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Overview


South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in July 2011. Although most of the oil production capacity in those two countries is in South Sudan, the country is landlocked and remains dependent on Sudan’s export pipelines and port. Civil unrest, disagreements over oil revenue sharing, and border disputes have curtailed oil production and investment in both countries.


South Sudan was officially recognized as an independent nation state in July 2011 following a referendum held in January 2011, when the South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly in favor of secession. Since the split, Sudan and South Sudan’s oil production has declined because of continued domestic political instability and conflict between the two countries.


The unified Sudan began producing oil in 1999, and as a result, the country tripled its per capita income within a decade.1 However, the secession of South Sudan significantly affected Sudan’s economy because it lost 75% of its oil production fields to South Sudan. According to an International Monetary Fund country report, Sudan’s government revenues and foreign exchange earnings fell by about one-half and two-thirds, respectively.2 Sudan and South Sudan’s oil sectors play a vital role in their economies and are closely linked; most of their producing assets are near or extend across their shared border. Although South Sudan now controls a substantial amount of the oil-producing fields, it is dependent on Sudan for transporting oil through its pipelines for processing and export. The transit and processing fees South Sudan must pay to Sudan to transport its crude oil are an important revenue stream for Sudan.3


Disruptions in oil production, disputes over oil revenue sharing, and lower oil prices have had a negative effect on both economies. In January 2012, South Sudan shut down virtually all of its oil production because of a dispute with Sudan over transit fees. The dispute was not resolved until April 2013 after protracted negotiations. In December 2013, a conflict between government forces and rebel factions led to a civil war in South Sudan. The peace agreement brokered in August 2015 provided a temporary reprieve, but fighting resumed in July 2016 and the security situation is still tenuous.4


Sudan has been more successful in weathering the downturn in oil prices in recent years by shifting to a more diversified economy. In addition, the partial lifting of U.S. sanctions on Sudan in October 2017 may provide more opportunities to attract additional foreign investment.5 Prospects for South Sudan are less optimistic, given the uncertain outcome for the ongoing peace process, its dependence on crude oil for revenue in the lower oil price environment, weak investor confidence, and a lack of functioning infrastructure.


Figure 1. Map of Sudan and South Sudan 

History


After gaining independence in 1956, the unified Sudan fought two civil wars. The second civil war ended with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government and opposition forces in 2005, and the outcome of the 2011 referendum led to a newly created independent state: South Sudan. Border issues are a major source of tension between the two countries post-secession, and political dynamics in both countries pose significant security risks for the oil sector.


Sudan has experienced two civil wars since gaining independence in 1956. The second civil war ended with the help of international observers and led to the signing of the CPA by the Sudanese government and the rebel factions in the southern region in 2005. The CPA established guidelines for oil revenue sharing and a timeframe to hold a referendum for independence of the South. The southern region overwhelmingly voted for secession, and in July 2011, South Sudan became an independent nation-state that is separate from Sudan, with Juba and Khartoum as their respective capitals.6


Armed conflict in both countries has persisted in the post-referendum period, as unresolved issues on domestic and interstate relations still linger. Both countries still contest some areas around the demarcated border the CPA established. Disputes over the Abyei area and the Heglig oilfield in South Kordofan state have been particularly contentious, as the areas have strategic importance for the oil sector and agricultural resources that both countries rely on, adding another layer of complexity to the disputes.7 In January 2012, South Sudan announced that it would shut its oil production over a dispute about oil transit fees. The dispute later turned violent, as the South Sudanese army–the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)–and Sudanese opposition forces took control of the oilfield for more than a week and destroyed critical infrastructure, which temporarily reduced Sudan’s oil production by more than 50%. The conflict was resolved in November 2012 with support from the international community, and both governments reached an agreement on oil transit fees and on compensation for lost production.8


The cooperation agreements and implementation matrix, which states the timeframe to carry out the obligations stipulated in the cooperation agreements, paved the way for restarting oil production in April 2013. According to a Business Monitor Intelligence (BMI) Research report, South Sudan currently pays Sudan US $24.50/barrel, which consists of a US $9.50/barrel transit fee and a US $15/barrel fee to cover the cost of debt repayment that is shared between the two countries.9 The drop of oil prices in 2014, however, has significantly lowered export revenues. Because South Sudan’s Dar blend trades at a significant discount to Brent, a drop in the price of Brent could significantly affect South Sudan’s fiscal position.10


Since the signing of the implementation matrix, the governments of Sudan and South Sudan shifted their focus from border conflicts to the mitigation of their respective domestic opposition factions. In September 2013, large-scale protests broke out around Sudan in response to cuts in fuel and basic commodities subsidies. The Sudanese security forces responded with violence, leading to hundreds of casualties.11 Divisions within the South Sudanese government eventually led to a civil war that still continues as of January 2018. The domestic political dynamics and the security situations in both countries directly affected negotiations on oil production and transportation and will continue to be a potential risk for disrupting the countries’ oil supplies and exports.


