In March 2019, Venezuela's crude oil production (excluding condensate) averaged 840,000 barrels per day (b/d), down from 1.1 million b/d in February, according to estimates in the U.S. Energy Information Administration's (EIA) April 2019 Short-Term Energy Outlook(STEO, Figure 1). This average is the lowest level since January 2003, when a nationwide strike and civil unrest largely brought Venezuela's state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.'s (PdVSA), operations to a halt. Widespread power outages, mismanagement of the country's oil industry, and U.S. sanctions directed at Venezuela's energy sector and PdVSA have all contributed to the recent declines. Venezuela's production decreased by an average of 33,000 b/d each month in 2018, and the rate of decline accelerated to an average of over 135,000 b/d per month in the first quarter of 2019. The number of active oil rigs—an indicator of future oil production—also fell from nearly 70 rigs in the first quarter of 2016 to 24 rigs in the first quarter of 2019. The declines in Venezuelan production will have limited effects on the United States, as U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil have decreased over the last several years, with average 2018 imports the lowest since 1989. However, there may be upward pressure on the prices of other crude oils imported into the United States.
Venezuela's production is expected to continue decreasing in 2019 and declines may accelerate as sanctions-related deadlines approach. These deadlines include provisions that third-party entities that use the U.S. financial system must cease transactions with PdVSA by April 28 and that U.S. companies, including oil service companies, involved in the oil sector must cease operations in Venezuela by July 27. Venezuela's chronic shortage of workers across the industry and the departure of U.S. oilfield service companies will likely contribute to a further step-level decrease in production.
Additionally, U.S. sanctions, as outlined in the January 25, 2019, Executive Order 13857, immediately banned exporting petroleum products—including unfinished oils that are blended with Venezuela's heavy crude oil for processing—from the United States to Venezuela and required payments for PdVSA-owned petroleum and petroleum products to be placed into an escrow account inaccessible by the company. The imposition of these sanctions has already affected oil trade between the United States and Venezuela in both directions. Preliminary weekly estimates indicate a significant decline in U.S. crude oil imports from Venezuela in February and March, as without direct access to cash payments, PdVSA had little reason to export crude oil to the United States. India, China, and some European countries continued to take Venezuela's crude oil, according to data published by ClipperData Inc., while the destinations of some vessels carrying Venezuelan crude oil remain unknown (Figure 2). Venezuela is likely keeping some crude oil cargoes intended for exports in floating storage until it finds buyers for the cargoes.
A series of ongoing nationwide power outages in Venezuela that began on March 7 cut electricity to the country's oil-producing areas, likely damaging the reservoirs and associated infrastructure. In the Orinoco Oil Belt area, Venezuela produces extra-heavy crude oil that requires dilution with condensate or other light oils produced using complex processing units, or upgraders, to upgrade the crude oil before it is sent via pipeline to domestic refineries or export terminals. These upgraders were shut down in March during the power outages. If the crude or upgraded oil cannot flow as a result of a lack of power to the pumping infrastructure, the heavier molecules sink and form a tar-like layer in the pipelines that can hinder the flow from resuming even after the power outages are resolved. However, according to tanker tracking data, Venezuela's main export terminal at Puerto José was apparently able to load crude oil onto vessels between power outages, possibly indicating that the loaded crude oil was taken from onshore storage. For this reason, EIA estimates that Venezuela's production fell at a faster rate than its exports.
In 2019, Venezuela's crude oil production decline has resulted from a combination of disruptions and lost capacity. EIA differentiates among voluntary production reductions; unplanned production outages, or disruptions; and expected declines in production. For the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), voluntary cutbacks count toward spare capacity. EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices.
For all countries, involuntary disruptions do not count as spare capacity. Events that could cause a disruption include, but are not limited to, sanctions, armed conflict, labor actions, natural disasters, or unplanned maintenance. In contrast, EIA considers production capacity declines that result from irreparable damage to be lost capacity and not a disruption. EIA no longer counts the lost production because it is very unlikely that it could return within one year and add to global supplies.
Because the power outages in Venezuela resulted from a lack of maintenance of the electricity grid, associated crude oil production declines are considered lost production capacity resulting from mismanagement. As of the April 2019 STEO, EIA includes the portion of Venezuela's production decline that resulted from U.S. sanctions—approximately 100,000 b/d beginning in February—as a disruption (Figure 3). If sanctions persist, the country will likely be unable to restart the disrupted portion of production and the 100,000 b/d will become lost capacity. Although EIA does not forecast unplanned production outages, its forecast for OPEC production totals will reflect declines in Venezuelan production.
