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Just after the calendar officially turned over to 2020, reports from China suggested that a ‘new strain of viral pneumonia of an unknown cause’ had been detected in the city of Wuhan. As investigations began, normal life continued, which included the mass movement of several million people in Wuhan and the surrounding Hubei province in preparation for the Lunar New Year festivities. As the extent of pandemic became apparent, Wuhan was placed on virtual lockdown on 23 January; several other cities in Hubei – totalling almost 60 million people – followed suit. The World Health Organisation declare the Wuhan Coronavirus Outbreak a ‘global emergency’, as the first death outside of China was declared in the Philippines.
Traced to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan, a mutating melting pot for infections with the cramped presence of all forms of live animals, domesticated and wild – the Wuhan pandemic has now exceeded the 2003 SARS crisis in terms of infections, nearing 20,000 in over a month vs just over 8,000 over five months. Infections and deaths have been mainly localised to China, with over 26 countries have reported cases (vs 29 for SARS). The University of Hong Kong predicts that the cases in Wuhan alone could peak at 75,000. In response, China has curtailed outbound travel, other countries have closed their borders to visitors with recent travel to China and airlines have cancelled thousands of flights. Economic activity in Hubei – as well as other Chinese provinces – has slowed down, with orders to work from home and public/private transportation banned. Given that the Wuhan Coronavirus is only in its second months, it is very likely that its broader impact will be far greater than SARS.
But let’s focus on its impact on oil. Crude oil prices plunged as the impact of the Wuhan pandemic deepened. Much of this is sentiment-based, pricing in a long-lasting economic disruption on pessimistic expectations of the outbreak. How true is this prognosis? In 2003, a similar fall in crude prices accompanied the SARS crisis. However, this cannot be a true parallel as coordinated OPEC efforts reduced crude prices that had risen as the US invaded Iraq at the same time. In China, the SARS effects on oil demand was broadly localised to one quarter – Q2 – and then also localised to one product – jet fuel. LPG, naphtha, gasoline and gasoil demand were relatively unaffected, with annual growth of 8-12% for the year vs 1% for jet fuel (which had grown by 28% the previous year). Will the Wuhan pandemic follow this pattern?
There is reason to believe it won’t. Take jet fuel. In 2003, Chinese jet fuel demand was 160,000 b/d; in 2019, it has grown six-fold to 860,000 b/d. In 17 years, China has become increasingly more connected to the world by air. The SARS crisis affected an estimated 21% of jet fuel demand in 2003. Apply that to 2019 and over 180,000 b/d of jet fuel demand could be eliminated. With the government placing restrictions on domestic and international air travel in China – something that was only implemented partially during SARS – the effect could be even higher. There is also global jet fuel demand to consider. As major airlines scale back or even cancel all flights to China, it will be tough times depending on how long the pandemic lasts. Refining margins for jet fuel in Asia are now at their lowest level in 4 years.
Other fuel products could be affected. Unlike SARS, China been praised for its speedy response to the pandemic – including extended civil lockdowns, activity shutdowns and extending official holiday periods – but that has curtailed tourist activity, transport movements and manufacturing operations. Gasoline and gasoil, in particular, will be impacted by this. Against a backdrop of already-decelerating oil and gas demand, Standard Chartered estimates that the Wuhan pandemic could reduce oil demand growth in 2020 from 1 mmb/d to 900,000 b/d – a 10% fall. A lot will depend on how soon and how well the pandemic can be contained. This new pandemic might not be as fatal as SARS thus far, but its effect on oil demand could be graver.
SARS vs Wuhan Coronavirus:
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The constant domestic fighting in Libya – a civil war, to call a spade a spade, has taken a toll on the once-prolific oil production in the North African country. After nearly a decade of turmoil, it appears now that the violent clash between the UN-recognised government in Tripoli and the upstart insurgent Libyan National Army (LNA) forces could be ameliorating into something less destructive with the announcement of a pact between the two sides that would to some normalisation of oil production and exports.