Petroleum and other liquids


Most of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s proved reserves of oil and natural gas are located in the Muglad and Melut Basins, which extend into both countries. Natural gas associated with oil production is mostly flared or reinjected into wells, and neither country currently produces nor consumes dry natural gas.


According to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy, Sudan and South Sudan had 1.5 billion barrels and 3.5 billion barrels of proved oil reserves, as of January 1, 2017, respectively. Most of these reserves are located in the oil-rich Muglad and Melut basins, which extend into both countries. Oil and natural gas exploration in Sudan and South Sudan is limited outside of these basins because of the lack of evidence of prospective acreage and the persistent civil unrest affecting both countries.12 Sudan has made efforts in the past few years to boost oil production levels by attracting new investment and awarding exploration licenses to develop several blocks, but progress has been slow.13


Natural gas associated with oil fields is mostly flared or reinjected. Despite proved reserves of 3 trillion cubic feet, natural gas development has been limited. According to the latest data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), Sudan emitted approximately 13.8 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of flared natural gas in 2016. From 2013 to 2016, Sudan was ranked 39th in the world for flared natural gas volume and intensity.14


Oil sector management


Prolonged sanctions against the unified Sudan allowed Asian national oil companies to dominate Sudan’s and South Sudan’s oil sectors. The China National Petroleum Corporation, India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, and Malaysia’s Petronas hold large stakes in the leading consortia that operate oil fields and pipelines. Sudan and South Sudan’s national oil companies, Sudapet and Nilepet, respectively, also hold small stakes in operations.


In Sudan, three main entities oversee activities in Sudan’s petroleum sector: the Ministry of Petroleum (MOP) administers and manages the Sudanese oil sector; the Sudanese Petroleum Corporation (SPC), a fully state-owned arm of MOP, is responsible for exploration, production, and distribution of crude oil and petroleum products; and Sudapet, the national oil company, holds minority stakes in each of the international consortia operating in the oil-producing blocks. 15


In South Sudan, the administrative structure largely mirrors Sudan’s. The Ministry of Petroleum and Mining is responsible for managing South Sudan’s petroleum sector. The National Petroleum and Gas Corporation (NPGC) is the main policymaking and supervisory body and reports directly to the president and national legislative assembly; it participates in all segments of the hydrocarbon sector and approves petroleum agreements on the government’s behalf. The Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) is South Sudan’s national oil company, and its activities mirror much of the responsibilities of its Sudanese counterpart. Nilepet oversees operations in the petroleum sector, and because of its limited technical expertise and financial resources, it holds minority stakes in production-sharing contracts with foreign oil companies.16 South Sudan’s Transitional Constitution, the 2012 Petroleum Act, and the 2013 Petroleum Revenue Management Act define the regulatory framework governing the hydrocarbon sector.17


Asian national oil companies (NOCs) dominate the oil sectors in both countries. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), and Malaysia’s Petronas hold large stakes in the leading consortia operating in both countries: the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the Dar Petroleum Operating Company, and the Sudd Petroleum Operating Company. The lifting of U.S. sanctions against Sudan in October 2017 may provide opportunities for other foreign investors to enter the industry.


Table 1: Main oil companies in Sudan and South Sudan
Consortium/subsidiaryCompanyCountry of
origin
Share %
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC)CNPCChina40
PetronasMalaysia30
ONGCIndia25
Sudapet*Sudan5
Greater Pioneer Operating Company (GPOC)CNPCChina40
PetronasMalaysia30
ONGCIndia25
Nilepet*South Sudan5
Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC)CNPCChina41
PetronasMalaysia40
NilepetSouth Sudan8
SinopecChina6
Tri-ocean EnergyEgypt5
Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC)PetronasMalaysis67.9
ONGCIndia24.1
NilepetSouth Sudan8.0
Petro Energy Operating Company (PEOC)CNPCChina95
SudapetSudan5
Petrolines for Crude Oil Ltd. (Petco)PetcoSudan50
SudapetSudan50
Source: Company websites, IHS Edin, IHS Markit, BMI Research


Crude oil production


Sudan and South Sudan have experienced frequent disruptions to oil production because of disputes over oil revenue sharing and armed conflict. Maturing oil fields and persistent violence, in conjunction with a lower oil price environment, have dampened investor confidence in spite of efforts to attract foreign investment.


