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After five weeks of being whiplashed by financial market fears, crude reconnected with its own fundamentals over March 12-16, only to become locked in a narrow price band, with WTI anchored at $60/barrel and Brent at $65. Predictions of ballooning non-OPEC oil supplies were counter-balanced by reiterations of confidence in strong global oil demand growth this year, depriving the market of any incentive to either go long or short.
The limbo could prove to be short-lived. As the week came to a close, Iran and the fate of its nuclear deal had moved to the top of news headlines. The sudden departure of Rex Tillerson, a moderate on Iran, and his replacement as US secretary of state by the more hawkish CIA director Mike Pompeo, could precipitate a clash between the two countries over the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal. The fate of the Iran nuclear deal is now a cliffhanger and likely to inject a fear premium in crude over the coming weeks.
Meanwhile, anxiety over the possible outbreak of trade wars, especially between the US and China, as well as the US and its partners in the precarious North American Free Trade Agreement — Canada and Mexico — could continue to rattle the financial markets. The fears come on top of lingering uncertainty over the course of US inflation rates and monetary policy. The Federal Reserve is widely expected to raise interest rates by a quarter of a percentage point at its next meeting March 20-21.
Myriad concerns rippling through the financial markets since the start of February ultimately converge to hang a question-mark over the presumed strong and synchronous global economic growth this year. They have rattled equity markets across the world and are likely to continue buffeting crude as well. A deceleration in the global economic growth would not bode well for the health of oil demand.
The oil market’s focus this week was primarily on OECD inventory data and outlook for global oil supply and demand balances. The closely-watched monthly oil market reports from OPEC and the International Energy Agency released on Wednesday and Thursday respectively were remarkably similar in tone and almost evenly split between the bullish and bearish elements on the horizon. The weekly US stocks data also pulled market sentiment in opposite directions, showing a major build in crude inventories and a plunge in gasoline and distillate stocks for the week ended March 9.
The OPEC and IEA reports lent further credence to expectations of a shale renaissance in 2018, given their projections of US crude production vaulting by 1 million b/d or more this year, way higher than the growth recorded in 2017. The market is once again paying attention to the weekly US rig count data after mostly ignoring it through the latter half of last year, once the shale growth trajectory had become clear. The rig numbers are not a good proxy for US crude production rates, but a useful input for market participants continuously trying to assess or validate their assessment of shale’s growth.
Unfortunately, the rig count is also not telling a coherent story yet. Baker Hughes reported a drop of four in the number of oil rigs operating in the US in the week ended March 9 to a total of 796, reversing six successive weeks of increases, and leaving the market guessing on what the trend might be.
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Working natural gas inventories in the Lower 48 states totaled 3,519 billion cubic feet (Bcf) for the week ending October 11, 2019, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report (WNGSR). This is the first week that Lower 48 states’ working gas inventories have exceeded the previous five-year average since September 22, 2017. Weekly injections in three of the past four weeks each surpassed 100 Bcf, or about 27% more than typical injections for that time of year.
Working natural gas capacity at underground storage facilities helps market participants balance the supply and consumption of natural gas. Inventories in each of the five regions are based on varying commercial, risk management, and reliability goals.
When determining whether natural gas inventories are relatively high or low, EIA uses the average inventories for that same week in each of the previous five years. Relatively low inventories heading into winter months can put upward pressure on natural gas prices. Conversely, relatively high inventories can put downward pressure on natural gas prices.
This week’s inventory level ends a 106-week streak of lower-than-normal natural gas inventories. Natural gas inventories in the Lower 48 states entered the winter of 2017–18 lower than the previous average. Episodes of relatively cold temperatures in the winter of 2017–18—including a bomb cyclone—resulted in record withdrawals from storage, increasing the deficit to the five-year average.
In the subsequent refill season (typically April through October), sustained warmer-than-normal temperatures increased electricity demand for natural gas. Increased demand slowed natural gas storage injection activity through the summer and fall of 2018. By November 30, 2018, the deficit to the five-year average had grown to 725 Bcf. Inventories in that week were 20% lower than the previous five-year average for that time of year. Throughout the 2019 refill season, record levels of U.S. natural gas production led to relatively high injections of natural gas into storage and reduced the deficit to the previous five-year average.
