Last week, Indonesian state energy firm Pertamina admitted that the country may become a net importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG) by 2020, as soaring demand in the populous western islands dwarf domestic supplies from the energy-rich east. This isn’t the first time that this scenario has been mooted – the BMI Group projects the tipping point to be 2022, while Wood Mackenzie expects LNG demand in Indonesia to hit 7 mtpa by 2020 – with the fundamental structural shift always being the same: rising demand from a growing population and industrial base versus declining output at the country’s domestic gas fields.
As a country, Indonesia has some 1.6% of the world’s total gas reserves, according to the BP Statistical Review. In theory, it should not be in a situation where it is short of gas. The reality is though, that Indonesia is a country of two halves – the gas-deficit west, where the islands of Sumatra and Java represent nearly three-quarters of demand, and the gas-surplus east, where remote areas in Kalimantan, Papua, Maluku and Nusa Tenggara churn out plenty of natural gas. Bridging the two is tough. As an archipelago, Indonesia cannot opt for a nation-wide pipeline network; even within the country, domestic liquefaction and regasification facilities are required to move natural gas from producing areas in the east to consuming areas in the west.
That infrastructure is still lacking. Indonesia has a national roadmap to make natural gas 20% of the national energy mix by 2025, and has set out a US$48.2 billion plan from 2016 to 2030 to build an ambitious gas grid. The existing infrastructure is mainly concentrated on regas facilities in Java and a pipeline connecting to Riau islands in the South China Sea to Java running through Sumatra, which does not solve the conundrum of moving gas from Indonesia’s east to west. So the planned investment will be primarily focused on building a network of smaller-scale liquefaction facilities across the east, supplemented by mini-LNG terminals connected directly to gas-fired power plants in the east.
This, in theory, should allow Indonesia to bridge the gap between its two halves. The question is, will there be enough gas? Indonesia is currently the fifth largest LNG exporter in the world, but its contracts are aging and based on maturing fields where international firms are the operators. They will be sending most of that LNG to Japan and Korea, with a lesser portion saved for the Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) clause. Given declining natural gas output in recent years, the DMO supply is insufficient to meet growing demand. Unlike Petronas in Malaysia, Pertamina does not have an international network of gas and LNG sources with which it can swap and juggle to maintain domestic balance.
Starting up new production sources is an answer, but this has always been an area that Indonesia faces immense problems with due to the fiscal terms it offers for its E&P contracts. ExxonMobil walked away from the East Natuna project earlier this year over exactly that, while years of wrangling have push the projected start of Inpex/Shell’s Masela-Abadi LNG project from 2018 to 2025 at the earliest. Chevron’s Indonesia Deepwater Development (IDD) project in the Makassar Strait was supposed to start in 2016, but has now been pushed to 2020 due to ‘bureaucratic holdups’. These three, and other projects, would have provided enough additional LNG supplies to allow domestic supply to keep pace with demand, but chronic delays have axed the scenario. That isn’t to say that there aren’t bright spots in Indonesia’s natural gas scene – Eni’s Jangkrik field is reporting results that are a third higher than its initial 450 mmscf/d capacity, and BP has sanctioned an expansion of Tangguh LNG to include a Train 3 – but these are balanced with weak spots, like Total’s recent reduction in the expected output for the Mahakam field, which feeds the Bontang LNG plant.
So Indonesia must turn to imports to meet demand, which is projected to grow rapidly given the Indonesia government’s push to move power generation from coal to gas. A recent suggestion that Indonesia may be purchasing LNG from Singapore caused some furore based on national pride last month, but this is the future. Pertamina already has LNG supply deals with Australia’s Woodside (2019-2034), Cheniere (from 2018-2038) and ExxonMobil (2025-2045). Cavalier Indonesian officials may think that this might not even be needed – suggesting that this is ‘insurance’ supply that can be quickly redirected on the international market – but reality is more stark. As things stand, if there was an OPEC for gas, Indonesia would be forced to bow out in 2020. That’s not necessarily a bad thing – Malaysia recently went through a similar evolution – but it does mean that resource patriotism can no longer apply.
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Headline crude prices for the week beginning 18 March 2019 – Brent: US$67/b; WTI: US$58/b
Headlines of the week
Midstream & Downstream
Risk and reward – improving recovery rates versus exploration
A giant oil supply gap looms. If, as we expect, oil demand peaks at 110 million b/d in 2036, the inexorable decline of fields in production or under development today creates a yawning gap of 50 million b/d by the end of that decade.
How to fill it? It’s the preoccupation of the E&P sector. Harry Paton, Senior Analyst, Global Oil Supply, identifies the contribution from each of the traditional four sources.
1. Reserve growth
An additional 12 million b/d, or 24%, will come from fields already in production or under development. These additional reserves are typically the lowest risk and among the lowest cost, readily tied-in to export infrastructure already in place. Around 90% of these future volumes break even below US$60 per barrel.
2. pre-drill tight oil inventory and conventional pre-FID projects
They will bring another 12 million b/d to the party. That’s up on last year by 1.5 million b/d, reflecting the industry’s success in beefing up the hopper. Nearly all the increase is from the Permian Basin. Tight oil plays in North America now account for over two-thirds of the pre-FID cost curve, though extraction costs increase over time. Conventional oil plays are a smaller part of the pre-FID wedge at 4 million b/d. Brazil deep water is amongst the lowest cost resource anywhere, with breakevens eclipsing the best tight oil plays. Certain mature areas like the North Sea have succeeded in getting lower down the cost curve although volumes are small. Guyana, an emerging low-cost producer, shows how new conventional basins can change the curve.