Most crude oil in Sudan and South Sudan is produced in the Muglad and Melut basins. South Sudan’s secession in 2011 substantially reduced Sudan’s oil production capabilities, because most of the oil fields are located in South Sudan. Sudan brought online two small oil fields in Blocks 6 and 17 at the end of 2012, and the country is exploring offshore production in the Red Sea basin. However, progress in developing the Red Sea basin area has been slow.18 In addition, Sudan’s oilfields are reaching maturity and thus nearing depletion. Sudan is trying to mitigate declining output by using enhanced oil recovery (EOR) techniques, but the decline is expected to continue.19


The partial lifting of U.S. sanctions imposed on Sudan has led to a renewed push by the Sudanese government to attract foreign investment in the upstream sector. In November 2017, Sudan put up 15 blocks for direct negotiation, with a possible second round in February 2018. Discussions of potential development projects between the government and State Oil Canada Ltd. and Russia-based Lukoil have been reported.20


In South Sudan, the ongoing civil war and political instability have undermined its ability to increase output to peak production capacity. Low investor confidence and the poor security situation pose serious obstacles to the government’s ability to boost crude oil production, and they may need to rely on deals that are privately negotiated with smaller companies such as Nigeria-based Oranto, which secured a 90% stake in Block B321. According to a recent study conducted by the World Bank Group on unsolicited proposals in infrastructure projects, privately negotiated transactions can face significant risk of cost overruns, delays in implementation, or early termination. Transactions that are privately negotiated, as opposed to transactions that use a competitive bidding process for procurement, are also more vulnerable than to allegations of corruption, whether perceived or real, which could complicate the execution of the project.22


South Sudan and, to a lesser extent, Sudan have experienced frequent disruptions to production because of disagreements over oil revenue sharing over the past few years. Damaged infrastructure and shut-in fields stemming from conflict have lowered overall production levels, and efforts to repair infrastructure or re-start production have been delayed. In 2016, combined production from both countries was 257,000 barrels per day (b/d)—lower than the peak production levels of 2010 when the unified Sudan produced approximately 486,000 b/d.23 Crude oil production in Sudan and South Sudan averaged approximately 102,000 b/d and 150,000 b/d in 2017, respectively.24 It is unlikely that either country will be able to increase production without significant improvements to the security situation or an increase in foreign investment.

Table 2: Sudan and South Sudan oil fields and operators
CountryLocationMain fieldsBlendOperator

Sudan
Block 1Unity, Toma, MungaNileGNPOC
Block 2Heglig, BambooNileGNPOC, Petrolines
Block 4Diffra, NeemNileGNPOC
Block 6Fula, HadidaFulaPetro Energy
Block 17al-BarasayaNASudapet*
Block 25Rawat Central, WateeshNASudapet*
South SudanBlock 1Unity, Toma, MungaNileGNPOC
Block 2Heglig, BambooNileGNPOC
Block 4Diffra, NeemNileGNPOC
Block 3 & 7Palogue, Adar-YaleDarDPOC
Block 5Mala, Thar JathNileSPOC
Source: IHS Markit, IHS Edin, Rystad, BMI Research 
Note: Star Oil exited partnership in 2016, Sudapet now sole operator


Export oil pipelines, storage, and port


Sudan has two main export pipelines that travel north across the country to the Bashayer Marine Terminal, located about 15 miles south of Port Sudan. Most of Sudan’s storage facilities for crude oil and refined products are also located at the Bashayer Terminal. The Bashayer Marine Terminal has a storage facility with a capacity of 2.5 million b/d and an export/import facility with a handling capacity of 1.2 million b/d. The terminal is operated by the GNPOC. South Sudan currently does not have any significant storage capacity.25


South Sudan exports all of its crude oil via pipeline through Sudan. Plans for the construction of a separate pipeline have been reported that would allow South Sudan to export crude oil through neighboring Kenya or Djibouti via Ethiopia and avoid transit fees.26 However, it is unlikely that the pipeline will be built, because production in South Sudan has been affected by the natural maturation of its fields and by disruptions.