As Venezuelan crude oil has come off the global market and as other countries—including the United States—have produced more light, sweet crude oil, the price discount of heavy, sour crudes has narrowed. U.S. refineries are among the most complex in the world, making them well-suited for the physical properties of Venezuelan crude oil (with high sulfur content and heavier API gravity). Heavier, more sour crude oil is typically priced lower than other crude oils because of differences in crude oil quality. Mars—a medium, sour crude oil produced in the U.S. Federal Offshore Gulf of Mexico—traded at a five-year (2014–18) average discount to Light Louisiana Sweet (LLS) of $3.94 per barrel (b). The Mars-LLS discount has narrowed in 2019, averaging $0.62/b in March, and even reached parity on March 27 (Figure 4).
Venezuela's crude oil production is forecasted to continue to fall through at least the end of 2020, reflecting an expectation of further declines in crude oil production capacity. Although EIA does not publish forecasts for individual OPEC countries, it does publish total OPEC crude oil and other liquids production. Further disruptions to Venezuela's production beyond what is currently included would change this forecast.
U.S. average regular gasoline and diesel fuel prices increase
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price increased more than 1 cent from a week ago to $2.84 per gallon on April 22, more than 4 cents higher than the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price increased nearly 12 cents to $2.76 per gallon, the West Coast price rose 5 cents to $3.63 per gallon, and the East Coast price increased nearly 2 cents to $2.73 per gallon. The Midwest price decreased more than 1 cent to $2.72 per gallon, and the Gulf Coast price fell slightly, remaining virtually unchanged at $2.54 per gallon.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price increased nearly 3 cents to $3.15 per gallon on April 22, more than 1 cent higher than the same time last year. The Rocky Mountain price increased 6 cents to $3.14 per gallon, the West Coast price increased nearly 5 cents to $3.70 per gallon, the Midwest price increased more than 3 cents to $3.04 per gallon, and the East Coast and Gulf Coast prices increased 2 cents to $3.17 per gallon and $2.92 per gallon, respectively.
Propane/propylene inventories rise
U.S. propane/propylene stocks increased by 1.0 million barrels last week to 57.8 million barrels as of April 19, 2019, 10.6 million barrels (22.5%) greater than the five-year (2014-2018) average inventory levels for this same time of year. Midwest inventories increased by 0.6 million barrels, while East Coast and Gulf Coast inventories each increased by 0.3 million barrels. Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories decreased by 0.2 million barrels. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 10.4% of total propane/propylene inventories.
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A lot of complications arise when a government changes. Particularly if the new government comes in on a mandate to reverse alleged deficiencies and corruption of previous governments. This is amplified when significant natural resources are involved. It has happened in the past – when Iran nationalised its oil industry by kicking out BP – and it could happen again in the future – in Guyana where the promise of oil riches in the hands of foreign firms has already caused grumbles. And it is also happening right now in Papua New Guinea, as the new government led by Prime Minister James Marape took aim at the Papua LNG deal.
Negotiated by the previous government of Peter O’Neill, the state’s new position that is the current gas deal is ‘disadvantageous’ to country. A complex set of manoeuvres – accusing O’Neill of multiple levels of corruption – led to a proposed vote of no confidence and an eventual resignation. With the departure of O’Neill, public opinion on the Papua LNG project (as well as the PNG LNG project) switched from being viewed as a boon to the economy to one of unequal terms that would not compensate the nation fairly for its resources.
So, despite a previous assurance in early August that the new government of Papua New Guinea would stand by the previous gas deal agreed with the Papua LNG stakeholders in April, Marape sent a team led by the Minister of Petroleum Kerenga Kua to Singapore to renegotiate with the project’s lead operator Total.
As the meeting was announced, suggestions pointed to a hardline position by Papua New Guinea… that they could ‘walk away from a new deal’ if the new terms were not acceptable. In a statement, Kua stated that the negotiations could ‘work out well or even disastrously’. From Total’s part, CEO Patrick Pouyanne said in July that he expected the government to respect the gas deal while Oil Search stated that it was seeking ‘further clarity on the state’s position’. The gas deal covers framework of the Papua LNG project, which was scheduled to enter FEED phase this year with FID expected in 2020, drawing gas from the giant onshore Elk-Antelope fields ahead of planned first LNG by 2024. So, the stakes are high.
With both sides locked into their positions, reports from Singapore suggested that the negotiations broke down into a ‘Mexican standoff’. No grand new deal was announced, and it can therefore be inferred that no progress was made. There is a possibility that PNG could abandon the deal altogether and seek new partners under more favourable terms, but to do so would be a colossal waste of time, given that Papua LNG is nearing a decade in development. Total and ExxonMobil have already raised the possibility of legal moves if the deal is aborted, with compensation running into billions – billions that the PNG government will not have unless the Papua LNG project goes ahead.
