EIA expects Brent prices will average $71 per barrel in 2018 before declining to $68 per barrel in 2019
In the June 2018 update of its Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts Brent crude oil prices will average $71 per barrel (b) in 2018 and $68/b in 2019. The new 2019 forecast price is $2/b higher than in the May STEO. The increase reflects global oil markets balances that EIA expects to be tighter than previously forecast because of lowered expected production growth from both the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the United States. Brent crude oil spot prices averaged $77/b in May, an increase of $5/b from April and the highest monthly average price since November 2014. EIA expects West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices will average almost $7/b lower than Brent prices in 2018 and $6/b lower than Brent prices in 2019 (Figure 1).
EIA expects that OPEC crude oil production will average 32.0 million b/d in 2018, a decrease of about 0.4 million b/d compared with 2017. Total OPEC crude oil output is expected to increase slightly, however, to an average of 32.1 million b/d in 2019, despite expected falling production in Venezuela and Iran, along with decreasing output in a number of other countries.
OPEC, Russia, and other non-OPEC countries will meet on June 22, 2018, to assess current oil market conditions associated with their existing crude oil production reductions. Current reductions are scheduled to continue through the end of 2018. Oil ministers from Saudi Arabia and Russia have announced that they will re-evaluate the production reduction agreement given accelerated output declines from Venezuela and uncertainty surrounding Iran’s production levels. In the June STEO, EIA assumes some supply increases from major oil producers in 2019. Depending on the outcome of the June 22 meeting, however, the magnitude of any supply response is uncertain. EIA currently forecasts global petroleum and other liquids inventories will increase by 210,000 b/d in 2019, which EIA expects will put modest downward pressure on crude oil prices in the second half of 2018 and in 2019.
EIA expects a decline in Iranian crude oil production and exports starting in November 2018, when many of the sanctions lifted in January 2016 are slated to be re-imposed. Iranian crude oil production is expected to fall by 0.2 million b/d in November 2018 compared with October and by an additional 0.5 million b/d in 2019.
The outlook for Venezuelan production is also lower than in the May STEO, with EIA now expecting larger declines in both 2018 and 2019 than previously forecasted. The seizure of state oil company PdVSA’s assets in the Caribbean by ConocoPhillips has diminished PdVSA’s ability to continue meeting its export obligations because it now must rely solely on domestic ports and ship-to-ship transfers to sustain crude oil exports. Venezuela’s domestic export infrastructure, however, is in disrepair and unable to accommodate the volume of exports previously handled out of its Caribbean facilities.
EIA expects that decreases in Iranian and Venezuelan production will be partially offset by increased production from Persian Gulf producers, most notably Saudi Arabia, which will likely increase production in an effort to offset Iranian production losses. Other sources of increasing production include Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, all of which have been restraining their crude oil output in compliance with the November 2016 OPEC/non-OPEC agreement on production cuts.
U.S. crude oil prices in both the Permian region and in Cushing, Oklahoma, traded at lower values relative to Brent in May, continuing the trend of constraints in transporting crude oil to the U.S. Gulf Coast for refining or for export, as discussed in the April and May STEOs. The Brent–WTI front-month futures price spread, in particular, widened to $11.43/b on June 7, the widest since February 2015. Although transportation constraints to the U.S. Gulf Coast are primarily affecting Permian Basin crude oils, the rapid increase in the Brent–WTI futures price spread in May and early June 2018 suggests some constraints are developing in crude oil transported from Cushing (where the WTI futures contract is delivered) to the Gulf Coast.
Because transportation options out of Cushing are limited, it remains uncertain how much the spread could narrow if Gulf Coast refiners increase refinery runs, which were lower than expected in May. In addition, U.S. crude oil exports are currently limited to higher-cost options which, unless port infrastructure buildout is expanded, will likely maintain a wide Brent–WTI spread. EIA is increasing its forecast of the Brent–WTI spot price spread for the second half of 2018 from $5.49/b to $7.67/b and for 2019 from $5.12/b to $5.79/b.