Sudan and South Sudan produce three crude oil blends: Dar, Nile, and Fula. The Dar blend (25.0° API gravity, 0.11% sulfur) is a heavy paraffinic type of crude oil that has a high acid content and must be heated during transport to avoid congealing in ship tanks.27 The Dar blend is produced at Blocks 3 and 7 in the Melut Basin, which is controlled by South Sudan.28The Nile blend (33.9° API gravity, 0.06% sulfur) is produced in the Muglad Basin at Blocks 1, 2, 4, and 5A; it is a medium, low-sulfur waxy crude oil and is a more attractive blend to refiners because of its high fuel and gasoil yields.29 The Fula blend is a highly acidic crude oil that is produced in the Muglad Basin at Block 6 and is transported via pipeline to the Khartoum refinery, where it is processed for domestic use rather than for export.30


The Petrodar (PDOC) pipeline transports crude oil from Palogue and Adar Yale oil fields (Blocks 3E and 7E) in the Melut Basin to the Bashayer Marine Terminal in Port Sudan. The pipeline is approximately 850 miles long with a design capacity of 500,000 b/d, and it has several heating units to facilitate the movement of the Dar blend crude oil along the pipeline.31


The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) pipeline transports Nile blend crude oil from the Heglig oil fields (Blocks 2 and 4) in Sudan and the Thar Jath and Mala oil fields (Block 1 and 5A) in South Sudan to the Bashayer Marine Terminal in Port Sudan for export, and to two refineries in El-Obeid and Khartoum for refining and distribution to the domestic market. South Sudan’s Thar Jath-Heglig section of the pipeline is approximately 100 miles and has a capacity of 200,000 b/d; the Heglig-Port Sudan section is approximately 930 miles long with a design capacity of 450,000 b/d.32 In September 2014, ownership of the pipeline and facilities was fully transferred to a local Sudanese pipeline operator, Petrolines for Crude Oil Ltd. (PETCO).33

Table 3: Crude oil pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan
OperatorStart of pipelineDestinationCrude oil blend
type
Aprox. length (miles)Design capacity
('000 bbl/d)
Main crude oil pipelines
DPOCBlock 3 and 7Bashayer Terminal 2, Port SudanDar850500
GNPOCHeglig facilitiesBashayer Terminal 1, Port SudanNile1000450
SPOCBlock 5AConnects to Heglig facilitiesNile60200
CNPCBlock 6Khartoum RefineryFula450200
Proposed crude oil pipelines
--South SudanLamu (Kenya)----450
--South SudanDjibouti via Ethiopia------
Source: Company websites, IHS Markit, BMI Research, IHS Edin

Figure 2. Crude oil production in Sudan and South Sudan

Crude oil exports


China is the leading export destination for crude oil from Sudan and South Sudan. In 2016, China accounted for 94% and 100% of Sudan’s and South Sudan’s crude oil exports, respectively.


Sudan and South Sudan export the Nile and Dar blends to Asian markets. All crude oil produced in South Sudan is exported via pipeline to Sudan for refining or export, because South Sudan has no refining capacity, and Sudan is the only country in the region with the refining infrastructure capable of processing these particular blends.34 Crude oil is exported from Port Sudan to Asia via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Given the lack of alternative transit routes, Bab el-Mandeb is a strategically important chokepoint that if blocked or closed could lead to significant increases in shipping time and costs.35


According to the United Nations international trade statistics database (UN Comtrade), Sudan and South Sudan exported a total of approximately 127,000 b/d of crude oil in 2016. Although this level is higher than the 65,000 b/d exported in 2012 during the production shutdown, it is lower than the 182,000 b/d exported in 2014. China is by far the largest export destination for Sudan’s and South Sudan’s crude oil, receiving almost 99% of total exports. India and Japan also import relatively small volumes of Sudan and South Sudan’s crude oil.Figure 3. Sudan and South Sudan crude oil exports
Figure 4. Sudan and South Sudan total exports in 2016

