Costs for utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) systems have declined in recent years—most sources show that system costs on a per-watt basis have fallen about 10% to 15% per year from 2010 through 2016. The level of those costs in certain years often varies across sources for reasons largely attributable to the way these costs are estimated.
To estimate capital costs of generating technologies, analysts use one of two common methods—total reported costs or aggregated component costs. Both approaches help explain the cost of utility-scale solar PV systems.
Reported costs: Using actual project data provides an empirical analysis that captures a large range of reported project costs in the market and accounts for the substantial variability in project design, location, and timing observed in the real world. Challenges with this approach include uncertainty about whether certain cost components are included in reported system costs, such as interconnection costs and the treatment of financing expense. Also, the data for each year reflect projects completed in that year, which do not necessarily reflect the costs of projects initiated in that year.
Component costs: The component cost approach provides more detail on the impact of changes in component-level technology and costs, which can be significant in a fast-moving market like solar PV. Such approaches typically represent either best-in-class or common-practice project criteria and do not necessarily capture the wide range of real-world project cost factors. Estimates that exclude financing expenses are called overnight estimates (i.e., as if the plant could be built instantly with no financing requirement). Component-based estimates may not reflect all potential costs to a system, such as developer profit margins.
EIA started collecting data on total capital costs directly from project owners as a part of the Form EIA-860 Annual Electric Generators Report in 2013. Because of respondent confidentiality, EIA only publishes capacity-weighted average values of new projects coming online each year and has published data for 2013, 2014, and 2015. This data series includes facilities with a nameplate capacity of at least one megawatt of alternating current. Respondents are asked to exclude government incentives and financing expenses from the reported costs.
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) begins with EIA’s capital cost dataset and gathers additional information from corporate financial reports, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) filings, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Section 1603 grant database. LBNL’s annual Utility-Scale Solar Report defines utility-scale solar facilities as those with at least five megawatts or more of alternating current, which cuts out some of the smaller plants included in EIA’s Electric Generator Report.
The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) publishes the Solar PV System Cost Benchmark report with estimates of total system costs based on the most up-to-date information on reported component costs and conversations with industry. These costs do not include additional net profit components, which are common in the marketplace. Also, NREL’s bottom-up approach models costs for a project sized at 100 megawatts of direct current, which is large enough to have realized some economies of scale relative to smaller systems.
EIA also projects future capital costs as part of the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO). Starting costs of solar PV come from contracted capital cost studies based on information on system design, configuration, and construction derived from actual or planned projects, using generic assumptions for labor and materials rates.
Although EIA does not update the capital cost study each year, in years where the report data are not updated, EIA extrapolates cost trends observed in the literature, including the sources noted above, and considers expected cost declines from learning-by-doing. For 2018, AEO2018 projects installed capital costs of $1.85 per watt (AC) for fixed-tilt PV systems and $2.11 per watt (AC) for single-axis tracking systems.
Principal contributor: Cara Marcy
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The Permian is in desperate need of pipelines. That much is true. There is so much shale liquids sloshing underneath the Permian formation in Texas and New Mexico, that even though it has already upended global crude market and turned the USA into the world’s largest crude producer, there is still so much of it trapped inland, unable to make the 800km journey to the Gulf Coast that would take them to the big wider world.
The stakes are high. Even though the US is poised to reach some 12 mmb/d of crude oil production next year – more than half of that coming from shale oil formations – it could be producing a lot more. This has already caused the Brent-WTI spread to widen to a constant US$10/b since mid-2018 – when the Permian’s pipeline bottlenecks first became critical – from an average of US$4/b prior to that. It is even more dramatic in the Permian itself, where crude is selling at a US$10-16/b discount to Houston WTI, with trends pointing to the spread going as wide as US$20/b soon. Estimates suggest that a record 3,722 wells were drilled in the Permian this year but never opened because the oil could not be brought to market. This is part of the reason why the US active rig count hasn’t increased as much as would have been expected when crude prices were trending towards US$80/b – there’s no point in drilling if you can’t sell.