EIA estimates that U.S. crude oil production averaged 10.7 million b/d in May 2018, up 80,000 b/d from the April level. EIA projects that U.S. crude oil production will average 10.8 million b/d for full-year 2018, up from 9.4 million b/d in 2017, and will average 11.8 million b/d in 2019.
U.S. average regular gasoline and diesel prices decrease
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price decreased nearly 3 cents from last week to $2.91 per gallon on June 11, 2018, up 55 cents from the same time last year. East Coast prices decreased nearly four cents to $2.84 per gallon, Midwest prices decreased three cents to $2.82 per gallon, Gulf Coast prices decreased nearly three cents to $2.70 per gallon, and West Coast and Rocky Mountain prices each decreased less than a penny to $3.45 per gallon and $2.99 per gallon, respectively.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price decreased 2 cents from last week to $3.27 per gallon on June 11, 2018, 74 cents higher than a year ago. Midwest prices declined nearly three cents to $3.20 per gallon, while East Coast, Gulf Coast, West Coast, and Rocky Mountain prices each declined nearly two cents to $3.26 per gallon, $3.04 per gallon, $3.77 per gallon, and $3.34 per gallon, respectively.
Propane/propylene inventories rise
U.S. propane/propylene stocks increased by 3.7 million barrels last week to 50.8 million barrels as of June 8, 2018, 10.7 million barrels (17.4%) lower than the five-year average inventory level for this same time of year. Midwest, Gulf Coast, Rocky Mountain/West Coast, and East Coast inventories increased by 1.9 million barrels, 1.5 million barrels, 0.2 million barrels, and 0.1 million barrels, respectively. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.7% of total propane/propylene inventories.
Something interesting to share?
Join NrgEdge and create your own NrgBuzz today
The week started off ominously. Qatar, a member of OPEC since 1960, quit the organisation. Its reasoning made logical sense – Qatar produces very little crude, so to have a say in a cartel focused on crude was not in its interests, which lie in LNG – but it hinted at deep-seated tensions in OPEC that could undermine Saudi Arabia’s attempts to corral members. Qatar, under a Saudi-led blockade, was allied with Iran – and Saudi Arabia and Iran were not friends, to say the least. This, and other simmering divisions, coloured the picture as OPEC went into its last meeting for the year in Vienna.
Against all odds, OPEC and its NOPEC allies managed to come to an agreement. After a nervy start to the conference – where it looked like no consensus could be reached – OPEC+ announced that they would cut 1.2 mmb/d of crude oil production beginning January. Split between 800,000 b/d from OPEC members and 400,000 b/d from NOPEC, the supply deal contained a little bit of everything. It was sizable enough to placate the market (market analysts had predicted only a 800,000 b/d cut). It was not country-specific (beyond a casual mention by the Saudi Oil Minister that the Kingdom was aiming for a 500,000 b/d cut), a sly way of building in Iran’s natural decline in crude exports from American sanctions into the deal without having individual member commitments. And since the baseline for the output was October production levels, it represents pre-sanction Iranian volumes, which were 3.3 mmb/d according to OPEC – making the mathematics of the deal simpler.
Crude oil markets rallied in response. Brent climbed by 5%, breaking a long losing streak, as the market reacted to the move. But the deal doesn’t so much as solve the problem as it does kick the can further down the road. A review is scheduled for April; coincidentally (or not), American waivers granted to eight countries on the import of Iranian crude expire in May. By April, it should be clear whether those will continue, allowing OPEC+ to monitor the situation and the direction of Washington’s policy against Iran in a new American political environment post-midterm elections. If the waivers continue, then the deal might stick. If they don’t, then OPEC+ has time to react.
There are caveats as well. OPEC members, who are shouldering the bigger part of the burden, said there would be ‘special considerations’ for its members. Libya and Venezuela - both facing challenging production environments – received official exemptions from the new group-level quota. Nigeria, exempted in the last round, did not. Iran claims to have been given an exemption but OPEC says that Iran had agreed to a ‘symbolic cut’ – a situation of splitting hairs over language that ultimately have the same result. But more important will be adherence. The supply deals of the last 18 months have been unusual in the high adherence by OPEC members. Can it happen again this time? Russia – which is rumoured to be targeting a 228,000 b/d cut – has already said that it would take the country ‘months’ to get its production level down to the requested level. There might be similar inertia in other members of OPEC+. Meanwhile, American crude output is surging and there is a risk to OPEC+ that they will be displaced out of their established markets. For now, OPEC remains powerful enough to sway the market. How long it will remain that way?
Infographic: OPEC+ December Supply Deal
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 10 December 2018 – Brent: US$62/b; WTI: US$52/b
Headlines of the week
The Permian is in desperate need of pipelines. That much is true. There is so much shale liquids sloshing underneath the Permian formation in Texas and New Mexico, that even though it has already upended global crude market and turned the USA into the world’s largest crude producer, there is still so much of it trapped inland, unable to make the 800km journey to the Gulf Coast that would take them to the big wider world.
The stakes are high. Even though the US is poised to reach some 12 mmb/d of crude oil production next year – more than half of that coming from shale oil formations – it could be producing a lot more. This has already caused the Brent-WTI spread to widen to a constant US$10/b since mid-2018 – when the Permian’s pipeline bottlenecks first became critical – from an average of US$4/b prior to that. It is even more dramatic in the Permian itself, where crude is selling at a US$10-16/b discount to Houston WTI, with trends pointing to the spread going as wide as US$20/b soon. Estimates suggest that a record 3,722 wells were drilled in the Permian this year but never opened because the oil could not be brought to market. This is part of the reason why the US active rig count hasn’t increased as much as would have been expected when crude prices were trending towards US$80/b – there’s no point in drilling if you can’t sell.
Assistance is on the way. Between now and 2020, estimates suggest that some 2.6 mmb/d of pipeline capacity across several projects will come onstream, with an additional 1 mmb/d in the planning stages. Add this to the existing 3.1 mmb/d of takeaway capacity (and 300,000 b/d of local refining) and Permian shale oil output currently dammed away by a wall of fixed capacity could double in size when freed to make it to market.
And more pipelines keep getting announced. In the last two weeks, Jupiter Energy Group announced a 90-day open season seeking binding commitments for a planned 1 mmb/d, 1050km long Jupiter Pipeline – which could connect the Permian to all three of Texas’ deepwater ports, Houston, Corpus Christi and Brownsville. Plains All American is launching its 500,000 b/d Sunrise Pipeline, connecting the Permian to Cushing, Oklahoma. Wolf Midstream has also launched an open season, seeking interest for its 120,000 b/d Red Wolf Crude Connector branch, connecting to its existing terminal and infrastructure in Colorado City.
Current estimates suggest that Permian output numbered around 3.5 mmb/d in October. At maximum capacity, that’s still about 100,000 b/d of shale oil trapped inland. As planned pipelines come online over the next two years, that trickle could turn into a flood. Consider this. Even at the current maxing out of Permian infrastructure, the US is already on the cusp on 12 mmb/d crude production. By 2021, it could go as high as 15 mmb/d – crude prices, permitting, of course.
As recently reported in the WSJ; “For years, the companies behind the U.S. oil-and-gas boom, including Noble Energy Inc. and Whiting Petroleum Corp. have promised shareholders they have thousands of prospective wells they can drill profitably even at $40 a barrel. Some have even said they can generate returns on investment of 30%. But most shale drillers haven’t made much, if any, money at those prices. From 2012 to 2017, the 30 biggest shale producers lost more than $50 billion. Last year, when oil prices averaged about $50 a barrel, the group as a whole was barely in the black, with profits of about $1.7 billion, or roughly 1.3% of revenue, according to FactSet.”
The immense growth experienced in the Permian has consequences for the entire oil supply chain, from refining balances – shale oil is more suitable for lighter ends like gasoline, but the world is heading for a gasoline glut and is more interested in cracking gasoil for the IMO’s strict marine fuels sulphur levels coming up in 2020 – to geopolitics, by diminishing OPEC’s power and particularly Saudi Arabia’s role as a swing producer. For now, the walls keeping a Permian flood in are still standing. In two years, they won’t, with new pipeline infrastructure in place. And so the oil world has two years to prepare for the coming tsunami, but only if crude prices stay on course.
Recent Announced Permian Pipeline Projects