Block 52. Its drilling campaign for the Sloanea-1 well is scheduled to begin in Q4 2020, and will be keenly watched by all in Suriname.

Unlike Guyana that had no state oil company, Suriname has existing national oil infrastructure. Staatsolie currently controls onshore and shallow water areas in the country. However, all wells drill in offshore Block A, B, C and D have turned out dry so far. That leaves Staatsolie in a situation: its own areas are not prolific as discoveries by Total, Apache, Petronas et al. For now, Staatsolie is looking to gain rights to 10-20% of any oil discovery within Suriname, but the framework for this is weak and it must navigate carefully to not antagonise the oil majors that are powering the discoveries in its waters. It will do well to avoid the confrontational attitude that is jeopardising LNG development in Papua New Guinea with ExxonMobil and Total, but Staatsolie does have a claim to Suriname’s oil riches for itself.

For now, it is exhilarating to observe the progress in this previously quiet corner of South America. It is the closest thing to frontier oil exploration in the 21st century, with each new discovery generating more and more excitement. Who would have thought there was so much oil left undiscovered? Guyana has shot into the spotlight, Suriname is starting its own ascent and… who knows… could French Guiana be next?

End of Article 

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In this time of COVID-19, we have had to relook at the way we approach workplace learning. We understand that businesses can’t afford to push the pause button on capability building, as employee safety comes in first and mistakes can be very costly. That’s why we have put together a series of Virtual Instructor Led Training or VILT to ensure that there is no disruption to your workplace learning and progression.

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August, 01 2020
2019 U.S. coal production falls to its lowest level since 1978

U.S. total annual coal production

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Coal Report

In 2019, U.S. coal production totaled 706 million short tons (MMst), a 7% decrease from the 756 MMst mined in 2018. Last year’s production was the lowest amount of coal produced in the United States since 1978, when a coal miners’ strike halted most of the country’s coal production from December 1977 to March 1978. Weekly coal production estimates from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) show the United States is on pace for an even larger decline in 2020, falling to production levels comparable with those in the 1960s.

2019 annual coal production by state

2019 annual coal production, top 10 coal-producing states


Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Coal Report

Wyoming produces more coal than any other state, representing 39% of U.S. coal production in 2019, at 277 MMst, which is 9% lower than its coal production in 2018. Coal production in West Virginia, the state with the second-highest coal output, fell by a relatively smaller 2% in 2019. West Virginia is a primary producer of metallurgical coal, which saw sustained demand for exports in 2019. Coal production recently stopped in two states, Kansas in 2017 and Arkansas in 2018. Arizona stopped producing coal in the fall of 2019 when the coal-fired Navajo Generating Station and adjacent Kayenta coal mine that supplied it both closed.

EIA estimates weekly coal production using coal railcar loadings. In 2020, weekly coal railcar loadings have been trending much lower than 2019 levels, and most recent year-to-date coal railcar loadings were down 27% compared with 2019.

U.S. weekly railcar loadings

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Coal Production

The decline of U.S. coal production so far in 2020 reflects less demand for coal internationally and less generation from U.S. coal-fired power plants. U.S. coal exports through May 2020 are 29% lower than during the first five months of 2019. U.S. coal-fired generation fell to a 42-year low in 2019, decreasing nearly 16% from the previous year, and has fallen another 34% through May 2020.

Estimated U.S. coal production through mid-July 2020 is 27% lower than the average annual 2019 output, and EIA expects these reductions in production to persist during the remainder of the year. In the latest Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), EIA forecasts a 29% decline in U.S. coal production in 2020.

EIA forecasts that U.S. coal production will increase by 7% in 2021, when rising natural gas prices may cause some coal-fired electric power plants to become more economical to dispatch. Much of EIA’s projected recovery in coal production is in the western United States.

Principal contributor: Rosalyn Berry

July, 29 2020