Chinese crude production peaked at some 4.3 mmb/d in 2015, capping off a long and steady rise that saw output rise from 3 mmb/d in 1996. But since then, output has fallen sharply. By 2017, the average output of Chinese fields was 3.8 mmb/d and by late 2018, production had fallen to 3.6 mmb/d. The issue is replenishment – the long and established Chinese oil fields in Bohai Bay are now way past their prime, and there have not been enough new fields joining the crowd to keep output at a steady level. Hopes that the American shale revolution could be repeated in inland China proved to be in vain, as geography stood in the way, and the world’s largest energy market is now more and more dependent on imports.
CNOOC plans to change that. After President Xi Jinping called for greater self-reliance and improving national security by boosting domestic reserves in August, the national upstream company CNOOC has now unveiled ambitious plans to boost capital spending with an eye to raise its production. Encompassing both domestic and international assets, CNOOC wants to boost its total capital budget by 14% to its highest level since 2014 to raise net production by 15%.
CNOOC’s focus will remain domestic, but international projects will assume greater importance as it aims to reduce its domestic share of total production from 65% to 63%. Within China, CNOOC will be looking at continuing shallow water exploration in the Bohai Bay and deepwater exploration in the Pearl River Mouth Basin, where it has recently signed strategic exploration deals in Areas A and Areas B. The integrated Huizhou 32-5/33-1 development has also started production, adding 19,200 b/d of output by 2020. It could move even further south, as China and The Philippines agreed to embark on joint exploration activities in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Opportunities exist where China and Vietnam have overlapping claims as well – but diplomatic relationships are more complicated there – and China is also continuing to use its muscle to claim purported oil-rich areas in the middle of the South China Sea around the Spratly Islands.
But while the domestic focus is aimed to meeting the Premier’s requests, it is internationally that the greater opportunities lie for CNOOC. Starting up this year will be the Egina oilfield in Nigeria, part of the OML130 block in which CNOOC has a 45% that includes the Akpo, Egina South and Preowei fields, with the Akpo producing 56,000 b/d last year. Promising assets in Uganda’s Lake Albert Basin, as well as Algeria, Gabon, Senegal and the Republic of Congo have also capped off a decade of growing investment into African upstream. Through its US$15.1 billion acquisition of Nexen in 2013, CNOOC has access to Canadian oil sands – which could make a comeback with the rise in crude prices – and it also has stakes in promising projects in Eagle Ford shale and deepwater Gulf of Mexico. But by far the best investment CNOOC has made is in Guyana, where it is a minority partner in ExxonMobil’s major discoveries in the Stabroek block – acquired when CNOOC decided to retreat from volatile Venezuela. With Guyanese production on track for 2020, CNOOC’s ambitious targets could be exceeded – and that’s good news for President Xi Jinping, who wants his state oil companies to grow from being domestic giants to international behemoths.
CNOOC Capital Expenditure Plans 2019-2020
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According to the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Nigeria has the world’s 9th largest natural gas reserves (192 TCF of gas reserves). As at 2018, Nigeria exported over 1tcf of gas as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to several countries. However domestically, we produce less than 4,000MW of power for over 180million people.
Think about this – imagine every Nigerian holding a 20W light bulb, that’s how much power we generate in Nigeria. In comparison, South Africa generates 42,000MW of power for a population of 57 million. We have the capacity to produce over 2 million Metric Tonnes of fertilizer (primarily urea) per year but we still import fertilizer. The Federal Government’s initiative to rejuvenate the agriculture sector is definitely the right thing to do for our economy, but fertilizer must be readily available to support the industry. Why do we import fertilizer when we have so much gas?
I could go on and on with these statistics, but you can see where I’m going with this so I won’t belabor the point. I will leave you with this mental image: imagine a man that lives with his family on the banks of a river that has fresh, clean water. Rather than collect and use this water directly from the river, he treks over 20km each day to buy bottled water from a company that collects the same water, bottles it and sells to him at a profit. This is the tragedy on Nigeria and it should make us all very sad.
Several indigenous companies like Nestoil were born and grown by the opportunities created by the local and international oil majors – NNPC and its subsidiaries – NGC, NAPIMS, Shell, Mobil, Agip, NDPHC. Nestoil’s main focus is the Engineering Procurement Construction and Commissioning of oil and gas pipelines and flowstations, essentially, infrastructure that supports upstream companies to produce and transport oil and natural gas, as well as and downstream companies to store and move their product. In our 28 years of doing business, we have built over 300km of pipelines of various sizes through the harshest terrain, ranging from dry land to seasonal swamp, to pure swamps, as well as some of the toughest and most volatile and hostile communities in Nigeria. I would be remiss if I do not use this opportunity to say a big thank you to those companies that gave us the opportunity to serve you. The over 2,000 direct staff and over 50,000 indirect staff we employ thank you. We are very grateful for the past opportunities given to us, and look forward to future opportunities that we can get.
Headline crude prices for the week beginning 15 July 2019 – Brent: US$66/b; WTI: US$59/b
Headlines of the week
Unplanned crude oil production outages for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) averaged 2.5 million barrels per day (b/d) in the first half of 2019, the highest six-month average since the end of 2015. EIA estimates that in June, Iran alone accounted for more than 60% (1.7 million b/d) of all OPEC unplanned outages.
EIA differentiates among declines in production resulting from unplanned production outages, permanent losses of production capacity, and voluntary production cutbacks for OPEC members. Only the first of those categories is included in the historical unplanned production outage estimates that EIA publishes in its monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO).
Unplanned production outages include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflicts, political disputes, labor actions, natural disasters, and unplanned maintenance. Unplanned outages can be short-lived or last for a number of years, but as long as the production capacity is not lost, EIA tracks these disruptions as outages rather than lost capacity.
Loss of production capacity includes natural capacity declines and declines resulting from irreparable damage that are unlikely to return within one year. This lost capacity cannot contribute to global supply without significant investment and lead time.
Voluntary cutbacks are associated with OPEC production agreements and only apply to OPEC members. Voluntary cutbacks count toward the country’s spare capacity but are not counted as unplanned production outages.
EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity—which only applies to OPEC members adhering to OPEC production agreements—as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. EIA does not include unplanned crude oil production outages in its assessment of spare production capacity.
As an example, EIA considers Iranian production declines that result from U.S. sanctions to be unplanned production outages, making Iran a significant contributor to the total OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages. During the fourth quarter of 2015, before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action became effective in January 2016, EIA estimated that an average 800,000 b/d of Iranian production was disrupted. In the first quarter of 2019, the first full quarter since U.S. sanctions on Iran were re-imposed in November 2018, Iranian disruptions averaged 1.2 million b/d.
Another long-term contributor to EIA’s estimate of OPEC unplanned crude oil production outages is the Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Production halted there in 2014 because of a political dispute between the two countries. EIA attributes half of the PNZ’s estimated 500,000 b/d production capacity to each country.
In the July 2019 STEO, EIA only considered about 100,000 b/d of Venezuela’s 130,000 b/d production decline from January to February as an unplanned crude oil production outage. After a series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 and cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, EIA estimates that PdVSA, Venezuela’s national oil company, could not restart the disrupted production because of deteriorating infrastructure, and the previously disrupted 100,000 b/d became lost capacity.