Oil refineries


Sudan has two oil refineries and three topping plants (smaller, less complex refineries) with a total capacity of 143,700 b/d. However, the only active refineries are the Khartoum (al-Jaili) refinery and the El-Obeid topping plant.36 The al-Jaili refinery, located approximately 45 miles north of Khartoum, is the country’s largest, with a capacity of 100,000 b/d. The other full-conversion refinery is the Port Sudan refinery (21,700 b/d), and the three topping plants are El-Obeid (10,000 b/d), Shajirah (10,000 b/d), and Abu Gabra (2,000 b/d).37


The al-Jaili refinery initially came online in 2000 with a capacity of 50,000 b/d and was a 50/50 joint venture between the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) and CNPC. It was later expanded in 2006, increasing total capacity to 100,000 b/d and creating two production lines that would allow the refining of both Nile and Fula blend crude oils. The expansion was notable for using the world’s first delayed-coking unit, a unit required to process Fula crude oil because of its high acid and calcium content. Discussions between Sudanese and Chinese officials on a proposed second expansion that could double the refinery’s capacity have been reported, but no significant progress has been made.38 Petronas signed a contract with MEM to expand the currently inactive Port Sudan refinery through a 50/50 joint venture and to add 100,000 b/d to its capacity, but development has been postponed as a result of rising costs.39


In South Sudan, two refineries were under construction: a 3,000 b/d refinery at Bentiu in the Unity State and a 10,000 b/d refinery at Thiangrial in the Upper Nile region. Plans to expand the Bentiu refinery to increase its capacity to 5,000 b/d have been reported. However, security issues have delayed the completion of the refineries, and it is unclear when or if the refineries will be operational.40

Table 4: Oil refineries in Sudan and South Sudan
CountryRefineryCapacity
(000 bbl/d)
StatusOperator
SudanKhartoum (al-Jaili)100OperationalCNPC/Sudapet
Port Sudan21.7Not operatingSudapet
El Obeid10OperationalSudapet
Shajirah10Not operatingConcorp
Abu Gabra2Not operatingSudapet
Total Capacity 143.7  
Planned refineriesOperator and/or builder 
South SudanUnity State (Bentiu)5Under constructionSafinat (Russia)/Nilepet
Upper Nile (Tangrial)10SuspendedGovernment of South Sudan
Proposed refineries
SudanPort Sudan100-- 
Khartoum (expansion)100-- 
Source: BMI Research, IHS Markit, PFC Energy, African Development Bank 
Note: The initial plan for construction at the Bentiu refinery in South Sudan was to build facilities with a capacity to process 3,000 b/d. Plans for expansion to increase capacity to 5,000 b/d have been discussed, but no progress has been made.


Liquids consumption


Oil consumption in Sudan and South Sudan peaked at 125,000 b/d in 2009 and has slightly declined to about 105,000 b/d in 2017.41 Domestic consumption of petroleum products grew rapidly with increased industrialization, car ownership, and access to electricity in the 2000s; however, the persistent instability in both states has dampened consumption.


Petroleum consumption in Sudan has been met by domestically refined crude oil, although lower production levels over the past few years have led to an increase of imported petroleum products to meet shortfalls in domestic demand. According to the latest data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), diesel and fuel oil for electricity generation, followed by gasoline for transportation, make up a significant portion of Sudan’s oil consumption, constituting 40% and 17% of total consumption in 2015, respectively. Diesel/fuel oil and gasoline make up an ever larger share of South Sudan’s oil consumption at 73% and 10% in 2015, respectively, although in absolute terms, its oil consumption has been declining.42

Figure 5. Petroleum and other liquids consumption in Sudan and South Sudan

Electricity


Sudan


Total electricity generation in Sudan was 12.7 billion kilowatthours (kWh) in 2015, of which 66% was generated by hydropower.43 Although power generation has continued to grow in the post-independence era, only 45% of the population had access to electricity in 2014, according to latest estimates from the World Bank.44 Approximately 40% of the population had access to electricity in 2013, with urban populations benefitting from a substantially higher level of access than rural populations, according to the most recent estimates made by African Development Bank (AfDB). Those not connected to a grid rely on biomass or diesel-fired generators for electricity.45 Sudan has two interconnected grids, the Blue Nile and Western grids, that cover a small portion of the country. An additional fourteen centers receive service from thermal generators and local distribution networks.46


Hydroelectricity is generated from seven dams: Roseires, Sinnar, Jebel Aulia, Khashm el-Girba, Merowe, Rumela, and Burdana. The Rumela and Burdana dams, located on the Upper Atbara and Setit rivers in eastern Sudan, were brought online in 2017 and are the most recent additions in hydropower generation. According to BMI Research reports, the two dams added 320 megawatts (MW) and 15 MW to total generation capacity, respectively.47 Development of the Kajbar dam, located further north in the Nile Valley, has stalled. The dam was strongly opposed by local communities because of its potentially significant environmental impact, and no evidence of progress regarding its construction is evident. The Kajbar dam, along with two other proposed hydropower projects, the Dal and El-Shireig dams, are heavily financed by the Saudi government.48


Regarding nonhydropower generation, the 500 MW Kosti Thermal Power Plant that came online in 2016 is an oil-fired plant jointly sponsored by the Sudanese and Indian government that was constructed by India-based Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.49 The Sudanese government is attempting to diversify its power generation mix by focusing on developing conventional thermal plants to meet domestic energy demand. However, the proposed projects are still at an early stage and rely heavily on Saudi financing. With the significant cuts in the Saudi budget as a result of lower oil prices, the future of these plants remains in doubt. Without diversification of its power generation mix, Sudan must rely heavily on hydropower to meet domestic demand, and will be especially vulnerable to weather patterns such as a severe or sustained drought.


South Sudan

South Sudan has one of the lowest electrification rates in the world, with only 5% of its population having access to electricity in 2014, according to the latest estimates from the World Bank. Total electricity generation was 310 million kWh in 2015.50 Those connected to the power network experience frequent blackouts or forced load shedding, making citizens rely on standby generators to meet energy needs.51 In April 2017, the AfDB approved a supplemental loan of US $14.57 million for a project approved in 2013 that supported the state-owned utility, the South Sudan Electricity Corporation, to strengthen and expand the country’s electricity distribution networks.52 AfDB project documents state that the additional financing was needed because the original grant underestimated project costs.53


According to BMI Research, five hydropower projects have been identified as potential opportunities for development: Fula Rapids (42 MW), Grand Fula (890 MW), Shukkoli (230 MW), Lakki (410 MW), and Bedden (570 MW). However, construction has been delayed because of low investor confidence and a lack of funding.54

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“Lubricants Shelf” to Assess Engine Oil Market

Already, lubricant players have established their footholds here in Bangladesh, with international brands.

However, the situation is being tough as too many brands entered in this market. So, it is clear, the lubricants brands are struggling to sustain their market shares.

For this reason, we recommend an impression of “Lubricants shelf” to evaluate your brand visibility, which can a key indicator of the market shares of the existing brands. 

Every retailer shop has different display shelves and the sellers place different product cans for the end-users. By nature, the sellers have the sole control of those shelves for the preferred product cans.

The idea of “Lubricants shelf” may give the marketer an impression, how to penetrate in this competitive market. 

The well-known lubricants brands automatically seized the product shelves because of the user demand. But for the struggling brands, this idea can be a key identifier of the business strategy to take over other brands.

The key objective of this impression of “Lubricants shelf” is to create an overview of your brand positioning in this competitive market.

A discussion on Lubricants Shelves; from the evaluation perspective, a discussion ground has been created to solely represent this trade, as well as its other stakeholders.

Why “Lubricants shelf” is key to monitor engine oil market?

The lubricants shelves of the overall market have already placed more than 100 brands altogether and the number of brands is increasing day by day.

And the situation is being worsened while so many by name products are taking the different shelves of different clusters. This market has become more overstated in terms of brand names and local products.

You may argue with us; lubricants shelves have no more space to place your new brands. You might get surprised by hearing such a statement. For your information, it’s not a surprising one.

Regularly, lubricants retailers have to welcome the representatives of newly entered brands.

And, business Insiders has depicted this lubricants market as a silent trade with a lot of floating traders.

On an assumption, the annual domestic demand for lubricants oils is around 100 million litres, whereas base oil demand around 140 million litres.

However, the lack of market monitoring and the least reporting makes the lubricants trade unnoticeable to the public.

February, 20 2019
Your Weekly Update: 11 - 15 February 2019

Market Watch

Headline crude prices for the week beginning 11 February 2019 – Brent: US$61/b; WTI: US$52/b

  • Oil prices remains entrenched in their trading ranges, with OPEC’s attempt to control global crude supplies mitigated by increasing concerns over the health of the global economy
  • Warnings, including from The Bank of England, point to a global economic slowdown that could be ‘worse and longer-lasting than first thought’; one of the main variables in this forecast are the trade tensions between the US and China, which show no sign of being solved with President Trump saying he is open to delaying the current deadline of March 1 for trade talks
  • This poorer forecast for global oil demand has offset supply issues flaring up within OPEC, with Libya reporting ongoing fighting at the country’s largest oilfield while the current political crisis in Venezuela could see its crude output drop to 700,000 b/d by 2020
  • The looming new American sanctions on Venezuelan crude has already had concrete results, with US refiner Marathon Petroleum moving to replace Venezuelan crude with similar grades from the Middle East and Latin America
  • While Nicolas Maduro holds on to power, Venezuela’s opposition leader Juan Guaido has promised to scrap requirements that PDVSA keep a controlling stake in domestic oil joint ventures and boost oil production through an open economy when his government-in-power takes over
  • Despite OPEC’s attempts to stabilise crude prices, the US House has advanced the so-called NOPEC bill – which could subject the cartel to antitrust action – to a vote, with a similar bill currently being debated in the US Senate
  • The see-saw pattern in the US active rig count continues; after a net loss of 14 rigs last week, the Baker Hughes rig survey reported a gain of 7 new oil rigs and a loss of 3 gas rigs for a net gain of 4 rigs
  • While demand is a concern, global crude supply remains delicate enough to edge prices up, especially with Saudi Arabia going for deeper-than-expected cuts; this should push Brent up towards US$64/b and WTI towards US$55/b in trading this week


Headlines of the week

Upstream

  • Egypt is looking to introduce a new type of oil and gas contract to attract greater upstream investment into the country, aiming to be ‘less bureaucratic and more efficient’ with faster cost-recovery, ahead of a planned Red Sea bid round encompassing over a dozen concession sites
  • Lukoil has commenced on a new phase at the West Qurna-2 field in Iraq, with 57 production wells planned at the Mishrif and Yamama formation that could boost output by 80,000 boe/d to 480,000 boe/d in 2020
  • Aker BP has hit oil and natural gas flows at well 24/9-14 in the Froskelår Main prospect in the Alvheim area of the Norwergian Continental Shelf
  • Things continue to be rocky for crude producers in Canada’s Alberta province; production limits were increased last week after being previously slashed to curb a growing glut on news that crude storage levels dropped, but now face trouble being transported south as pipelines remain at capacity and crude-by-rail shipments face challenging economics

Midstream & Downstream

  • The Caribbean island of Curacao is now speaking with two new candidates to operate the 335 kb/d Isla refinery after its preferred bidder – said to be Saudi Aramco’s American arm Motiva Enterprises – withdrew from consideration to replace the current operatorship under PDVSA
  • America’s Delta Air Lines is now reportedly looking to sell its oil refinery in Pennsylvania outright, after attempts to sell a partial stake in the 185 kb/d plant failed to attract interest, largely due to its limited geographical position

Natural Gas/LNG

  • Total reports that it has made a new ‘significant’ gas condensate discovery offshore South Africa at the Brulpadda prospect in Block 11B/12B in the Outeniqua Basin, with the Brulpadda-deep well also reporting ‘successful’ flows of natural gas condensate
  • Italy’s Eni and Saudi Arabia’s SABIC have signed a new Joint Development Agreement to collaborate on developing technologies for gas-to-liquids and gas-to-chemicals applications
  • The Rovuma LNG project in Mozambique is charging ahead with development, with Eni looking to contract out subsea operations for the Mamba gas project by mid-March and ExxonMobil choosing its contractor for building the complex’s LNG trains by April
February, 15 2019
SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK

Forecast Highlights

Global liquid fuels

  • Brent crude oil spot prices averaged $59 per barrel (b) in January, up $2/b from December 2018 but $10/b lower than the average in January of last year. EIA forecasts Brent spot prices will average $61/b in 2019 and $62/b in 2020, compared with an average of $71/b in 2018. EIA expects that West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices will average $8/b lower than Brent prices in the first quarter of 2019 before the discount gradually falls to $4/b in the fourth quarter of 2019 and through 2020.
  • EIA estimates that U.S. crude oil production averaged 12.0 million barrels per day (b/d) in January, up 90,000 b/d from December. EIA forecasts U.S. crude oil production to average 12.4 million b/d in 2019 and 13.2 million b/d in 2020, with most of the growth coming from the Permian region of Texas and New Mexico.
  • Global liquid fuels inventories grew by an estimated 0.5 million b/d in 2018, and EIA expects they will grow by 0.4 million b/d in 2019 and by 0.6 million b/d in 2020.
  • U.S. crude oil and petroleum product net imports are estimated to have fallen from an average of 3.8 million b/d in 2017 to an average of 2.4 million b/d in 2018. EIA forecasts that net imports will continue to fall to an average of 0.9 million b/d in 2019 and to an average net export level of 0.3 million b/d in 2020. In the fourth quarter of 2020, EIA forecasts the United States will be a net exporter of crude oil and petroleum products by about 1.1 million b/d.