A quick recap. Since the 2011 uprising that ended the rule of dictator Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has been in a state of perpetual turmoil. Led by General Khalifa Haftar and the remnants of loyalists that fought under Gaddafi’s full-green flag, the Libyan National Army stands in direct opposition to the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) that was formed in 2015. Caught between the two sides are the Libyan people and Libya’s oilfields. Access to key oilfields and key port facilities has changed hands constantly over the past few years, resulting in a start-stop rhythm that has sapped productivity and, more than once, forced Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to issue force majeure on its exports. Libya’s largest producing field, El Sharara, has had to stop production because of Haftar’s militia aggression no fewer than four times in the past four years. At one point, all seven of Libya’s oil ports – including Zawiyah (350 kb/d), Es Sider (360 kb/d) and Ras Lanuf (230 kb/d) were blockaded as pipelines ran dry. For a country that used to produce an average of 1.2 mmb/d of crude oil, currently output stands at only 80,000 b/d and exports considerably less. Gaddafi might have been an abhorrent strongman, but political stability can have its pros.
This mutually-destructive impasse, economically, at least might be lifted, at least partially, if the GNA and LNA follow through with their agreement to let Libyan oil flow again. The deal, brokered in Moscow between the warlord Haftar and Vice President of the Libyan Presidential Council Ahmed Maiteeq calls for the ‘unrestrained’ resumption of crude oil production that has been at a near standstill since January 2020. The caveat because there always is one, is that Haftar demanded that oil revenues be ‘distributed fairly’ in order to lift the blockade he has initiated across most of the country’s upstream infrastructure.
Shortly after the announcement of the deal, the NOC announced that it would kick off restarting oil production and exports, lifting an 8-month force majeure situation, but only at ‘secure terminals and facilities’. ‘Secure’ in this cases means facilities and fields where NOC has full control, but will exclude areas and assets that the LNA rebels still have control. That’s a significant limitation, since the LNA, which includes support from local tribal groups and Russian mercenaries still controls key oilfields and terminals. But it is also a softening from the NOC, which had previously stated that it would only return to operations when all rebels had left all facilities, citing safety of its staff.
If the deal moves forward, it would certainly be an improvement to the major economic crisis faced by Libya, where cash flow has dried up and basic utilities face severe cutbacks. But it is still an ‘if’. Many within the GNA sphere are critical of the deal struck by Maiteeq, claiming that it did not involve the consultation or input of his allies. The current GNA leader, Prime Minister Fayyaz al Sarraj is also stepping down at the end of October, ushering in another political sea change that could affect the deal. Haftar is a mercurial beast, so predictions are difficult, but what is certain is that depriving a country of its chief moneymaker is a recipe for disaster on all sides. Which is why the deal will probably go ahead.
Which is bad news for the OPEC+ club. Because of its precarious situation, Libya has been exempt for the current OPEC+ supply deal. Even the best case scenarios within OPEC+ had factored out Libya, given the severe uncertainty of the situation there. But if the deal goes through and holds, it could potentially add a significant amount of restored crude supply to global markets at a time when OPEC+ itself is struggling to manage the quotas within its own, from recalcitrant members like Iraq to surprising flouters like the UAE.
Mathematically at least, the ceiling for restored Libyan production is likely in the 300-400,000 b/d range, given that Haftar is still in control of the main fields and ports. That does not seem like much, but it will give cause for dissent within OPEC on the exemption of Libya from the supply deal. Libya will resist being roped into the supply deal, and it has justification to do so. But freeing those Libyan volumes into a world market that is already suffering from oversupply and weak prices will be undermining in nature. The equation has changed, and the Libyan situation can no longer be taken for granted.
Market Outlook:
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According to 2018 data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) for newly constructed utility-scale electric generators in the United States, annual capacity-weighted average construction costs for solar photovoltaic systems and onshore wind turbines have continued to decrease. Natural gas generator costs also decreased slightly in 2018.
From 2013 to 2018, costs for solar fell 50%, costs for wind fell 27%, and costs for natural gas fell 13%. Together, these three generation technologies accounted for more than 98% of total capacity added to the electricity grid in the United States in 2018. Investment in U.S. electric-generating capacity in 2018 increased by 9.3% from 2017, driven by natural gas capacity additions.