Assistance is on the way. Between now and 2020, estimates suggest that some 2.6 mmb/d of pipeline capacity across several projects will come onstream, with an additional 1 mmb/d in the planning stages. Add this to the existing 3.1 mmb/d of takeaway capacity (and 300,000 b/d of local refining) and Permian shale oil output currently dammed away by a wall of fixed capacity could double in size when freed to make it to market.
And more pipelines keep getting announced. In the last two weeks, Jupiter Energy Group announced a 90-day open season seeking binding commitments for a planned 1 mmb/d, 1050km long Jupiter Pipeline – which could connect the Permian to all three of Texas’ deepwater ports, Houston, Corpus Christi and Brownsville. Plains All American is launching its 500,000 b/d Sunrise Pipeline, connecting the Permian to Cushing, Oklahoma. Wolf Midstream has also launched an open season, seeking interest for its 120,000 b/d Red Wolf Crude Connector branch, connecting to its existing terminal and infrastructure in Colorado City.
Current estimates suggest that Permian output numbered around 3.5 mmb/d in October. At maximum capacity, that’s still about 100,000 b/d of shale oil trapped inland. As planned pipelines come online over the next two years, that trickle could turn into a flood. Consider this. Even at the current maxing out of Permian infrastructure, the US is already on the cusp on 12 mmb/d crude production. By 2021, it could go as high as 15 mmb/d – crude prices, permitting, of course.
As recently reported in the WSJ; “For years, the companies behind the U.S. oil-and-gas boom, including Noble Energy Inc. and Whiting Petroleum Corp. have promised shareholders they have thousands of prospective wells they can drill profitably even at $40 a barrel. Some have even said they can generate returns on investment of 30%. But most shale drillers haven’t made much, if any, money at those prices. From 2012 to 2017, the 30 biggest shale producers lost more than $50 billion. Last year, when oil prices averaged about $50 a barrel, the group as a whole was barely in the black, with profits of about $1.7 billion, or roughly 1.3% of revenue, according to FactSet.”
The immense growth experienced in the Permian has consequences for the entire oil supply chain, from refining balances – shale oil is more suitable for lighter ends like gasoline, but the world is heading for a gasoline glut and is more interested in cracking gasoil for the IMO’s strict marine fuels sulphur levels coming up in 2020 – to geopolitics, by diminishing OPEC’s power and particularly Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer. For now, the walls keeping a Permian flood in are still standing. In two years, they won’t, with new pipeline infrastructure in place. And so the oil world has two years to prepare for the coming tsunami, but only if crude prices stay on course.
Recent Announced Permian Pipeline Projects
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 3 December 2018 – Brent: US$61/b; WTI: US$52/b
Headlines of the week
The engine oil market has grown up around 10 to 12% in the last three years because of various reasons, mostly because of the rise of automobiles.
According to the Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA), the number of registered petrol and diesel-powered vehicles is 3,663,189 units.
The number of automotive vehicles has increased by 2.5 times in the last eight years.
The demand for engine oils will rise keeping pace with the increasing automotive vehicles, with an expected 3% yearly growths.
Mostly, for this reason, the annual lubricant consumption raised over 14% growth for the last four years. Now its current demand is around 160 million tonnes.
The overall lubricants demand has increased also for the growth of the power sector, which has created a special market for industrial lubricants oil.
The lubricants oil market size for industries has doubled in the last five years due to the establishment of a number of power plants across the country.
The demand for industrial oil will continue to rise at least for the next 15 years, as the quick rental power plants need a huge quantity of lube oil to run.
The industries account for 30% of the total lubricant consumption; however, it is expected to take over 35% of the overall demand in the next 10 years.
Mobil is the market leader with 27% market share; however, market insiders say that around 70% market shares belong to various brands altogether, which is still undefined.
It is already flooded with many global and local brands.