The deficit was also decreased as last year’s low inventory levels are rolled into the previous five-year average. For this week in 2019, the preceding five-year average is about 124 Bcf lower than it was for the same week last year. Consequently, the gap has closed in part based on a lower five-year average.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report
The level of working natural gas inventories relative to the previous five-year average tends to be inversely correlated with natural gas prices. Front-month futures prices at the Henry Hub, the main price benchmark for natural gas in the United States, were as low as $1.67 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in early 2016. At about that same time, natural gas inventories were 874 Bcf more than the previous five-year average.
By the winter of 2018–19, natural gas front-month futures prices reached their highest level in several years. Natural gas inventories fell to 725 Bcf less than the previous five-year average on November 30, 2018. In recent weeks, increasing the Lower 48 states’ natural gas storage levels have contributed to lower natural gas futures prices.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report and front-month futures prices from New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)
Market Watch
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 14 October 2019 – Brent: US$59/b; WTI: US$53/b
Headlines of the week
Upstream
Midstream/Downstream
Natural Gas/LNG
Amid ongoing political unrest, Ecuador has chosen to withdraw from OPEC in January 2020. Citing a need to boost oil revenues by being ‘honest about its ability to endure further cuts’, Ecuador is prioritising crude production and welcoming new oil investment (free from production constraints) as President Lenin Moreno pursues more market-friendly economic policies. But his decisions have caused unrest; the removal of fuel subsidies – which effectively double domestic fuel prices – have triggered an ongoing widespread protests after 40 years of low prices. To balance its fiscal books, Ecuador’s priorities have changed.
The departure is symbolic. Ecuador’s production amounts to some 540,000 b/d of crude oil. It has historically exceeded its allocated quota within the wider OPEC supply deal, but given its smaller volumes, does not have a major impact on OPEC’s total output. The divorce is also not acrimonious, with Ecuador promising to continue supporting OPEC’s efforts to stabilise the oil market where it can.
This isn’t the first time, or the last time, that a country will quit OPEC. Ecuador itself has already done so once, withdrawing in December 1992. Back then, Quito cited fiscal problems, balking at the high membership fee – US$2 million per year – and that it needed to prioritise increasing production over output discipline. Ecuador rejoined in October 2007. Similar circumstances over supply constraints also prompted Gabon to withdraw in January 1995, returning only in July 2016. The likelihood of Ecuador returning is high, given this history, but there are also two OPEC members that have departed seemingly permanently.
The first is Indonesia, which exited OPEC in 2008 after 46 years of membership. Chronic mismanagement of its upstream resources had led Indonesia to become a net importer of crude oil since the early 2000s and therefore unable to meet its production quota. Indonesia did rejoin OPEC briefly in January 2016 after managing to (slightly) improve its crude balance, but was forced to withdraw once again in December 2016 when OPEC began requesting more comprehensive production cuts to stabilise prices. But while Indonesia may return, Qatar is likely gone permanently. Officially, Qatar exited OPEC in January 2019 after 48 years of continuous membership to focus on natural gas production, which dwarfs its crude output. Unofficially, geopolitical tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia – which has resulted in an ongoing blockade and boycott – contributed to the split.
The exit of Ecuador will not make much material difference to OPEC’s current goal of controlling supply to stabilise prices. With Saudi production back at full capacity – and showing the willingness to turn its taps on or off to control the market – gains in Ecuador’s crude production can be offset elsewhere. What matters is optics. The exit leaves the impression that OPEC’s power is weakening, limiting its ability to influence the market by controlling supply. There are also ongoing tensions brewing within OPEC, specifically between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The continued implosion of the Venezuelan economy is also an issue. OPEC will survive the exit of Ecuador; but if Iran or Venezuela choose to go, then it will face a full-blown existential crisis.
Current OPEC membership:
