In the August 2018 update of its Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO), the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts Brent crude oil prices to average $73 per barrel (b) in the second half of 2018 and decline to an average of $71/b in 2019 (Figure 1). Competing upside and downside price risks are expected to play a large role in price formation during the forecast period. Upside price risks stem largely from the possibility of supply outages when both petroleum inventories and spare crude oil production capacity for members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are lower than average. Downside price risks stem largely from potentially reduced demand because economic growth and resulting crude oil demand could be lower than forecast.
Daily and monthly average crude oil prices could vary significantly from annual average forecasts because global economic developments and geopolitical events in the coming months have the potential to push oil prices higher or lower than the current STEO price forecast.
EIA forecasts total global liquid fuels inventories to decrease by 0.3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2018, followed by an increase of 0.3 million b/d in 2019 (Figure 2). Inventory changes of this magnitude should be considered mostly balanced, contributing to forecast Brent crude oil prices remaining between $70/b and $73/b from August 2018 through the end of 2019. However, the forecast for slight inventory increases in 2019 contributes to expectations of modest downward price pressure in 2019.
On the supply side, the combination of relatively low inventory and OPEC spare capacity levels elevates the risk of upward price movements if a supply disruption occurs or if forecast production growth does not materialize.
Changes in global petroleum inventories data are not collected directly, but are estimated based on forecasts for global production and consumption. However, inventory data for the United States and other countries within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are available and may provide insight into global supply. In terms of days of supply, OECD inventories are expected to remain less than the monthly average for the previous five years, so any outages could have a significant effect on crude oil prices (Figure 3).
In 2018 and in 2019, EIA expects OPEC spare crude oil production capacity to decrease from 2017 levels (Figure 4). Although spare capacity in 2016 was lower than that forecast for 2018 and 2019, OECD inventories were higher in 2016, as seen in Figure 3. OPEC spare production capacity is forecast to average 1.6 million b/d in 2018 and to fall to 1.3 million b/d in 2019, down from 2.1 million b/d in 2017 and lower than the 10-year (2008–17) average of 2.3 million b/d. With little spare capacity, risks on the supply side (including greater-than-forecast disruptions in Iran, Venezuela, or Libya) may have significant price impacts.
EIA forecasts OPEC’s petroleum and other liquids production to decrease from the 2017 level of 39.5 million b/d to 39.1 million b/d in 2018 and to 39.0 million b/d in 2019. The small decline in 2019 reflects crude oil production increases from some producers that nearly offset anticipated declines from other OPEC members.
Brent spot prices averaged more than $74/b in June 2018, up $10/b from December 2017. Price increases in 2018 have been largely driven by unplanned supply disruptions and the expected loss of some Iranian crude oil production by the end of the year because of renewed sanctions. The August 2018 STEO reflects the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the plan to reinstate sanctions on companies doing business with Iran. Sanctions will likely affect the Iranian oil sector, which would limit the country’s crude oil production and exports by the end of 2018. Uncertainty remains regarding the degree to which the U.S. sanctions will take Iranian crude oil off the market.
Future crude oil production in Venezuela and Libya and the magnitude of the production response from other OPEC members and Russia are also highly uncertain. Developments regarding these and other variables could influence prices in either direction.
Concerns about the pace of future economic and oil consumption growth have likely contributed to demand side uncertainty. The August STEO forecasts global demand growth for petroleum and other liquids to average 1.66 million b/d in 2018 and 1.57 million b/d in 2019, down from the July STEO forecast of 1.72 million b/d and 1.71 million b/d for 2018 and 2019, respectively.
U.S. average regular gasoline price increases, diesel price decreases
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price increased less than one cent from last week to remain at $2.85 per gallon on August 6, 2018, up 47 cents from the same time last year. Rocky Mountain and East Coast prices each rose over a penny to $2.92 per gallon and $2.80 per gallon, respectively, and Midwest prices increased less than one cent to $2.77 per gallon. West Coast and Gulf Coast prices each decreased less than one cent to $3.34 per gallon and $2.59 per gallon, respectively.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price decreased less than one cent from last week to $3.22 per gallon on August 6, 2018, 64 cents higher than year ago. Midwest prices fell nearly one cent to $3.15 per gallon, and West Coast, East Coast, and Gulf Coast prices each decreased less than a penny, remaining virtually unchanged at $3.72 per gallon, $3.22 per gallon, and $3.00 per gallon, respectively. Rocky Mountain prices were unchanged at $3.36 per gallon.
Propane/propylene inventories rise slightly
U.S. propane/propylene stocks increased by 0.1 million barrels last week to 66.4 million barrels as of August 3, 2018, 9.3 million barrels (12.2%) lower than the five-year (2013-2017) average inventory level for this same time of year. Gulf Coast inventories increased by 0.3 million barrels and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories rose slightly, remaining virtually unchanged. Midwest and East Coast inventories decreased by 0.2 million barrels and 0.1 million barrels, respectively. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 4.3% of total propane/propylene inventories.
For questions about This Week in Petroleum, contact the Petroleum Markets Team at 202-586-4522.
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According to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has the world’s 9th largest natural gas reserves (192 TCF of gas reserves). As at 2018, Nigeria exported over 1tcf of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to several countries. However domestically, we produce less than 4,000MW of power for over 180million people.
Think about this – imagine every Nigerian holding a 20W light bulb, that’s how much power we generate in Nigeria. In comparison, South Africa generates 42,000MW of power for a population of 57 million. We have the capacity to produce over 2 million Metric Tonnes of fertilizer (primarily urea) per year but we still import fertilizer. The Federal Government’s initiative to rejuvenate the agriculture sector is definitely the right thing to do for our economy, but fertilizer must be readily available to support the industry. Why do we import fertilizer when we have so much gas?
I could go on and on with these statistics, but you can see where I’m going with this so I won’t belabor the point. I will leave you with this mental image: imagine a man that lives with his family on the banks of a river that has fresh, clean water. Rather than collect and use this water directly from the river, he treks over 20km each day to buy bottled water from a company that collects the same water, bottles it and sells to him at a profit. This is the tragedy on Nigeria and it should make us all very sad.
Several indigenous companies like Nestoil were born and grown by the opportunities created by the local and international oil majors – NNPC and its subsidiaries – NGC, NAPIMS, Shell, Mobil, Agip, NDPHC. Nestoil’s main focus is the Engineering Procurement Construction and Commissioning of oil and gas pipelines and flowstations, essentially, infrastructure that supports upstream companies to produce and transport oil and natural gas, as well as and downstream companies to store and move their product. In our 28 years of doing business, we have built over 300km of pipelines of various sizes through the harshest terrain, ranging from dry land to seasonal swamp, to pure swamps, as well as some of the toughest and most volatile and hostile communities in Nigeria. I would be remiss if I do not use this opportunity to say a big thank you to those companies that gave us the opportunity to serve you. The over 2,000 direct staff and over 50,000 indirect staff we employ thank you. We are very grateful for the past opportunities given to us, and look forward to future opportunities that we can get.
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 15 July 2019 – Brent: US$66/b; WTI: US$59/b
Headlines of the week
Unplanned crude oil production outages for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averaged 2.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first half of 2019, the highest six-month average since the end of 2015. EIA estimates that in June, Iran alone accounted for more than 60% (1.7 million b/d) of all OPEC unplanned outages.
EIA differentiates among declines in production resulting from unplanned production outages, permanent losses of production capacity, and voluntary production cutbacks for OPEC members. Only the first of those categories is included in the historical unplanned production outage estimates that EIA publishes in its monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO).
Unplanned production outages include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflicts, political disputes, labor actions, natural disasters, and unplanned maintenance. Unplanned outages can be short-lived or last for a number of years, but as long as the production capacity is not lost, EIA tracks these disruptions as outages rather than lost capacity.
Loss of production capacity includes natural capacity declines and declines resulting from irreparable damage that are unlikely to return within one year. This lost capacity cannot contribute to global supply without significant investment and lead time.
Voluntary cutbacks are associated with OPEC production agreements and only apply to OPEC members. Voluntary cutbacks count toward the country’s spare capacity but are not counted as unplanned production outages.
EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity—which only applies to OPEC members adhering to OPEC production agreements—as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. EIA does not include unplanned crude oil production outages in its assessment of spare production capacity.
As an example, EIA considers Iranian production declines that result from U.S. sanctions to be unplanned production outages, making Iran a significant contributor to the total OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages. During the fourth quarter of 2015, before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became effective in January 2016, EIA estimated that an average 800,000 b/d of Iranian production was disrupted. In the first quarter of 2019, the first full quarter since U.S. sanctions on Iran were re-imposed in November 2018, Iranian disruptions averaged 1.2 million b/d.
Another long-term contributor to EIA’s estimate of OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages is the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Production halted there in 2014 because of a political dispute between the two countries. EIA attributes half of the PNZ’s estimated 500,000 b/d production capacity to each country.
In the July 2019 STEO, EIA only considered about 100,000 b/d of Venezuela’s 130,000 b/d production decline from January to February as an unplanned crude oil production outage. After a series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 and cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, EIA estimates that PdVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, could not restart the disrupted production because of deteriorating infrastructure, and the previously disrupted 100,000 b/d became lost capacity.