But the implications of the deal or no-deal are even wider. The PNG state has already stated that it will look at the planned expansion of the PNG LNG project (led by ExxonMobil and Santos) next, which draws from the P’nyang field. Renegotiation of the current gas deals in PNG may have populist appeal but have serious implications – alienating two of the largest oil and gas supermajors and two of PNG’s largest foreign investors could lead to a monetary gap and a mood of distrust that PNG may be unable to ever fill. Hardline positions are a good starting position, but eventual moderation is required to ever strike a deal.
Papua LNG Factsheet:
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) earned almost $711 billion in net oil export revenues in 2018 (Figure 1). The estimate is up 29% from 2017, but about 40% lower than the record high of almost $1,200 billion in 2012. The 2018 earnings increase is mainly a result of higher crude oil prices. The Brent spot price rose from an annual average of $54 per barrel (b) in 2017 to $71/b in 2018. However, EIA forecasts annual OPEC net oil export revenues will decline to $593 billion in 2019 and to $556 billion in 2020. Decreasing OPEC revenues are primarily a result of decreasing production among a number of OPEC producers.
EIA estimates net oil export revenues based on oil production—including crude oil, condensate, and natural gas plant liquids—and total petroleum consumption estimates, as well as crude oil prices forecast in the August 2019 Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO). EIA’s net oil export revenues estimate assumes that exports are sold at prevailing spot prices and adjusts the prices for benchmark crude oils forecast in STEO (Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the average imported refiner crude oil acquisition cost) with historical price differentials among spot prices for the different OPEC crude oil types. For countries that export several different varieties of oil, EIA assumes that the proportion of total net oil exports represented by each variety is the same as the proportion of the total domestic production represented by that variety. For example, if Arab Medium represents 20% of total oil production in Saudi Arabia, the estimate assumes that Arab Medium also represents 20% of total net oil exports from Saudi Arabia.
Although OPEC net export earnings include estimated Iranian revenues, they are not adjusted for possible price discounts that trade press reports indicatedIran may have offered its customers after the United States announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018. The United States reinstated sanctions targeting Iranian oil exports in November 2018. Similarly, EIA does not adjust for Venezuelan crude oil exports to China or India for volumes that are sent for debt repayments to China and Russian energy company Rosneft, respectively, and thus do not generate cash revenue for Venezuela.
If the $711 billion in net oil export revenues by all of OPEC is divided by total population of its member countries and adjusted for inflation, then per capita net oil export revenues across OPEC totaled $1,416 in 2018, up 26% from 2017 (Figure 2). The increase in per capita revenues likely benefited member countries that rely heavily on oil sales to import goods, fund social programs, and otherwise support public services.
In addition to benefiting from higher prices, some OPEC member countries have increased export revenues by reducing domestic consumption and consequently exporting more. For example, Saudi Arabia has significantly reduced the amount of crude oil burned for power generation. Limiting crude oil burn allowed Saudi Arabia to export more crude oil and to maximize revenues.
Others have been able to charge higher premiums based on the quality of their crude oil streams. As the global slate of crude oil has changed with more light crude oil production (with higher API gravity), OPEC members have benefited from a narrowing price discount for their heavy crude oils, which are typically priced lower than lighter crude oils because of quality differences. Smaller discounts for OPEC members’ heavier crude streams contributed to higher spot prices for the OPEC crude oil basket price, which incorporates spot prices for the major crude oil streams from all OPEC members (Figure 3).
Despite the increase in annual average crude oil prices in 2018, OPEC revenues fell during the second half of 2018, mainly because of lower production and export volumes from Iran and Venezuela (Figure 4). EIA estimates that OPEC total petroleum liquids production decreased slightly in 2018 when increased production in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya could not offset significant declines in Iranian and Venezuelan production. Combined crude oil production in Iran and Venezuela fell by almost 800,000 barrels per day (b/d), or 14%, in 2018 and again by over 1.0 million b/d in the first seven months of 2019. Although Iranian net oil export revenues increased by 18% from 2017 to 2018, a year-to-date comparison indicates a significant decrease in revenues in 2019 (Figure 4). EIA estimates that from January to July 2018, Iran received about $40 billion in export revenues, compared with an estimated $17 billion from January to July 2019. Further decreases in OPEC members’ production beyond current EIA assumptions would further reduce EIA’s OPEC revenue estimates for 2019 and 2020.
U.S. average regular gasoline and diesel prices fall
The U.S. average regular gasoline retail price fell nearly 3 cents from the previous week to $2.60 per gallon on August 19, 22 cents lower than the same time last year. The Gulf Coast price fell nearly 6 cents to $2.27 per gallon, the East Coast price fell nearly 4 cents to $2.52 per gallon, the West Coast and Rocky Mountain prices each fell nearly 2 cents to $3.24 per gallon and $2.67 per gallon, respectively, and the Midwest price fell nearly 1 cent, remaining at $2.52 per gallon.