3. Contingent resource
These existing discoveries could deliver 11 million b/d, or 22%, of future supply. This cohort forms the next generation of pre-FID developments, but each must overcome challenges to achieve commerciality.
Last, but not least, yet-to-find. We calculate new discoveries bring in 16 million b/d, the biggest share and almost one-third of future supply. The number is based on empirical analysis of past discovery rates, future assumptions for exploration spend and prospectivity.
Can yet-to-find deliver this much oil at reasonable cost? It looks more realistic today than in the recent past. Liquids reserves discovered that are potentially commercial was around 5 billion barrels in 2017 and again in 2018, close to the late 2030s ‘ask’. Moreover, exploration is creating value again, and we have argued consistently that more companies should be doing it.
But at the same time, it’s the high-risk option, and usually last in the merit order – exploration is the final top-up to meet demand. There’s a danger that new discoveries – higher cost ones at least – are squeezed out if demand’s not there or new, lower-cost supplies emerge. Tight oil’s rapid growth has disrupted the commercialisation of conventional discoveries this decade and is re-shaping future resource capture strategies.
To sustain portfolios, many companies have shifted away from exclusively relying on exploration to emphasising lower risk opportunities. These mostly revolve around commercialising existing reserves on the books, whether improving recovery rates from fields currently in production (reserves growth) or undeveloped discoveries (contingent resource).
Emerging technology may pose a greater threat to exploration in the future. Evolving technology has always played a central role in boosting expected reserves from known fields. What’s different in 2019 is that the industry is on the cusp of what might be a technological revolution. Advanced seismic imaging, data analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence, the cloud and supercomputing will shine a light into sub-surface’s dark corners.
Combining these and other new applications to enhance recovery beyond tried-and-tested means could unlock more reserves from existing discoveries – and more quickly than we assume. Equinor is now aspiring to 60% from its operated fields in Norway. Volume-wise, most upside may be in the giant, older, onshore accumulations with low recovery factors (think ExxonMobil and Chevron’s latest Permian upgrades). In contrast, 21st century deepwater projects tend to start with high recovery factors.
If global recovery rates could be increased by a percentage or two from the average of around 30%, reserves growth might contribute another 5 to 6 million b/d in the 2030s. It’s just a scenario, and perhaps makes sweeping assumptions. But it’s one that should keep conventional explorers disciplined and focused only on the best new prospects.
Global oil supply through 2040
Things just keep getting more dire for Venezuela’s PDVSA – once a crown jewel among state energy firms, and now buried under debt and a government in crisis. With new American sanctions weighing down on its operations, PDVSA is buckling. For now, with the support of Russia, China and India, Venezuelan crude keeps flowing. But a ghost from the past has now come back to haunt it.
In 2007, Venezuela embarked on a resource nationalisation programme under then-President Hugo Chavez. It was the largest example of an oil nationalisation drive since Iraq in 1972 or when the government of Saudi Arabia bought out its American partners in ARAMCO back in 1980. The edict then was to have all foreign firms restructure their holdings in Venezuela to favour PDVSA with a majority. Total, Chevron, Statoil (now Equinor) and BP agreed; ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused. Compensation was paid to ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, which was considered paltry. So the two American firms took PDVSA to international arbitration, seeking what they considered ‘just value’ for their erstwhile assets. In 2012, ExxonMobil was awarded some US$260 million in two arbitration awards. The dispute with ConocoPhillips took far longer.
In April 2018, the International Chamber of Commerce ruled in favour of ConocoPhillips, granting US$2.1 billion in recovery payments. Hemming and hawing on PDVSA’s part forced ConocoPhillips’ hand, and it began to seize control of terminals and cargo ships in the Caribbean operated by PDVSA or its American subsidiary Citgo. A tense standoff – where PDVSA’s carriers were ordered to return to national waters immediately – was resolved when PDVSA reached a payment agreement in August. As part of the deal, ConocoPhillips agreed to suspend any future disputes over the matter with PDVSA.
The key word being ‘future’. ConocoPhillips has an existing contractual arbitration – also at the ICC – relating to the separate Corocoro project. That decision is also expected to go towards the American firm. But more troubling is that a third dispute has just been settled by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes tribunal in favour of ConocoPhillips. This action was brought against the government of Venezuela for initiating the nationalisation process, and the ‘unlawful expropriation’ would require a US$8.7 billion payment. Though the action was brought against the government, its coffers are almost entirely stocked by sales of PDVSA crude, essentially placing further burden on an already beleaguered company. A similar action brought about by ExxonMobil resulted in a US$1.4 billion payout; however, that was overturned at the World Bank in 2017.
But it might not end there. The danger (at least on PDVSA’s part) is that these decisions will open up floodgates for any creditors seeking damages against Venezuela. And there are quite a few, including several smaller oil firms and players such as gold miner Crystallex, who is owed US$1.2 billion after the gold industry was nationalised in 2011. If the situation snowballs, there is a very tempting target for creditors to seize – Citgo, PDVSA’s crown jewel that operates downstream in the USA, which remains profitable. And that would be an even bigger disaster for PDVSA, even by current standards.
Infographic: Venezuela oil nationalisation dispute timeline