Solar
The average construction cost for solar photovoltaic generators is higher than wind and natural gas generators on a dollar-per-kilowatt basis, although the gap is narrowing as the cost of solar falls rapidly. From 2017 to 2018, the average construction cost of solar in the United States fell 21% to $1,848 per kilowatt (kW). The decrease was driven by falling costs for crystalline silicon fixed-tilt panels, which were at their lowest average construction cost of $1,767 per kW in 2018.
Crystalline silicon fixed-tilt panels—which accounted for more than one-third of the solar capacity added in the United States in 2018, at 1.7 gigawatts (GW)—had the second-highest share of solar capacity additions by technology. Crystalline silicon axis-based tracking panels had the highest share, with 2.0 GW (41% of total solar capacity additions) of added generating capacity at an average cost of $1,834 per kW.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Generator Construction Costs and Annual Electric Generator Inventory
Wind
Total U.S. wind capacity additions increased 18% from 2017 to 2018 as the average construction cost for wind turbines dropped 16% to $1,382 per kW. All wind farm size classes had lower average construction costs in 2018. The largest decreases were at wind farms with 1 megawatt (MW) to 25 MW of capacity; construction costs at these farms decreased by 22.6% to $1,790 per kW.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Generator Construction Costs and Annual Electric Generator Inventory
Natural gas
Compared with other generation technologies, natural gas technologies received the highest U.S. investment in 2018, accounting for 46% of total capacity additions for all energy sources. Growth in natural gas electric-generating capacity was led by significant additions in new capacity from combined-cycle facilities, which almost doubled the previous year’s additions for that technology. Combined-cycle technology construction costs dropped by 4% in 2018 to $858 per kW.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Generator Construction Costs and Annual Electric Generator Inventory
Fossil fuels, or energy sources formed in the Earth’s crust from decayed organic material, including petroleum, natural gas, and coal, continue to account for the largest share of energy production and consumption in the United States. In 2019, 80% of domestic energy production was from fossil fuels, and 80% of domestic energy consumption originated from fossil fuels.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes the U.S. total energy flow diagram to visualize U.S. energy from primary energy supply (production and imports) to disposition (consumption, exports, and net stock additions). In this diagram, losses that take place when primary energy sources are converted into electricity are allocated proportionally to the end-use sectors. The result is a visualization that associates the primary energy consumed to generate electricity with the end-use sectors of the retail electricity sales customers, even though the amount of electric energy end users directly consumed was significantly less.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review
The share of U.S. total energy production from fossil fuels peaked in 1966 at 93%. Total fossil fuel production has continued to rise, but production has also risen for non-fossil fuel sources such as nuclear power and renewables. As a result, fossil fuels have accounted for about 80% of U.S. energy production in the past decade.
Since 2008, U.S. production of crude oil, dry natural gas, and natural gas plant liquids (NGPL) has increased by 15 quadrillion British thermal units (quads), 14 quads, and 4 quads, respectively. These increases have more than offset decreasing coal production, which has fallen 10 quads since its peak in 2008.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review
In 2019, U.S. energy production exceeded energy consumption for the first time since 1957, and U.S. energy exports exceeded energy imports for the first time since 1952. U.S. energy net imports as a share of consumption peaked in 2005 at 30%. Although energy net imports fell below zero in 2019, many regions of the United States still import significant amounts of energy.
Most U.S. energy trade is from petroleum (crude oil and petroleum products), which accounted for 69% of energy exports and 86% of energy imports in 2019. Much of the imported crude oil is processed by U.S. refineries and is then exported as petroleum products. Petroleum products accounted for 42% of total U.S. energy exports in 2019.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review
The share of U.S. total energy consumption that originated from fossil fuels has fallen from its peak of 94% in 1966 to 80% in 2019. The total amount of fossil fuels consumed in the United States has also fallen from its peak of 86 quads in 2007. Since then, coal consumption has decreased by 11 quads. In 2019, renewable energy consumption in the United States surpassed coal consumption for the first time. The decrease in coal consumption, along with a 3-quad decrease in petroleum consumption, more than offset an 8-quad increase in natural gas consumption.
EIA previously published articles explaining the energy flows of petroleum, natural gas, coal, and electricity. More information about total energy consumption, production, trade, and emissions is available in EIA’s Monthly Energy Review.
Principal contributor: Bill Sanchez