The U.S. average diesel fuel price fell nearly 2 cents to $2.99 per gallon on August 19, 21 cents lower than a year ago. The Midwest price fell over 2 cents to $2.90 per gallon, the West Coast and East Coast prices each fell nearly 2 cents to $3.56 per gallon and $3.02 per gallon, respectively, the Gulf Coast price fell more than 1 cent to $2.75 per gallon, and the Rocky Mountain price fell less than 1 cent, remaining at $2.94 per gallon.
Propane/propylene inventories rise
U.S. propane/propylene stocks increased by 4.0 million barrels last week to 90.5 million barrels as of August 16, 2019, 10.2 million barrels (12.7%) greater than the five-year (2014-18) average inventory levels for this same time of year. Gulf Coast, East Coast, Midwest, and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories increased by 2.0 million barrels, 1.0 million barrels, 0.7 million barrels, and 0.4 million barrels, respectively. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 4.4% of total propane/propylene inventories.
Student guardian visa subclass 590 allows you to stay in Australia as a guardian or custodian or relative of an overseas student who is pursuing an education course in Australia. With 590 student guardian visa, You can stay with your child to take care of him/her in Australia until the course complete. Your child age must below then 18th years old before applying for a student guardian visa 590. If you're a relative then you can stay with the child by submitting written permission of a child’s caretakers like a guardian or grandparents. If your child is older then eighteen years then to apply for visa subclass 590 you need to show that you have special emergency circumstances. You can apply for a 590 student guardian visa outside from Australia and acquire enrollment in alternative courses up to three months with a 590 visa. You will be authorized to take care more then one child if you have. You can do the other study or coach just for 3 months with this Student Guardian Visa Subclass 590.
Step By Step Process About 590 Visa
1.Before Applying for Visa
Meet Eligibility Criteria
• You must be a parent or grandparents or relative of a non-Australian child who is below 18th of age.
• If you want to apply from inside of Australia then you need to hold a substantive visa except for domestic worker, temporary work visa, transit visa, visitor visa, etc.
• If your another child who is below 18th and not coming to Australia with you then you need to give evidence that you have made welfare arrangement for the child.
• You have to account for your all healthcare expenses so make sure that medical insurance can only reduce your expenses.
• Your past immigration history must be credible like you must not have any visa cancellation history.
• Your intention should be genuine at the time of applying for student guardian visa 590 and it should be not against Australian culture and policies.
• If your family members are also applying with you then they also need to meet health policies of the Australian government
• Only a parent or grandparents or custodian or step parents of an overseas student visa 500 holder can apply for this student guardian visa subclass 590.
• If parents are not present due to any reason for looking after the visa subclass 500 holder student then any relative can apply for this 590 student guardian visa.
• You must be a guardian of an international student who must be below 18th of age except for exceptional circumstances.
• You have to give assurance to immigration authorities that you will be able to provide welfare.
• Your age must be above 21 years old before going to apply for a student guardian visa 590.
• You have to pay back any type of debt to the Australian government if you have.
• If you have another child aged 6 years old then you can bring him/her to Australia but if your child if older then 6 years then you need to show emergency condition to bring him/her to Australia.
•Provide character certificate and other national identities.
•Submit bank documents and salary slips to prove that you will be enough capable to give welfare to the student.
•Provide guardianship documents to prove your credibility to that child.
•Translate your non-English documents into English.
•Submit legal student guardianship form.
•Provide dependent under 6 documents if you bring your child who is under 6 years of age.
2. Processing Time And Cost Of This Visa
Visa subclass 590 cost starts from AUD 560. This visa 590 may proceed in 2 to 4 months. But in case you forget to submit any documents then you processing time of visa can be increased. Your visa application processing time can be increased if you provide incomplete information.
3. Apply For The Visa
You need to apply online for the 590 student guardian visa 6 weeks before the student’s course starts. At the time applying for the visa, you have to prove that you are genuine and legal applicant by submitting legal documents. If you submit illegal information to immigration authorities then they have the authority to cancel your visa application immediately. You and your relative which is listed in visa application will not able to get a visa for the next 10 years in case of any fraud by you. You should contact an experienced Immigration Agent Adelaide.
4. Conditions After You Have Applied For The Visa
• You are not allowed to do any type of work in Australia.
• You can study only for 3 months.
• With visa subclass 590 you can’t apply for another visa
• At the time of leaving Australia, you must have brought the student to your country.
• If you have another child who is below 6th years of age then you can bring him/her to Australia.
Get The Direction To Migration Agent Adelaide - ISA Migrations and Education Consultants.