Natural gas

  • The Henry Hub natural gas spot price averaged $3.13/million British thermal units (MMBtu) in January, down 91 cents/MMBtu from December. Despite a cold snap in late January, average temperatures for the month were milder than normal in much of the country, which contributed to lower prices. EIA expects strong growth in U.S. natural gas production to put downward pressure on prices in 2019. EIA expects Henry Hub natural gas spot prices to average $2.83/MMBtu in 2019, down 32 cents/MMBtu from the 2018 average. NYMEX futures and options contract values for May 2019 delivery traded during the five-day period ending February 7, 2019, suggest a range of $2.15/MMBtu to $3.30/MMBtu encompasses the market expectation for May 2019 Henry Hub natural gas prices at the 95% confidence level.
  • EIA forecasts that dry natural gas production will average 90.2 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) in 2019, up 6.9 Bcf/d from 2018. EIA expects natural gas production will continue to rise in 2020 to an average of 92.1 Bcf/d.

Electricity, coal, renewables, and emissions

  • EIA expects the share of U.S. total utility-scale electricity generation from natural gas-fired power plants to rise from 35% in 2018 to 36% in 2019 and to 37% in 2020. EIA forecasts that the electricity generation share from coal will average 26% in 2019 and 24% in 2020, down from 28% in 2018. The nuclear share of generation was 19% in 2018 and EIA forecasts that it will stay near that level in 2019 and in 2020. The generation share of hydropower is forecast to average slightly less than 7% of total generation in 2019 and 2020, similar to last year. Wind, solar, and other nonhydropower renewables together provided about 10% of electricity generation in 2018. EIA expects them to provide 11% in 2019 and 13% in 2020.
  • EIA expects average U.S. solar generation will rise from 265,000 megawatthours per day (MWh/d) in 2018 to 301,000 MWh/d in 2019 (an increase of 14%) and to 358,000 MWh/d in 2020 (an increase of 19%). These forecasts of solar generation include large-scale facilities as well as small-scale distributed solar generators, primarily on residential and commercial buildings.
  • In 2019, EIA expects wind’s annual share of generation will exceed hydropower’s share for the first time. EIA forecasts that wind generation will rise from 756 MWh/d in 2018 to 859 MWh/d in 2019 (a share of 8%). Wind generation is further projected to rise to 964 MWh/d (a share of 9%) by 2020.
  • EIA estimates that U.S. coal production declined by 21 million short tons (MMst) (3%) in 2018, totaling 754 MMst. EIA expects further declines in coal production of 4% in 2019 and 6% in 2020 because of falling power sector consumption and declines in coal exports. Coal consumed for electricity generation declined by an estimated 4% (27 MMst) in 2018. EIA expects that lower electricity demand, lower natural gas prices, and further retirements of coal-fired capacity will reduce coal consumed for electricity generation by 8% in 2019 and by a further 6% in 2020. Coal exports, which increased by 20% (19 MMst) in 2018, decline by 13% and 8% in 2019 and 2020, respectively, in the forecast.
  • After rising by 2.8% in 2018, EIA forecasts that U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will decline by 1.3% in 2019 and by 0.5% in 2020. The 2018 increase largely reflects increased weather-related natural gas consumption because of additional heating needs during a colder winter and for additional electric generation to support more cooling during a warmer summer than in 2017. EIA expects emissions to decline in 2019 and 2020 because of forecasted temperatures that will return to near normal. Energy-related CO2 emissions are sensitive to changes in weather, economic growth, energy prices, and fuel mix.

U.S. residential electricity price

  • West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price
  • World liquid fuels production and consumption balance
  • U.S. natural gas prices
  • U.S. residential electricity price
  • West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price
February, 13 2019